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Preface 
David J. Glover 
International Development Research Centre 
Ottawa, Canada 
The Crisis in African Agriculture 
In recent years, agricultural production in Af-
rica has deteriorated dramatically. Per capita food 
production has declined in most countries over the 
last decade while famine has devastated many re-
gions. In addition, earnings from agricultural ex-
ports have failed to provide the foreign exchange 
needed to finance essential imports and repay exter-
nal debts. In short, the lack of dynamism in the 
agricultural sector has retarded economic develop-
ment and permitted human suffering on a tragic 
scale. · 
The magnitude of the problem and the need to 
devise solutions are by now widely recognized. The 
role of research in suggesting those solutions is also 
widely accepted. Policy reform, particularly with 
respect to agricultural pricing, is frequently recom-
mended, though little firm data is available on the 
aggregate supply response of African producers. 
While it is clear that farmers will respond to favour-
able prices for individual commodities, such pro-
duction increases may simply represent a diversion 
of effort from other crops. New technologies may 
provide the means to increase aggregate supply, but 
so far the soils and climate of Africa have made the 
development of such technologies extremely diffi-
cult Such problems indicate the need for a redou-
bling of research efforts on both policy and technol-
ogy development 
Research on these two aspects is necessary but 
insufficient, however. Unless price signals and new 
technologies are effectively transmitted to produc-
ers, they will not have the desired effects. For 
example, high output prices may not be attractive if 
they are extremely volatile. Low fertilizer prices 
may not be effective if the inputs ai:rive too late for 
timely application or if farmers must travel long 
distances to obtain them. New technologies will not 
be adopted if farmers are not aware of them or if 
they must fully bear the risks of experimentation. In 
many cases, governments have attempted to inter-
vene in these areas, but without consistent success. 
Crop insurance has suffered from unsustainably 
high administrative costs and the "moral hazard" 
problem; agricultural extension has suffered from a 
lack of suitable incentives to extensionists. The 
design of altemati ve institutional frameworks could 
significantly enhance the effectiveness of poflky 
reform and technological innovation in promoting 
agricultural growth; to date, however, this third 
necessary condition for development has received 
less attention. 
Contract Farming as an 
Institutional Framework 
One of the most promising institutional frame-
works for delivering price incentives, technology 
and other agricultural inputs is contract farming. 
This system, under various names and in different 
forms (satellite farming, nucleus estates, outgrow er 
schemes), involves a contractual relationship be-
tween farmers and a central processing or exporting 
unit. This unit can be a private firm, a public agency 
or a joint venture of several types; the term "firm" 
is used here for simplicity. In contract farming, a 
firm purchas_es produce from local farmers-which 
can supplement pr substitute for company produc-
tion. The terms of the purchase are arranged in 
advance through contracts, the exact nature of which 
varies considerably from case to case. Contracts are 
generally signed at planting time and specify how 
much produce thecompanywill buy and what price 
it will pay for it. Often the firm provides credit, 
inputs, farm machinery rentals and technical ad-
vice, and it always retains theright to reject substan-
d3rd produce. 
Contracting is most commonly practised by 
food processing firms. Since their processing plants 
have high fixed costs, these firms have an interest in 
keeping raw material inflows at a steady level close 
to plant capacity. Relying on open market purchase 
is unlikely to achieve this. Contracts, on the other 
hand, can specify planting dates (and thus, indi-
rectly, delivery dates) as well as total quantities to · 
be delivered. The contraet reduces much of the 
uncertainty that would exist if the company simply 
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bought crops on the open market, and gives it some 
control over the production process (for example, 
over the variety grown). In addition, the company 
does not have to invest in land, hire labour or 
manage large-scale farming operations which may 
tax the managerial capacity and technical expertise 
of a primarily industrial firm. There is no reason, of 
course, that the firm cannot use more than one 
method of obtaining supplies, and some firms have 
company farms and open market purchases in 
addition to contract growers. 
The contract also provides certain advantages 
for the grower. He or she has an assured market, 
access to the company's services and easier access 
to credit. Even in cases when the firm itself does not 
provide loans to its growers, banks will generally 
accept a contract as collateral. In fact, the credit-
facilitating aspectofthecontractis often the farmer's 
principal motive for signing up. 
Contract farming and outgrower schemes have 
become widespread in Africa and other parts of the 
developing world over the last ten to twenty years. 
Of particular importance are the schemes financed 
in whole or in part by the Commonwealth Develop-
ment Corporation (CDC). These frequently involve 
both government agencies and private firms, the 
latter often receiving management or technical 
assistance contracts. A CDC/World Bank-financed 
tea scheme in Kenya1 has been widely publicized 
and discussed as a promising model for commod-
ity-focused projects. The US Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) has financed many 
schemes in Latin America and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) has been active in this area in 
Asia. Private firms, foreign and domestic, have also 
made equity investments not connected with donor 
agencies. Local governments have participated in 
many of the schemes and in some cases govern-
. ments have identified them as important elements 
in their rural development plans. 
The reasons for this interest are fairly clear. 
Developing . country governments are concerned 
about foreign ownership ofland and the "enclave" 
nature of plantations, with their weak linkages to 
the rest of the economy. Contract farming seems to 
provide greater local involvement Donor agencies 
see contract farming as a way of channeling re-
sources to smallholders, compatible with a greater 
role for the private sector. More specifically, the 
system is attractive as a way of providing small-
2 
holders with the services they need in order to 
compete with large commercial growers: credit, 
technical assistance, inputs, quality control and 
marketing. Finally, private finns may see the sys-
tem as a way of shedding risk, avoiding expropria-
tion, attracting aid funds and establishing good 
relations with government. This convergence of 
interests has led to a noticeable expansion of 
interest and activity in this area in recent years. 
Evidence on which to base these high expecta- · 
lions is far from solid, however. There have been 
few rigorous empirical studies that would justify 
contract farming as the panacea some claim it to be. 2 
Furthermore, insufficient attention has been paid to 
the possible problems contract farming may pose 
for smallholders or to its possible limitations. 
Contract farming generally involves some form 
of monopsony, in which a single firm deals with a 
multitude of usually unorganized farmers. This can 
lead to an imbalance in bargaining·power and in the 
distribution of benefits among the actors involved. 
Contract farming schemes have generally concen-
trated on the production of relatively high-value 
commodities for export, rather than basic foods for 
local consumption. Public outgrower schemes like 
the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) 
have provided effective technical assistance to 
growers, but have counted on very high ratios of 
extensionists to farmers to do so. Co-ordinating the 
delivery of services and produce involving a large 
number of small-scale farmers is also extremely 
management-intensive, raising questions about the 
replicability of such schemes. Finally, many out-
grower projects in Africa began as settlement 
schemes, whose relationship with traditional tenure 
systems has frequently been.problematic. 
The Special Issue 
This special issue of the Eastern Africa Eco-
nomic Review is theresultof acomparativeresearch 
programme carried out in seven countries in East 
and Southern Africa between 1986 and 1988. The 
programme responded to the perceived gap in the 
literature and consisted of case studies of some 
eighteen contract farming and outgrower schemes 
in the region. The papers in this volume were 
presented at a conference held in Harare, Zim-
babwe in October 1988 attended by academics, 
policy-makers, investors and project managers. 
Preface 





















b. Such as fruits, vegetables, oilseeds and pineapple. 
The purpose of the programme was to identify 
those factor8 which have led to different outcomes 
in terms of grower welfare. Existing research in 
Africa and elsewhere indicated a wide diversity of 
experiences, from cases in which farmers have 
benefited substantially in terms of income and 
improved.farming skills to those in which growers 
appear to have been severely exploited by firms. 
The reasons behind the variations were unclear, 
however. An underlying assumption of the research 
programme was that three factors are of paramount 
importance: 
the nature of the crop and the market in which 
it is sold 
the specific form which contract farming takes 
(e.g.", contract terms, the involvement of grow-
ers' organizations, the participation of private/ 
public/donor agencies) 
the policy context iri which the scheme is situ-
ated 
The of cases selected for study was 
made in such a way that each of these variables 
could be held constant and the factors which deter-
mine different outcomeidentified. The cases de-
scribed in these papers are shown in Table 1. 
The papers highlight the wide vanety of organ-
izational forms which contract farming and out-










variations in form and in the social and policy 
context in which the schemes operate have at times 
made comparative analysis difficult. It has also 
been difficult to summarize the wealth of detailed 
information available on each scheme in these short 
papers; the reader is referred to more extensive 
country studies available from the authors for more 
detail. In spite of these shortcomings, we believe 
the papers fill an important gap in the literature; we 
hope that they are useful in. their own right and will 
also serve to stimulate further interest in this phe-
nomenon, in Africa and elsewhere. 
The authors would like to express their appre-
ciation to the many people whose support and 
advice were instrumental in the success of the 
project. These include the farmers, project manag-
ers and policy-makers who generously contributed 
their time in the research process; the scholars from 
outside the region who offered the benefit of their 
experience in preparatory meetings; and all those 
involved in the preparation of the conference and 
this special issue of the Review, The financial 
support of the International Development Research 
Centre is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents results of five case studies of smallholder outgrower schemes in Kenya 
based on primary and secondary data. Basic description, performance and impact, and 
problems, constraints and prospects for a scheme are presented in each case study. None of the 
schemes examined was an unqualified success or without problems, constraints and prospects. 
Introduction 
Definition and forms of contract 
farming 
Contract farriling is a production system where 
smallholders or large-scale farmers (owner-culti-
vators) enter into a formal or informal production 
and sale agreement (contract) with agro-industrial 
corporations. The contract often specifies that tech-
nological know-how and various outgrowers' agri-
cultural support services will be provided to the 
farmers including the inputs, credit, machinery 
rentals, extension services, and general infrastruc-
ture. The contract also includes provisions regard-
ing terms of sale of output; distribution of produc-
tion and marketing risks; maintaining price levels; 
and mechanisms for arbitrating breach or termina-
tion of contract by either party. Existing large-scale 
smallholder contract farming schemes tend to be 
commodity-specific. 
Ownership of the corporations may be wholly 
public, wholly private or joint public and private, 
and they are often set up with concessional funding 
from international development agencies. In mixed 
economies, both public and private contract farm-
ing schemes exist. Public contract farming schemes 
dominate the smallholder agricultural sub-sectors 
of many developing countries. These schemes 
comprise a smallholder service, small-scale farmer 
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settlement and nucleus estate/smallholder outgrower 
schemes. 
The main component of the service schemes is 
an authority to encourage and enable smallholders 
to grow a particular crop through providing effi-
cient support services and inputs. In the small-
farmers: settlement schemes, small-scale faµmers 
move or are moved to holdings allocated for them 
in a discrete settlement area, which may be newly 
developed or may be an acquired plantation. They 
produce crops which are marketed through a central 
settlement authority which also provides other 
support services including extension and research. 
In the nucleus estate/smallholder outgrower 
schemes, smallholders are encouraged to grow a 
particular crop under contract to supplement output 
from a nucleus estate. The nucleus estate of a 
scheme authority or firm then provides the farmers 
with a variety of support services. 
Contract farming schemes in Kenya 
Contract farm,ing is a post-independence phe-
nomenon in Kenya. At present the country is char-
acterized by both large-scale and smallholder con-
farming schemes. Medium to large-scale 
schemes are found for poultry (BAT Ltd.), malting 
barley (Kenya Breweries Ltd.), sunflower and rape 
seed (Oil Crop Development Ltd.-OCD) and 
horticulture (Hortiequip Ltd., Kenya Orchards Ltd., 
Contract Farming and Outgrower Schemes in Kenya: Case Sutdles 
Table 1: Smallholder f:ontract Farming in Kenya 
Crop Farm Farmers (no.) 1fil 
Tea KTDS 150,500 I 
Sugar MSC, others 35,000 a 
Oilseeds OCD, UFUT A 34,000 
Horticulture NJ'oro Canners, others· 12,000 ?:?.'& 
)'@ Tobacco BAT 10,000 
etc). The focus of contract farming schemes, how-
ever, is the small farm sub-sector of the economy. 
Here, it has been significant in tea, tobacco, 
sunflower seed, French beans and other horticul-
tural crops (Table 1). 
Approximately 16 per cent of the 1.5 million 
smallholders in country produce under contract 
farming. At present, contract farming accounts for 
about 40 per cent. of tea, 50 per cent of sugarcane 
and 80 per cent of tobacco production in Kenya.1 A 
majority of the schemes are linked to a processing 
firm. Many firms are joint venture investments 
involving private management and Kenya Govern-
ment equity participation. However, many schemes 
feature participation of a European multinational 
company, either as owner-manager of the scheme 
or through management and marketing contracts 
with locally-owned firms. The tea and sugar schemes 
are almost wholly public schemes. All but the 
sugarcane scheme involve a nucleus estate. 
Data type and sources 
Each of the following case studies provides a 
basic description of the scheme; its performance 
and impact and its problems, constraints and pros-
pects for expansion. The sugarcane, tea and sun-
flower case studies are based largely on secondary 
data, while the remainder of the case studies are 
based on both secondary and primary data. Primary 
data for these case studies was obtained from inter-
views with scheme· management and extension 
staff and a random sample of farmers. A propor-
tional random sample of 50 of the current tobacco 
scheme outgrowers in the Siakago Division of 
Embu, 29 out of33 past sweetcorn scheme out-
growers in Mua Hills of Machakos and 50 current, 
10 past and 10 pre-selected French beans outgrow-
ers in Vihiga Division of Kakamega were inter-
viewed by the principal researchers using a ques-
5 
tionnaire. The sample surveys were conducted 
between March 1987 and May 1988. 
The Case of Sugarcane 
Basic description 
Sugarcane outgrower schemes in Kenya date 
back to the 1920s. At present there are two private 
and five public sugarcane outgrower schemes. The 
private schemes are Miwani, begun in 1922, and 
Rarriisi (1937), while the public schemes are the 
East African Sugar Industries Limited of Muhoroni 
(1976), the Chemelil Sugar Company at Chemelil 
(1968), the Mumias Sugar Company at Mumias 
(1973), Nzoia Sugar Company in Bungoma (1978) 
and the South Nyanza (Sony) Sugar Company at 
Awendo (1981). The phenomenal growth in public 
sugarcane outgrower schemes during the 1967-81 
period was justified to achieve domestic self-suffi-
ciency in sugar, create wage employment in the 
rural areas, create further sources of income for 
farmers and create import-saving industry. · 
All the public schemes are managed privately 
by either the Mehta Group International of India. 
(Muhoroni) or Booker and Tate of London (Mumias 
and Awendo ). Establishment of some of the schemes 
(Awendo andB ungoma) entailed displacing people 
to create room for nucleus estates. The schemes are 
located almost entirely in Western Kenya which 
accounts for 98 per cent of total cane production; 
the remaining 2 per cent of output being produced 
at Ramisi in Coast Province.2 Smallholder sugar-
cane outgrower schemes accounted for about 78 per 
cent of total cane acreage in the country in 1984. 
Only the Mumias, Bungoma and Awendo 
smallholder outgrower schemes are based strictly 
on contract farming. Each of these scheme com-
prise a factory complex and its supporting planta-
tions (nucleus estate) at the centre, and contracted 
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smallholder outgrowers (with an average size of 
le8s than 20 hectares) within a 32-kilometre periph-
ery. Nucleus estates are owned and managed by 
millers and are highly mechanized. The justifica-
tion for establishing nucleus estates in Kenya's 
major sugar factories was based on an a priori 
asspmption that outgrowers would not guarantee a 
continuous flow of cane to the factory. Hence, the 
estates provide a buffer against the risk of inade-
quate cane supplies from theoutgrowers to meet the 
factory requirements. These account for roughly 25 
per cent of the total cane supply to the sugar indus-
try. 
An interested smallholder sugarcane outgrower 
enters into a contract of at least a five-year duration 
(necessary to complete one seed cane crop and two 
ratoon crops), which specifies access to technologi-
cal know-how, company (miller's) intervention at 
any stage of production, sale of cane output, distri-
bution of production and marketing risks and termi-
nation of contract by either party. The contract re-
stricts farmers to the miller's production.know-how 
through selected inputs and extension services. The 
cane contracts provide for the miller to intervene at 
any stage of production to maintain quality-at the 
expense of the farmer. 
The contract also obliges the farmer to sell his 
cane to the contracting miller. This is effected 
through zoning laws. However, the contract does 
not explicitly oblige the miller to buy all cane from 
the farmer. In terms of distribution of risks, the 
contract transfers greater risk-bearing to the out-
growers-such as risks of bad weather and arson. 
Furthermore, the contract does not guarantee farm-
ers a minimum price of cane output, implying a 
price risk to them. However, this· is minimized 
through government control of cane prices. 
In all the schemes, contracted farmers receive 
both credit and extension services. Credit is paid in-
kirid, in seed-cane, fertilizers, pesticides, land prepa-
ration and harvesting machinery, and transport 
services. Interest is charged on the credit. Only in 
the Mumias scheme is credit administered by an 
outgrowers organization rather than the miller. In 
all cases, however, inputs credit recovery is tied to 
cane output 
Harvested cane is weighed in the presence of the 
farmers or their representatives and issued with a 
weighing machine printout. The records are also 
sent to the relevant outgrowers' organization. Pay-
ment is made net of inputs, loans, interest and 
charges by outgrower organizations. Loan recovery 
is phased over the plant and ratoon crops on a 
sliding scale. Average net returns per farmer for the 
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·first crop and ratoon crops varies significantly from 
one scheme to another. In 1988 it was estimated at 
aboutKSh 20,000 per hectare for the plant crop and 
at between KSh 14,000 per hectare and KSh 20,000 
per heetare for Mumias' .3 Farmers are paid with 
some delays due to the separation of production and 
marketing functions of sugar. At present, millers 
only produce sugar while the Ministry of Com-
merce, through the Kenya National Trading Corpo-
ration (KNTC), markets it. 
At the initial stages, the millers dealt with con-
tracted farmers individually. In time, however, the 
complexity and the costs of relating to large num-
bers of outgrowers individually have forced millers 
to encourage formation of outgrower organizations 
to represent farmers in scheme policies and their 
implementation. These take the form of outgrowers 
companies (in Mumias and Awendo) and outgrow-
ers co-operative unions (in Bungoma). Their per-
formance, however, is controversial. 
Due to problems of continuity of research staff 
in individual companies and possible conflicts of 
interest, there is a central sugarcane research station 
based at Kibos. At present, the research activities of 
the station are being conducted through the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). Scheme 
management would, however, prefer t.o finance and 
manage the research on sugarcane themselves. 
Performance and impact 
Kenya's sugar industry provides interesting cases 
of success and failure during the post-independence 
period. The objective of self-sufficiency in sugar is 
part of the broader national objective of food self-
sufficiency, spelt out in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 
1981 on national food policy. Production of sugar 
increased from about 35,000 tonnes a year in the 
1960s to 413,000 tonnes in 1987.4 On the other 
hand, consllinption of sugar increased from 100,000 
tonnes in the 1963-64 period to approximately 
396,000 tonnes during 1987. Sugar self-sufficiency 
was only achieved in 1979 and 1983. 
The sugar industry plays an important role in the 
Kenyan economy-both saving foreign exchange 
and. employing a part of Kenya's labour force. 
Furthermore, since 1976, the industry pays into the 
exchequer KSh 1,000 in the form of excise duty for 
every tonne of sugar produced. The industry also 
provides a means of livelihood to small farmers and 
employees in the industry. The development of the 
sugar industry has, therefore, yielded socio-eco-
nomic benefits in terms of employment and rural 
development. 
Other benefits from the sugar industry have 
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been derived from theuseofitsby-products: molas-
ses and bagasse. Molasses is used for the extraction 
of ethanol; an ingredient in fuel (gasohol) and 
alcohol (gin) production. The bagasse (waste prod-
uct in the extraction of fibrous stems from cane) are 
used as fuel in sugar factories to heat boilers and 
generate steam and electricity. 
Problems, constraints and prospects 
One problem of the schemes that could affect 
their continued viability appears to be the nature of 
the contracts used. The contracts transfer greater 
production and market risk to the outgrowers. The 
kind of inequitable distribution of risks minimizes 
outgrowers' expected returns from the scheme.· 
This, however, has not resulted in a significant 
turnover rate among scheme outgrowers. Delayed 
payments, harvest and heavy deductions for inputs 
arid services have not lead to a significant turnover 
rate among scheme outgrowers, either. Delayed 
payments which undermine the key attraction of 
contract farming-market security-have been 
attributed to the separation of the production and 
marketing functions. 
Delays in cane harvesting are costly to both 
outgrowers (in terms of opportunity cost of tied-up 
land) and millers (in terms ofloss of sugar content). 
Delays have been attributed to several factors, in-
cluding harvesting and milling machinery break-
downs. Some growers, especially in the Nyanza 
sugar belt, burn their cane to attract early harvest-
ing. Burnt cane must be harvested immediately 
thereby causing costly interruption in the cane har-
vest schedule. Penalties are imposed on farmers 
who burn their cane. 
The Case of Sunflower 
Basic description 
The sunflower outgrowers scheme was started 
in 1982 by Oil Crop Development (OCD) Ltd., a 
subsidiary of East Africa Industries (EAI) Ltd. At 
its. inception the scheme was based on contract 
farming and consisted of 80 per cent large-scale and 
20 per cent smallholder outgrower farmers.5 How-
ever, since the 1985/86 crop season the ratio ap-
pears to have reversed and the smallholder sub-
scheme is no longer based on contract farming. 
OCD discontinued contract farming in sunflower 
due to the difficulty of policing contracts given the 
non-monopsonistic nature of the sunflower seed 
market. The market is characterized by many mill-
ers running at considerate excess capacity. These 
tended to free ride on OCD's investment costs on 
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quality seed by poaching it. At present, the sun-
flower scheme is based on OCD appointed agents in 
the production areas acting as middlemen who 
distribute and purchase sunflower seed. 
Currently, smallholder outgrowers account for 
about 90 per cent of total sunflower production in 
the country from about 20,000 aeres.6. There are 
about 70,000 smallholder sunflower outgrowers 
distributed throughout the country in the marginal 
areas of Central Province (7,000 outgrowers), Rift 
Valley Province (9,000outgrowers), Wes tern Prov-
ince (14,000 outgrowers ), Eastern Province (28,000 
outgrowers), and Nyanza Province (12,000 out-, 
growers). The recent preference· for smallholder 
over large-scale outgrowers has been attributed to 
insufficient commitment to the sunflower crop by 
large-scale farmers, high service costs, under-re-
covery of expenditure incurred on large farms, 
absenteeism of large-scale farmers and better farm 
practices, especially crop rotation, in smallhold-
ings. 
The agents do not have ariy clear selection 
criteria for scheme outgrowers. Any person inter-
ested in growing sunflower simply approaches the 
local OCD agent and receives seeds. The supply of 
fertilizer and other chemicals to farmers on credit 
was discontinued in 1985 due to difficulty of loan 
recovery. The company does provide limited exten-
sion .services to farmers in liaison with staff from 
the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Agent also purchase produce, earning a com-
mission of 20 cents per kilogram of output pur-
chased. The farmer is paid KSh 2.80 per kilogram 
of output delivered. Appointed local transporters 
transport both seed and produce. OCD sells 75 per 
cent of the processed oil to EAI and 25 per cent of 
it to other users. 
There is no official arrangement between OCD 
and government institutions requiring consultation 
or reporting. The company organizes its projects 
and activities independently of the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and is under no obligation to consult with, 
or refer any matter to, the Ministry. It deals directly 
with the farmers and determines the conditions for 
such dealing. Whatever liaison there is, it is entiiel y 
voluntary on the part of the company, being neces-
sitated essentially by the company's requirements. 
Performance and. impact 
Sunflower growing has been a major economic 
boost to the local economy of the marginal areas of 
Kenya in a number of ways. First, it provides 
employment directly to about 70,000 small-scale 
farmers and their families in these areas. Second, 
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sunflower production provides substantial incomes 
not only to outgrowers but also to buying agents and 
local transporters. In 1986, some KSh 94.5 million 
was earned from about 30,000 tonnes of sunflower 
seed of which the marginal areas of Meru District 
alone earned KSh 23.4 million.7 The cash comes at 
the season when farmers are buying agricultural 
inputs for the short rains and sending their children 
to school for their second· and third terms. Third, 
since sunflower is a cash crop for the marginal areas 
of the country, it has provided an opportunity for 
equitable distribution of wealth and rural develop-
ment. Small-scale farmers in these areas often lack 
an alternative cash crop. Finally, sunflowerprOduc-
tion has contributed about 20,000 tonnes of high 
quality vegetable oil for domestic consumption, 
thus saving the country foreign exchange amount-
ing to more than KSh 100 million and some KSh 12 
million in oilseed cake for the animal industry. By 
1995/96 the country is expected to achieve about40 
per cent self-sufficiency (or saving of about K£ 20 
million) and self-sufficiency in domestic cake re-
quirements. 
Problems, constraints and 
opportunities 
Expansion of the sunflower scheme is favoured 
by a number of factors including suitable climate 
conditions, the highest yield per hectare of all oil 
crops except oilseed rape, its high oil content, its 
suitability for crop rotation (rotates well with cere-
als, especially maize and wheat), its annunity, suita-
bility to the country's bi-modal rainfall regime (it 
can be grown both during ·the long and short rains), 
and its fast maturity compared to other oil crops 
thereby giving "fast cash" to many small-scale 
farmers. 
However, expansion of sunflower production in 
the country has been constrained by low returns due 
to low international and domestic market prices. 
Available information shows that. sunflower is not 
as profitable in high potential areas as in marginal 
areas. Thus, expansion of production would be 
limitedtothemarginalpartsofthecountry.Further-
more, the lower prices of imported oil fats reduces 
the demand for vegetable oils, limiting expansion 
ofits production further. 
The Case of Tobacco 
Basic description · 
While the history of flue-cured tobacco produc-
tion in Kenya can be traced to the 1930s (in Sagana 
and Kitui) and 1950s (at Ena near Em bu), tobacco 
8 
production did not begin in earnest until 1975. Prior 
to 1975 most leaf for Kenyan cigarette and pipe 
tobacco manufacture was imported from Uganda 
and Tanzania. The deteriorating political situation 
within the East African Community provided the 
environment for the development of a tobacco 
production scheme in Kenya. The tobacco scheme 
is a smallh-older outgrower scheme based on con-
tract farming. It is operated and managed by British 
American Tobacco(K)Ltd. (BAT), a locally-incor-
porated transnational with 40 per cent local and 60 
per cent foreign ownership. T.he Kenya Govern-
ment has only a 20 percentequity participation role. 
Thus the company is privately-managed and organ-
izes its projects and activities independently of 
government agencies (such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture). 
In 1987, there were about 11,000 smallholder 
outgrowers in the BAT scheme. These produced 
about 7 million kilograms of green leaf tobacco 
from 5,000 hectares.8 The total number of farmers, 
crop area and output are, however, distributed 
unevenly among the three types of tobacco pro-
duced in the scheme. These are flue-cured tobacco 
(Bungoma/Busia, South Nyanza and Meru areas), 
fire-cured tobacco (South Nyanza) and burley to-
bacco (South Nyanza). In 1987, about 3,500 farm-
ers produced about 2 million kilograms of fire-
cured tobacco from about 1,600 hectares, and some 
7,000 farmers produced about 5 million kilograms 
of flue-cured tobacco from about 4,000 hectares, 
and 100 farmers produced 1 million kilograms of 
burley tobacco from 50 hectares: 
The scheme is organized on the concept of 
"production centres'.'. These serve as bases for 
supplying both production materials and agricul-
tural extension services and act as buying centres 
for purchasing cured leaf. The main production 
centres are located at Malakisi in B ungoma, Mitun-
guu in Meru, Siakago in Embu, Oyani, Rongo and 
Kuria in South Nyanza, and Kitui. 
There are two types of farmers contracted by the 
company in the production areas: society and direct 
scheme outgrowers. These co-exist only in the 
traditional production areas ofKitui and Em bu. The 
majority of the contracted farmers are the direct 
scheme outgrowers. There are only three tobacco 
co-operative societies which together produce 500 
tonnes of leaf worth KSh 7.7 million annually.9 
Most registered farmers are women although they 
have no title to land. This is attributed to women 
being more available on the farms than their hus-
bands. 
The scheme's management extends in-kind 
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credit to the registered farmers, such as seedlings, 
fertilizers and other necessary inputs such as sisal 
twine, flow pipes and iron sheets, transport 
and extension services. The only thing the society 
farmers are supplied directly by the c::ompany is 
extension services. The other inputs are supplied to 
the society which, in tum, distributes them to its 
members according to internal rules. The company 
only supervises the ploughing, planting, weeding 
and curing activities of the farmer. This has the 
advantage of minimi7;ing the cost deducted from the 
farmers' proceeds and increasing their production 
skills. 
Once the grade of the delivered output has been 
determined at the collection centre, payment is 
made on the spot to both direct and society farmers. 
Payment is net of company loans advanced. Loan 
recovery is limited to 50 per cent of every Sale until 
fully recovered. Society farmers are generally paid 
with delays and additional deductions. Average 
returns to farmers.from tobacco is aboutKSh 8,500 
per annum.10 .Producer and consumer prices of 
tobacco are unrelated due to the existence of excise 
duty and sales tax. Excise tax on tobacco products 
is 68 per cent. The producer price of green leaf 
tobacco is also controlled to maintain profitability 
balance among crops. 
Quantity and quality controls in the scheme are 
achieved through acreage restrictions per farmer 
and deployment of well-trained extension officers 
who work closely with the farmers at every stage of 
production. The average acreage prescribed per 
producer is 0.5 hectares (1.25 acres) from which 
between 300-500 kilograms of tobacco is expected.11 
The acreage restriction is not very effective with 
society farmers. 
Farmers have no formal representation in the 
scheme's policy and its implementation. However, 
at the division level farmers elect a few ad hoc 
representatives who present their grievances to the 
local managers for solutions or onward transmis-
sion to the senior management staff in Nairobi. The 
direct scheme outgrowers appear reluctant to form 
an outgrowers' organization. The reluctance is 
explained by the performance of existing tobacco 
co-operative societies which both delay and reduce 
to the farmers. The scheme management 
also seems happy with the present situation in view 
of the high potential for disruptive politicization of 
· such organizations, in evidence at some ·existing 
tobacco co-operative societies. 
Performance and impact 
In 1988, the total number of people directly or 
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indirectly deriving income from the tobacco scheme 
was estimated at 600,000.12 This includes scheme 
employees, farmers, dealers, stockists, retailers and 
transporters. An additional 1,000 casual workers 
earned income from re-handling and sorting green 
leaf tobacco for export. 
The tobacco scheme has saved significant 
amounts of foreign exchange. The scheme saved 
the country a total of KSh 110.5 million in foreign 
exchangein 1982. Theinitialobjectiveofthescheme 
of domestic self-sufficiency in green leaf tobacco 
was achieved in 1982, limiting further expansion in 
production. Theschememanagement then explored 
possibilities of exporting green leaf tobacco to 
Eiirope. In 1983, it exported 153 tonnes of fire-
cured tobacco to the UK, Holland and Germany. In 
1987, it exported 450 tonnes of leaf (worth KSh 
76.5 million) and plants to export600 tonnes ofleaf 
in 1988. The scheme management also exports 
manufactured cigarettes to neighbouring countries. 
Farmers in the scheme are encouraged to grow 
enough trees to be self-sufficient in their woodfuel 
requirements. Afforestation is a key element of the 
·contract the farmers sign with the company. The 
scheme had contributed about 13.5 million trees in 
the country by 1987. Growing trees helps to con-
serve soil in the production areas. The scheme 
management also encourages soil conservation 
through making ridges, grass and tree wind-breaks. 
. Tobacco production has been a major boost to 
household income in the production areas. Most 
outgrowers express satisfaction with their returns 
from tobacco production. Indeed, the initial expec-
tations of many of the outgrowers appear to have 
been exceeded. The proceeds from tobacco helps 
them to pay school fees, build good houses and feed 
and clothe their families. The average annual in-
come from tobacco production is estimated at about 
KSh 8,500 per annum. The scheme provides em-
ployment for both the farm family and the commu-
nity. 
Due to the restricted acreage allowed in produc-
tion per farmer and the average landholding size in 
the production areas, it would appear that tobacco 
production has not affected household food self-
sufficiency. Indeed, land appears to be the least 
significant factor in explaining household food 
shortfalls from one season to another in these areas. 
Tobacco production may, however, have compro-
mised household food security indirectly through 
its competition for family labour. It should 
be noted, however, that income from tobacco is 
used to meet household goods shortfalls. 
The scheme management operates a research 
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station based at Malakisi in Bungoma. The station 
conducts research on woodfuel usage, tobacco dis-
eases and seed multiplication rate .. Information 
generated there is passed on to outgrowers through 
scheme extension staff. 
Problems, constraints and 
opportunities 
Defaulting on loans made forinputs is attributed 
to natural calamities such as drought and hail-
storms and poor crop husbandry. However, the 
incidence of such cases is limited due to the scheme's 
effective extension services. Consequences of de-
faulting include stopping further company loans 
·and/or growing of the crop. Again, incidences of 
these were low. No legal action has been taken to 
recover overdue loans. This was explained by high 
legal fees, goOd public relations with the farmers 
and legal inadequacies of the contracts signed. 
Having achieved domestic self-sufficiency in 
green leaf tobacco the scheme now depends on 
export markets if it is .to expand. Negative world-
wide campaigns against smoking seem to depress 
the market, thereby reducing the opportunities for 
export. Introduction of the Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA), however, offers prospects for expanded 
tobacco production by expanding regional markets 
for tobacco. 
The Case of Tea 
Basic description 
Smallholder tea outgrower schemes in Kenya 
were first introduced in the Swynnerton Plan of 
1954. Prior to this, all tea production in Kenya was 
based on plantation (estate) schemes. Kenya's land 
policy at independence only limited expansion of 
the estate schemes, explaining their present co-
existence with the smallholder outgrower schemes. 
In June 1984 there were 199,555 tea smallholder 
outgrowers growing 56,173 of tea, with an 
average of about 0;38 hectares per farmer. 13 The 
scheme has been operated and managed by the 
Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), a 
parastatal, since January 1964. KTDA, a predeces-
sor of the Special Crops Development Authority 
(SCDA), is privately managed and enjoys both op-
erational and technological autonomy. Its invest-
ment capital, especially for construction of facto-
ries, is derived from both external sources (CDC, 
World Bank, European In vestment Bank and OPEC) 
and domestic sources (Kenya Government and 
financial parastatal corporations). Its operational 
costs are met from a cess deducted monthly from 
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the monthly payment to the farmers for their green 
leaf. 
There appear to be no formal contracts signed 
between the Authority and the smallholder tea 
outgrower farmers. The Authority registers pre-
selected farmers and issues them with tea plants and 
othernecessary inputs on credit. It closely monitors 
all stages of tea production to guarantee high qual- . 
ity tea. The KTDA takes charge of planting pro-
grammes, field operations, inspection, collettion, 
purchase and transportation . .Senior extension and 
headquarters staff make periodic visits to assess 
their problems and the progress of outgrowers. 
Originally, the activities of the Authority were 
limited to extension and leaf production. However, 
since the late 1960s it has started to process its own 
tea. It now operates thirty-nine factories which it 
has 'built or bought from private companies. 
The Authority makes two payments to outgrow-
ers for output delivered. The first is a fixed payment 
based on the weight of green leaf (per kilogram) 
collected while the second is a variable annual 
payment based on the price achieved by the "made" 
(manufactured) tea internationally. Payments are 
net of cost of fertilizers and other inputs supplied by 
the Authority. A charge is also levied on growers as 
a down payment for tea stumps, and credit is care-
fully controlled in order to strengthen the Author-
ity's power to regulate the selection of growers and 
the acreage on which farmers can plant tea. An 
additional incentive to outgrowers in the scheme is 
the ownership of shares in individual KTDA tea 
factories which earn them dividends. About 15,000 
farmers, approximately 10 per cent of all outgrow-
ers, currently own some 1.6 million shares in the 
early sixteen tea factories incorporated as public 
companies.14 Payment of dividends on these shares 
is limited until factory loan obligations are met. 
KTD A has, since its inception, encouraged farm-
ers to participate in scheme policy decisions and 
their implementation. The elected Divisional and 
District Tea Committees, the Provisional Tea Boards 
and farmers' representatives on the KTDA Board 
itself comprise the fonnal institutional channel for 
advising the tea land allqcation process, transmit-
ting KTDA policy information and for forwarding 
grievances. 
Performance and impact 
The scheme is considered to be the largest and 
most successful smallholder tea scheme in the world. · 
TheschemehascontributedsignificantlytoKenya's 
smallholder tea output. This has increased from a 
mere 1,200 metric tonnes in 1965 to over 30,000 
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tonnes in 1979/80. Smallholder tea area and the 
number of farmers has expanded steadily under the 
Authority's successive planting plans. In spite of 
rapid expansion, the operating costs of the scheme 
have been maintained over the years. Once the basic 
organizational structures were securely in place, 
the scheme's cost per grower and per hectare began 
to fall sharply in real terms. 
Comprehensive information on the socio-eco-
nomic effects of tea development on smallholder 
farmers is generally lacking. However, tea districts 
appear economically buoyant compared to the re-
mainder of rural Kenya. The success of the small-
holder tea scheme has been attributed to a number 
of factors including institutional features, such as 
efficient management structure, operational and 
technological autonomy, favourable incentive 
schemes and prompt payment off armers, 15 favour-
able market conditions for tea and grower participa-
tion.16 
Problems, constraints and prospects 
Difficulty in supervising to maintain plucking 
standards (two leaves and a bud) and the high cost 
of servicing loans constrain expansion of the small-
holder tea scheme. To strict plucking stan-
dards the average size of holdings is restricted to 
one hectare. This has been achieved in most produc-
tion areas. The cost of servicing loans (75 per cent 
of which are denominated in foreign currency) for 
the construction of factories has been a major fi-
nancial burden on the scheme, especially during the 
1981-82 recession. 
The Case of Sweetcorn 
Basic description 
The sweetcorn scheme is a private smallholder 
scheme based on contract farming. It was started by 
Kenya Orchards Limited (KOL), a local private 
company, in 1979. The scheme is located in Mua 
Hills, Machakos District. Introduction of the scheme 
was justified on many grounds, including availabil-
ity of a crop near the factory, a source for imported 
sweetcorn seed and need for extension services in 
crop production. Previously the company purchased 
sweetcorn from private commercial farmers at Athi 
River, 40 kilometres away. Farmers around Mua 
Hills could not import the seed and needed exten-
sion services to grow it. 
The scheme management recruits prospective 
farmers using its extension staff and the local · 
administration. These farmers sign a contract with 
the company which specifies the quality and variety 
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of seed that the farmer will be provided with. Farm-
ers who have signed the contract are supplied with 
free seed. The contract also specifies that the farmer 
has been given full instructions as to the sowing 
time, planting procedure, manure/fertilizer appli-
cation rates and the pests and diseases and their 
control measures. The contract obliges the farmers 
to sell the yield to KOL and requires KOL to pay the 
farmer a specified price per quantity delivered. The 
price ofKSh 1.00 per kilogram for the sweetcorn on 
the cob has prevailed since 1979. The purchase is on 
cash terms at pre-selected buying centres. 
The sweetcorn crop takes approximately three 
months to mature. The contract specifies the time 
when the farmer is supposed to take the com to the 
factory but does not specify whether KOL is obliged 
to buy all of the farmer's produce. Nor does it 
specify what should be done in case KOL or the 
"farmer fails to honour the contract because of natu-
ral calamities or administrative bottlenecks. The 
distribution of risks in the contract, therefore, ap-
pears uncertain. 
A majority of farmers in the scheme are igno-
rant of both the contents and implications of the 
contracts they have signed. Very few farmers seem 
to know what to do in case the company breaches 
the contract. In the absence of an outgrowers or-
ganization, farmers' grievances are channeled 
through the local leadership-which is often ac-
cused of colluding with the company management 
Land devoted to sweetcorn ranges between 0.2 
acres and 3 acres with a mean of0.9 acres. The mean 
acreage of land devoted to crops in the study are is 
6.9 acres. Sweetcorn occupies only 13 per cent of 
the total area under crops or 3 .8 per cent of to tall and 
holding. 
Performance and impact 
The KOL sweetcorn scheme appears to have 
failed. Out of thirty-three farmers contracted be-
tween 1979 and 1982, only two continued to grow 
the crop by the time of our survey in 1987. The high 
farmer quit rate from the scheme has been attributed 
to low returns from sweetcorn sales. The average 
net income from sweetcorn is approximately KSh 
200 per acre (KS h 500 per hectare). This is very low 
compared to other cash crops like tomatoes, beans, 
cow peas, cotton or sunflower. However, past and 
current outgrowers cite short crop maturity and a 
ready market as attractive features of the scheme. 
The scheme also provides limited employment to 
outgrowers and their families, and the community. 
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Problems, constraints and 
prospects 
The main perfonnance problems of the scheme 
are low yields and output prices. The low yields 
have been attributed to farmers' inaccessibility to 
the essential inputs. The only input the company 
provides is seed. A majority of outgrowers use 
neither fertilizers nor insecticides on their sweet-
corn crop. The fixed price ofKSh 1.00 per kilogram 
(on the cob) provides low returns to the farmer. 
These low returns have been identified as the main 
source of the high turnover rate among outgrowers 
which undennines viability of the scheme. 
The Case of French Beans 
Basic description 
A smallholder outgrower French bean scheme 
was first promoted in Kenya in 1976, by Comer-
shop Ltd., a local private company. The company 
promoted the crop in Webuye area of Western 
Kenya through a farmers' co-operative society. 
Since 1982, however, the French bean scheme is 
based on contract farming in Vihiga, Hamisi and 
Ikolomani Divisions of Kakamega District. The 
scheme is operated and managed by Hortiequip 
Ltd., a subsidiary ofNjoro Canners Ltd. At present, 
there are 21,000 smallholder outgrowers in the 
scheme. There is some limited production ofFrench 
beans outside the scheme in the Rongai, Kitale, 
Naivasha and Thika areas. · 
French bean production is organized in terms of 
centres which serve as bases for the supply of inputs 
and extension services and for bean collection. A 
· production centre has at least 200 farmers. The crop 
has two production seasons a year coinciding with 
the long and short rains. One month prior to the 
beginning of each crop season, the scheme's con-
trol clerks (extension staff) recruit farmers on a 
centre basis. These sign a contract with the scheme 
management prior to planting time. The contract 
limits farmers to the technological know-how spec-
ifications of the scheme management, effected 
through supplying outgrowers with inputs and ex-
tension services. In tenns of inputs, outgrowers are 
supplied with one kilogram of seed and fertilizers 
and insectieides. The scheme's extension staff 
supervises crop planting and inspects each farm at 
least five times during the crop season. 
The contract binds the farmers to sell the crop to 
the scheme management at a pre-set price. In 1987, 
the price was set at KSh 4.10 per kilogram of extra 
fine pods (i.e., those not exceeding 6.0 cm. in 
diameter, without string or disease, and uniform 
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and fresh). It obliges the company to purchase all 
quality output from the farmers: The contracts shift 
most production risks (due to crop spoilage and/or 
bad weather) to outgrowers. The main source of risk 
for scheme management is weight loss (of about 10 
to 15 per cent) in beans in transit to the processing 
factory. 
The one kilogram of seed that each farmer is 
restricted requires a 17 metre by 10 metre plot and 
is based on careful study of the land and labour 
available. The production area is densely populated 
with an average land holding of 0.5 hectares. At 
present the crop occupies only 8.4 per cent of the 
area under crops and 7 per cent of total land hold-
ings of individual farmers. 
French bean production is labour intensive. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the crop 
requires 3,283 man hours per hectare.17 In 
Kakamega, the total labour requirement for land 
preparation, planting, top dressing and harvesting is 
3,000 man hours per hectare or 375 man days per 
hectare. Most of the labour is required for picking 
and sorting; tasks which require patience and skill. 
Out of the 4,327 farmers contracted during the first 
season of 1987, over 4,200 (97 per cent) were 
women, although they did not hold land titles. 
Labour, especially female labour, is abundant in the 
production area. According to the 1979 census, the 
population density in this area was estimated at over 
65 to 70 people per square kilometre. The relative 
abundance of female labour is accounted for by 
male out-migration to urban areas. The average· 
wage rate in the area is KSh 15 per day compared to 
KSh 25 per day in Central Province. 
The crop is ready for picking after one and a half 
to two months from planting. The crop is picked 
daily and delivered to the collection centres for 
grading and weighirig .by the scheme's control 
clerks. After all i.he season's crop has been picked, 
the accounts are finalized and the farmers paid 
within two weeks. Payment is made net of company 
loans for inputs. -
Processed extra-fine French beans are a high 
value product with limited domestic market and the 
crop is grown and processed for export markets in 
Europe. France alone accounts for 95 per cent of the 
world market of the product. Njoro Canners Ltd. 
sells all the processed beans to Compagnie Saupi-
quet. 
Performance and impact 
The scheme has been a major boost to the 
economy of the production area. It provides em-
ployment directly to 21,000 farmers and their 
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families. Crop returns to individual farmers are 
substantial. The average return from a 17 metre by 
10 'metre of land planted with one kilogram of seed 
is KSh 300 or KSh 4,000 per hectare per annum for 
two crop seasons. This is much higher than returns 
to other cash crops like tea, maize and sugarcane 
grown in the area. The scheme not only provides 
employment and incomes to participating farmers 
and their families, but also to the community in 
terms of company employees and local transporters. 
Recent introduction of a biotechnology technique 
which uses the by-product "maganda" to make 
fertilizer has led to a 40 per cent economy on inor-
ganic fertilizer at sowing time and boosted the yield 
of the crop by 20 per cent.18 At the national level, the 
scheme earns the country substantial foreign ex-
change from exporting processed beans. 
Problems, constraints and 
prospects 
The biggest problem farmers experience in the 
scheme is inequitable distribution of risks. They 
bear all risks of crop failures while the management 
only bears the risk of weight loss of the crop transit 
to the factory. The management's attempt to form 
an insurance scheme to protect farmers against risks 
of crop failure has yet to be approved by the relevant 
authorities. 
About 10 to 15 per cent of input loans are not 
recovered, usually due to crop failure. 19 Defaulting 
farmers are usually denied further input loans. Legal 
action against unrecovered loans has not been taken 
due to the high legal costs, and maintaining good 
public relations with farmers. The company per-
ceives the contract as only providing an official 
framework of operation which in turn creates con-
fidence in the farmers. 
Some contracted farmers breed their own seed 
for planting due to the high cost of selected seed and 
the need to grow more crop than is permitted. This, 
however, poses serious quality control problems 
for the company. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a comparative analysis of smallholder outgrower schemes in Kenya for 
sugarcane, tea, tobacco, sunflower, sweetcorn and French beans. Based on micro- and macro-
level criteria, the tea, tobacco, sugarcane and French beans schemes performed better than the 
others examined, Constraints to replicability of the successful schemes are identified as lack 
of skilled managers and technicians to manage and operate schemes efficiently, high cost of 
penetrating into high-value export markets, poor unfrastructural development in some 
production areas, international and domestic market conditions giving rise to low and unstable 
returns to scheme management and farmers, high cost of training and communication with 
unskilled outgrowers. Policy implications of the study include the need to streamline produc-
tion and marketing systems, introducing insurance schemes to protect outgrowers against 
production and marketing risks, encouraging increased participation by farmers in the 
schemes' policy and implementation, co-ordinating scheme management and government ac-
tivities to minimize duplication and strengthening the legal framework for the schemes by in-
troducing a Contract Farming Act. · 
Introduction 
Contract farming has existed in Kenya only 
since Independence. It accounts for 50 per cent of 
total sugar, 40 per cent of tea, and 80 per cent of 
tobacco production.' Existing contract farming 
schemes predominantly use smallholders. Only the 
barley scheme is based on large-scale contract 
farming. Approximately 16 per cent of the coun-
try's 1.5 million smallholders produce under a 
contract system.2 Public and private smallholder 
schemes co-exist in the country. However, all the 
schemes are managed privately, i.e., enjoy opera-
tional and technological autonomy. This limits their 
relationship with national extension, credit and 
input distribution programmes. The public and 
private agro-processing firms promoting contract 
farming schemes in Kenya include KTDA (tea); the 
Mumias, Nzoia and South Nyanza Sugar c;ompa-
nies (sugarcane); KOL (sweetcorn); BAT (K) Ltd. 
(tobacco); OCD Ltd. (sunflower); Hortiequip Ltd . 
. (French beans); and East African Breweries (bar-
ley). Only the sugarcane schemes have a nucleus es-
tate. Contract farming in sunflower proved unvi-
able and was replaced by a loose system based on 
appointed middlemen (agents). High turnover rates 
among scheme outgrowers seem to minimize 
chances of the sweetcorn scheme being viable in the 
future.3 
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Contract farming and outgrower schemes are a 
significant growing feature of Kenya's rural devel-
opment strategy. However, these have ac-
corded low research priority by both academicians 
and policy makers. Little is known about their 
relative peformance and development impact with 
respect to food self-suffieiehcy, productivity, 
employment-crea.tion, equity and balance of pay-
ments. Furthermore, determinants of the nature and 
viability of the schemes and constraints to replica-
bility of successful ones remain empirical issues. 
These information gaps present major handicaps to 
rational design and implementation of schemes that 
enhance the performance of the country's agricul-
tural sector. This paper attempt$ to fill the existing 
information gaps based on an analysis of the results 
of five case studies on sugarcane, tea, tobacco, sun-
flower, sweetcorn and french beans.4 
The results of the case studies are analysed in 
terms of determinants of the nature and viability, 
relative performance and constraints to replicabil-
ity of successful schemes.5 Policy and future re-
search issues implied by the results of the analysis 
are briefly outlined in the paper. 
Determinants of Nature and Viability 
of Contract Farming Schemes 
Development and institutional policies. From 
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our analysis of the six case studies, development 
policies-especially, agricultural and land poli-
cies-are important detenninants of contract farm-
ing in Kenya. The smallholder bias of Kenya's ag-
ricultural development policy and land acquisition 
policy in the post-Independence period may ex-
plain the phenomenal growth of smallholder con-
tract farming schemes in the country. However, the 
land tenure system-as reflected by presence or ab-
sence of private title to land---does not appear a 
detenninant of existing contract farming schemes. 
While all the six schemes were located in areas 
where farmers had private title to land, secure 
access to land, rather than its ownership, was pre-
requisite for a farmer's participation in the scheme. 
Indeed, women were the registered farmers in almost 
all the schemes, despite not having titles to land. 
The scheme output rather than land title deed acted 
as collateral for input loans advanced to farmers at 
the beginning of any scheme crop season. The co-
existence of public and private smallholder out-
grower schemes is consistent with the country's 
development philosophy of a mixed economic 
system.6 
Market size, security and structure for raw _ 
materials and final output. The market for the raw 
materials of the schemes was generally large, se-
cure and monopsonistic, with the exception of the 
sunflower scheme. Discontinuation of contract 
farming in the sunflower scheme and its subsequent 
replacement by a loose system based on appointed 
middlemen (agents} could be attributed to the non-
monopsonistic market for sunflower seed which 
made it difficult to police contracts. The many 
millers running considerable excess capacity tended· 
to free ride on OCD's investment on quality sun-
flower seed ,by poaching it. 
While the market structure for the final product 
for all the schemes was monopolistic, the markets 
varied in size, security and location. Sugar enjoys a 
large and growing domestic market while made tea 
enjoys both large and secure domestic and export 
markets. Processed extra fine French beans have a 
large and guaranteed market in France, while sweet-
corn products have a limited domestic demand. 
Vegetable oils made from sunflower seed have 
limited domestic demand due to government policy 
which prices imported oil fats cheaper than vege-
table oils. 
Production and processing technology. Pro-
duction of all the five scheme crops analyzed was 
labour intensive at all stages of production. Eco-
nomical crop production using hired labour did not 
· appear feasible. Furthermore, co-ordinated deliver-
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ies of quality raw materials of the crops for process-
ing could not be guaranteed through open market 
sales. The economies of large-scale sugarcane 
processing, its capital-intensive production and co-
ordinated harvest and delivery explain not only the 
existence of a nucleus estate in the sugar scheme, 
but also the assignment of most production and 
harvest tasks to the scheme management. 
·Prices and pricing policies. Producer and/or 
final output price levels were detennined either by 
the government, international market conditions or 
scheme management with implications for differ-
ential returns to the schemes. Tea producer prices 
are determined by international market conditions. 
Buoyant world market prices for tea and the exemp-
tion of tea from export taxes imply very high tea 
producer prices. However, domestic consumer tea 
prices are regulated. Both producer and consumer 
p'rices of sugarcane are regulated by the govern-
ment, implying higher returns to both millers and 
outgrowers than the current depressed world mar-
ket conditions for sugar would pennit 
The producer and final output prices for sun-
flower and French beans depend on international 
market conditions. The low producer and final 
output (vegetable oil) prices for the sunflower are 
due to depressed international and domestic market 
conditions for the crop. Furthermore, the market for 
'vegetable oils was reduced by the policy of main-
taining a comparatively low price for imported oil 
fats. The large and lucrative international market 
conditions for French beans explains the observed 
high returns to farmers in the scheme. The low 
producer price of sweetcorn, detennined by scheme 
management, has led to a high turnover rate among 
sweetcorn scheme outgrowers thereby minimizing 
its future viability. 
Barriers to entry and exit. Four of the scheme 
crops analyzed (tea, sugarcane, tobacco, and French 
beans) had barriers to entry. They had long queues 
of applicants interested in growing the respective 
crops. Barriers· to entry are due to limited domestic 
and/or international demand for the final products. 
Entry into the sunflower and sweetcorn schemes · 
was free. Barriers to exit from the schemes existed 
only for the tea scheme since it illegal to uproot tea 
bushes 
Farmer participation in management. Farmer 
participation in scheme policy and its implementa-
tion was best developed in the tea scheme. In the 
sugarcane schemes farmers are represented in 
management by their outgrowers organizations. In 
the remainder of the schemes analyzed, farmers 
were not represented in scheme management at all. 
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Diversification of income sources. Only two of 
the schemes (tobacco and sunflower) were located 
in fairly marginal areas of the country in which the 
scheme provided perhaps the only cash crop pro-
duction opportunity. Theremainderoftheschemes, 
however, were located in the high potential areas 
where farmers earned income from other crops and 
livestock. This has implications for their bargaining 
power with scheme management, their overail in-
come and exposure to risk. 
Payment system. A variety of payment systems 
were revealed in the schemes analyzed with impli-
cations for both the stability of farmers' incomes 
and incentives for timely delivery of quality pro-
duce. Payment delays occurred in only the sugar-
cane scheme, attributed to the separation of the 
production and marketing functions of sugar. In the 
tea scheme farmers received two payments for tea. 
The first payment is fixed per kilogram of green leaf 
delivered, while the second is a variable annual 
payment based on the price of made tea achieved 
internationally. In addition, farmers own shares in 
the scheme from which they earn dividends. In the 
sugar cane scheme farmers receive three payments 
based on plant and two ratoon crops. In the remain-
der of the schemes farmers received a single pay-
ment based on fixed producer prices. 
In all cases, payments were made net of loans 
and charges for inputs and services provided by 
outgrowers' organizations. In both the tobacco and 
sugarcane schemes loan recovery was phased out. 
In the former, scheme loan recovery was restricted 
to 50 per cent of any sale, while in the latter scheme 
it was distributed unevenly over payments for plant 
and ratoon crops. In all the other schemes, the loans 
were recovered from single sales. Total loan recov-
ery per farmer was highest in the sugarcane scheme 
due to the assignment of most production tasks to 
scheme management.7 
Nature of Contract. Formal contracts were en-
tered in all but the sunflower and tea schemes. The 
contracts were of a standard form and not based on 
consensus between the parties (technically referred 
to as "consensus ad idem"). They were drafted by 
the scheme management with specifications for 
technological know-how, sale of output, distribu-
tion of production and marketing risks and termina-
tion by either party. Generally they transferred 
greater risk bearing to farmers with implications for 
lOw scheme benefits. This kind of distribution of 
risks has led to a high turnover rate among outgrow-
ers in some schemes (e.g., sweetcorn) thereby re-
ducing their future viability. Breaches of contracts 
by either parties have not been enforced in law 
largely due to the contracts' legal inadequacies and 
the need to create good public relations with farm-
ers. Scheme management perceives most contracts 
as merely providing an official framework of opera-
tion with farmers. Most contracted farmers know 
neither the contents nor. the implications of the 
contracts they sign. 
Relative Performance 
of Contract Farming Schemes 
Micro-level performance. At the micro-level 
the schemes were evaluated in terms of returns to 
farmers, timely supply of inputs: credit delivery 
systems, research, extension, food security, envi-
ronmental conservation, payment system (i.e., pro-
ducer price level, price determination formulae, 
and promptness of payments) and opportunities for 
farmer participation. The average returns to farmers 
were high in the tea, tobacco (KSh 8,500 per an-
num), sugarcane (KSh 12,000 per hectare), and 
French bean (KSh 4,000 per annum) schemes, but 
lowest in the sweetcorn scheme (KSh 1,000 per 
annum).8 
Outgrowers were supplied with one or more 
inputs in all the schemes. In the sunflower and 
sweetcorn schemes outgrowers were supplied with 
seeds while in the other schemes farmers were also 
supplied with fertilizers and sprays. Only the sugar-
cane outgrowers were supplied with machinery 
services for land preparation and harvesting. In all 
cases, the inputs were delivered in a timely fashion. 
Credit was provided in-kind (in terms of inputs 
and services) in all the schemes analyzed. It was 
administered by the scheme management in all but 
. the Mumias scheme where it was administered by 
an outgrower organization-Mumias Outgrowers 
Company. OCD administers its credit on seed 
through appointed agents in the production areas. 
Default of credit appeared low in all the schemes, 
ranging between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the 
total loan advanced for inputs.9 
17 
Research on crop varieties, diseases and seed 
multiplication rate was an explicit activity of the tea 
and tobacco schemes. The other schemes merely 
provided extension services for seed varieties and 
relevant production techniques developed else-
where. 
All the schemes had active extension program-
mes which varied in terms of size and level of 
training of extension staff. The tea, tobacco, and 
sugarcane schemes had large extension program-
mes with well-trained staff who worked very closely 
with outgrowers. The French beans had an elabo-
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rate extension programme, but its extension staff 
(control clerks) had limited training. The sunflower 
and sweetcorn schemes had skeletal extension staff 
and largely depended on. government extension 
services for their outgrowers. In general, scheme 
extension programmes focussed on the scheme's 
crop and, therefore, did not duplicate existing gov-
ernment extension programmes. The extension staff 
to farmers ratio was lower in the schemes than the 
national average. The tobacco scheme extension 
programmes were rated superior to those of govern-
ment due to their farm management and effective 
farmer communication focus. 
Due to crop acreage restrictions per farmer in all 
the schemes it would appear that introducing the 
schemes did not sacrifice household food security. 
Furthermore, scheme crop income was used to sup-
plement household food short-falls. However, the 
schemes may have compromised household food 
security indirectly through their competition for 
family labour. 
Only the tobacco scheme explicitly promoted 
environmental conservation through tree planting 
constructing ridges. Afforestation is a require-
ment in the contract the outgrowers sign with the 
scheme management. By 1987 the scheme had 
contributed about 13.5 million trees in the produc-
tion areas.10 · 
The relative performance of the scheme with 
respect to the payment system and opportunities for 
farmer participation has been presented in the pre-
vious section. 
Macro-level performance. At the macro-level 
the schemes were evaluated in terms of contribution 
to rural employment, balance of payments' govern-
ment budget, and reduction in personal and regional 
income distribution imbalances. All the schemes 
together created direct employment for more than a 
quarter million participating farmers and their 
families and, indirectly, to the community in terms 
of scheme employees, transporters, stockists, etc. 
In 1988, for example, the tobacco scheme afone 
directly and indirectly employed about 600,000 
people.11 Total employment in the tea and sugar-
cane schemes is estimated to be even higher. Only 
the sweetcorn scheme appears to have made least 
contribution to rural employment in Kenya. 
The larger schemes made significant contribu-
tions to the government budget in terms of excise 
and income taxes. In 1982, the tobacco scheme 
contributed about KSh 1 billion, while the sugar-
cane scheme contributed about KSh 1.3 billion 
during th.e 1978-87 period.12 
The tea and French bean schemes earned the 
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country substantial foreign exchange through ex-
porting their final products. The sugarcane and 
·sunflower schemes contribute to import supstitu-
tion in sugar and cooking oils thereby saving the 
country foreign exchange. The tobacco scheme 
both saves and earns the country foreign exchange 
through import substitution in green leaf tobacco 
and exports of leaf tobacco to Europe and cigarettes 
to neighbouring countries. The foreign exchange 
savings and/or earnings appear extremely limited in 
the sweetcorn scheme. 
Schemes' performance with respect to redress-
ing personal and regional income distribution 
imbalance could not be established with the data 
from the case studies. However, their rural location 
offers opportunities for reducing the rural-urban in-
come distribution imbalance. the sun-
flower scheme in the marginal areas provided 
opportunities for reducing regional income distri-
bution imbalances. We could not establish whether 
the schemes had ameliorated or exacerbated intra-
regional income distribution imbalances. 
Constraints to replicability 
None of the schemes analyzed were unqualified 
successes. However, the tea, tobacco, sugarcane 
and French bean schemes had performed better on 
most elements of the evaluation criteria than any of 
the other schemes analyzed. Replicability of the 
positive elements of these schemes elsewhere would 
be constrained by the following factors: 
lack of skilled managers and technicians to 
manage and operate schemes efficiently 
• high cost of penetrating into high-value export 
markets. Entering such markets require costly 
information on characteristics of consumer and 
retail demand (i.e., quality, packaging, season-
ality); technical and marketing innovations of 
competitors; tariff and non-tariff barriers and 
preferences; and wholesale and retail marketing 
channels via brokers or multinational corpora-
tions. · 
• poor infrastructural development in some pro-
duction areas that would inhibit delicate and 
timely transportation of produce to distant ex-
port markets 
• poor international and domestic market condi-
tions reflected in low and insecure demand for 
raw materials and final products of potential 
schemes 
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high cost of training and communicating with 
unskilled outgrowers 
Policy implications 
The following are the main policy changes implied 
by the schemes analyzed: 
streamlining the production and marketing of 
some crops (e.g., sugarcane) to minimize pay-
ment delays 
introducing production and/or marketing insur-
ance schemes to protect outgrowers against 
crop failures and market vagaries 
phasing out recovery of loans made for inputs 
and services 
encouraging greater and more effective partici-
pation of outgrowers in scheme policy design 
and implementation 
integrating contract farming schemes into na-
tional agricultural programmes to minimize 
duplication of resources 
streamlining and strengthening the legal frame-
work for contract farming through introducing 
a Contract Farming Act. This would protect 
outgrowers through introducing minimum and 
compulsory provisions for each contract, insti-
tutionalizing negotiations between outgrower 
organizations and scheme management and 
introducing guaranteed minimum returns 
scheme. 
providing training courses to farmers in basic 
literacy, accounting, and cash management to 
minimize conflicts between outgrowers and 
scheme management Quasi-training activities 
such as group meetings to ,explain contract 
terms, interest rates, calculation of deductions, 
and other technical areas would improve effi-
ciency and minimize conflicts. 
Future research issues 
There are a number of areas where further 
research would greatly enhance the findings of the 
· present study and provide a basis for policy actions 
regarding production and marketing contracts. The 
first area is to undertake theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the determinants of the viability, distri-
bution of benefits among scheme actors and per-
formance of the existing contract farming schemes 
in Kenya. Second, the impacts of contract farming 
schemes on transfer of technology to outgrowers 
and income distribution should be investigated 
further. The third area is the impact of rights to land 
and other regulations regarding agricultural man-
agement on the structure and viability of contract 
farming schemes. The performance of existing 
outgrowers organizations should be analyzed and, 
lastly, the present study could be extended into 
livestock, poultry, manufacturing and services sub-
sectors of the economy that would augment existing 
data on high value export crops. 
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Abstra.ct 
This study is based on a survey ofnearly 300 asparagus outgrowers in Maseru District, Lesotho 
conducted in 1987-88 and interviews with government officials and representatives of the 
processing company. Key features of contract farming in Lesotho are discussed. Public policy 
issues are examined including the Lesotho economy, the agricultural development strategy, 
land tenure and land management issues and the relationship between the Lesotho government 
and foreign aid agencies. The production system in which outgrowers are involved, particu-
larly the complex contractual relationships between outgrowers and the agri-business com-
pany, is- examined as well as the processing and marketing structure. The position of women 
as growers and dominant workers at the processing plant is examined including problems they 
face and the implications of seasonal employment. The increasingly important role of the 
Asparagus Growers Coop«rative Society is discussed. 
Key factors determining the success of the asparagus outgrow er scheme are: suitable agro-
climatic conditions; smallholder, family-based production with a high level of self-exploita-
tion by the farmer; effective extension services; a guaranteedmarket in Europe and av ail ability 
of concessionary capital resources to the processing company and, to a lesser extent, to the 
outgrowers. The study indicates that asparagus is a unique crop. Although the outgrower 
scheme is largely a success, its replicability in other product lines would not be easy. 
The asparagus production and processing 
scheme in Lesotho, the focus of this study, is 
regarded as the most significant contract farming. 
and outgrower model within the agricultural sector 
of the country. The contract farming and outgrower 
model of agricultural production and its relation-
ship to enterprises that process and sell agricultural 
products (whether to domestic or external markets) 
do not have a long history in Lesotho. The intro-
duction of asparagus-a crop that is neither indige-
nous nor traditionally grown-in Le_sotho's agri-
cultural sector was advocated by a United Nations 
Development Programme/ Food and Agriculture 
Organization (UNDP/FAO) horticultural consult-
ant to the Government of Lesotho in 1971. A case 
for asparagus production was made on the basis of 
agronomic, agro-climatic and economic considera-
tions. Asparagus is a drought-resistant crop which 
could be adopted without great difficulties by 
Lesotho's female-dominated agrarian society and 
could gainfully and intensively employ rural 
(female) labour. That it is also very marketable as 
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a high-value crop in the target market of Western 
Europe also impressed the Government of Lesotho 
and its Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). 
Asparagus was adopted within Lesotho's agri-
cultural sector on the basis of the contract farming 
and outgrower model. This had been advocated on 
the grq,unds thatit would stimulate the revival of the 
agricultural sector into a dynamic export sector and 
bring about agricultural transformation with the 
emergence of off-farm processing industries, such 
as canning enterprises, and spread the benefit of the 
process among rural-based asparagus outgrowers. 
Production and processing of asparagus and 
export to Western Europe was implemented in 
January 1974 as a pilot scheme within an area-
based project of the MOA in Maseru District, the 
Thaba-BosiuRural DevelopmentProject(TBRDP). 
This was a donor-supported project with broad 
rural development goals. 
The asparagus production and processing 
scheme has two distinct parts. The asparagus pro-
duction part consists of the outgrowers themselves 
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who are being serviced with technical advice by the 
MOA extension service and inputs by Basotho 
Farm Produce (BFP), a subsidiary company of the 
Lesotho National Development Corporation 
(LNDC) under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
BFP also provides agronomic services to the as-
paragus outgrowers. 
The second section is the cannery itself, Baso-
tho Fruits and Vegetable Canners (BFVC), a sub-
sidiary of the LNDC which serves mainly as the 
marketing and distribution channel for the aspara-
gus cash crop. This is a mainstream agri-business 
enterprise, which, although dealing mainly with 
asparagus, is also diversifying into processing beans, 
peas, fruits and jam. 
The significance of the asparagus production 
and processing scheme as a case study is based on 
the following considerations: 
It appears to be the most representative scheme 
in Lesotho in terms of the socio-economic impact 
of agri-business ventures that process domestic 
agricultural produce on the basis of a contrac-
tual link between outgrowers and enterprises, 
and in terms of its replicability to other agricul-
tural product lines. 
The scheme is fourteen years old, enabling this 
study to evaluate its performance on micro and 
macro-economic criteria, especially in relation 
to Lesotho's economic development objectives 
and its impact on the environment, i.e., soil 
fertility. 
· In the particular circumstances of Lesotho, this 
scheme illuminates the central role of foreign 
fild agencies-whether multilateral or bilat-
eral-in shaping national policy towards the 
agricultural sector in Lesotho. This scheme is 
regarded by the Lesotho government as the 
most viable model of the MOA strategy to 
intensify production and processing of high-
value horticultural crops. 
The success of the scheme could clearly have 
significant macro-economic implications on agri-
cultural development, on-farm and off-farm em-
ployment generation and on the strategy of agro-
industrialization. 
Public Policy Issues and Context 
Lesotho's economy 
Lesotho is a small country of 30,000 sq. km. 
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which is land-locked and completely surrounded 
by the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The coun-
try is mountainous, with eighty-seven per cent of its 
area consisting of rugged terrain and only thirteen 
per cent being considered arable. 
Lesothohasastructurallyweakeconomywhich 
is open, with minimum restrictions on the flow of 
commodities between Lesotho and the RSA-which 
has a more developed agricultural and industrial 
production and marketing infrastructure. The price 
structure of traded commodities in Lesotho (in-
cluding agricultural produce) is profoundly influ-
enced by the economy of the RSA.1 
Lesotho's meagre natural resources and colo-
nial history of neglect and underdevelopment have 
led to a situation of structural dependence on the 
RSA. The country depends heavily on South Africa 
for paid employment (mostly in the gold and coal 
mines), imports of food and manufactured goods 
and transport routes. The remittances of Basotho 
mine workers in the RSA contribute over 50 per 
cent of Lesotho's GNP.2 
The major structural constraints and imbalances 
facing Lesotho are: low agricultural productivity 
and a high dependence on food imports; low indus-
trial productive capacity; a narrow and undiversi-
fied export base; excessive reliance on migrant 
labour remittances; and a high dependence of 
government revenues on receipts derived from the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) com-
pensatory funds. 
In the last twenty-one years of Lesotho's post-
independence history (1966-87), the government 
has attempted to address the above constraints and 
imbalances through various national policy meas-
ures, the most important of which have been the 
various five-year development plans which set out 
government development policies and targets. 
The first five years of Lesotho's post-colonial 
period (1966-70) was undistinguished and no sig-
nificant economic growth occurred nor were there 
any noteworthy national development policy ini-
tiatives. Nevertheless, the government did estab-
lish the Lesotho National Development Corpora-
tion (LNDC) in 1967 to promote medium and 
large-scale investment in Lesotho and to support 
industrial development. 3 Another achievement was 
the successful re-negotiation of the Southern Afri-
can Customs Union Agreement in 1969 between 
the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland. The revised compensation formula 
provided Lesotho with more revenue from the 
Customs Union pool.4 
The subsequent fifteen-year period (1970-85) 
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was distinguished by two features. Firstly, the 
government prepared five-year plans 
which set out guidelines and targets for the devel-
opment of various sectors of the economy and the 
public sector itself. In implementing these pro-
grammes, the Government of Lesotho (GOL) 
depended heavily on external capital and technical 
assistance offered by various foreigil aid agencies.5 
Secondly, the Lesotho economy (both GDP and 
GNP) registered high growth rates. Annual growth 
of the GDP, attributed to both private and public 
sector investment, averaged 7 per cent Domestic 
resources were augmented by bilateral and multi-
lateral aid inflows which contributed substantially 
to overall growth.6 During the 1970s mine wages 
and mineworkers' remittances increased by almost 
8 per cent per annum in real terms, with the 
consequence that aggregate GNP grew marginally 
faster than GDP, at 7.4 per cent per annum. 
The high economic growth rates of the 1970s 
were still based on a structurally weak economy. 
The positive factors were clearly exogenous: in-
creases in mine-worker remittances due to a rise in 
mine wages, increased SACU funds, increased 
tourism incomes (mainly due to South African 
tourists), huge foreign aid inflows and investment 
in diamond proouction in Lesotho by the South 
African mining house, De Beers Ltd. 
In the 1980s the economic growth rate has not 
been maintained, illustrating the vulnerability of 
the Lesotho economy to exogenously-induced 
shocks. Negative factors include.a decreasein RSA 
mine employment for Lesotho citizens, De Beers' 
decision to close the diamond mine in 1982, a 
decline in concessional aid flows, the RSA's eco-
nomic down-tum and its consequences on Lesotho 
and worsening government budget deficits.7 · 
The most significant effect has been the stagna-
tion of agricultural output due to a historic decline 
in productivity, the drought cycle, and the increas-
ing dependence of rural families in Lesotho on off-
farm wage remittance resulting in the neglect of 
agriculture. Lesotho's small-scale agricultural sector 
has declined in its contribution to the GDP in the 
last eleven years. While in 1975 it accounted for 38 
per cent of GDP, in 1986 it contributed only 21 per 
cent of GDP. 8 Yet this is still the country's most 
important sector given the fact that over 85 per cent 
of Lesotho's population of 1.6 million live in rural 
areas while 60 to 70 per cent of the labour force 
derive some supplemental income from agricul-
ture.9 
Agricultural development strategy 
Given the negative impact of exogenous factors 
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and bleak prospects for economic growth in the 
1980s the government's.basic objectives, as out-
lined in the four five-year plans, are to maximize 
national income and employment and reduce pov-
erty through rural development.10 
According to the five-year plan for 1986-90, 
achieving these basic objectives will depend on 
restructuring the Lesotho economy by maximizing 
investment in the productive sectors, t.e., industry 
and agriculture. Agriculture-based industries can 
be regarded as the interface of these sectoral priori-
ties. 
The sectoral goals and policies for agriculture 
are to: intensify soil conservation, land utilization 
and environmental protection; increase agricul-
tural production through intensive and extensive 
agricultural development and to establish large-
scale labour-intensive agricultural rural develop-
ment programmes to generate employment.11 
.Intensive crop and horticultural production is a 
priority objective, 12 due to: 
• a large domestic demand for fruits and· vege-
tables in the burgeoning towns and cities is 
developing, currently met by imports constitut-
ing up to 75 percentofLesotho's consumption. 
these products bring relatively high returns which 
can compete effectively with off-farm income 
• entry into these ventures is relatively easy due 
to the absence of any significant economies of 
scale in production. 
The above considerations are based on farming 
systems research sponsored by the government on 
a range of high value crops, including lucerne,. 
vegetables, fruits, essential oils and asparagus.13 
The plan then sets out the following objective: 
During the fourth five-year plan period, the 
government will encourage the develop-
ment of horticultural production to reduce 
dependence on foreign imports and to in-
crease export earnings. Strategies involv-
ing specialized marketing assistance to small 
farmers and reduced input prices to in-
crease profit margins will be considered to 
improve the competitiveness of the small 
Basotho farmers. 14 
The government has identified and set tasks to 
be performed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
to support high-value crop production. The follow-
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ing technical and marketing services will be under-
taken by the Ministry. 
intensify horticultural research, both on-station 
and through adaptive research programmes 
strengthen MOA' s hortieultural extension serv-
ices through appropriate training and develop-
ing effective advisory messages. Given budget-
ary constraints on the expansion of the Minis-
try's extension staff, extension service priori-
ties have to be set. 
• improve marketing services offered by MOA. 
The Ministry is expected to establish a frame-
work for monitoring markets and dissemination 
of market information, including advice on 
import regulations.Is 
Land management issues 
The MOA has set out crop production projec-
tions which can be attained if Lesotho's land re-
source base is optimally utilized. Given that only 
13 per cent of the land area is considered arable 
(300,000 hectares) only up to 3 per cent of this land 
is regarded as potentially suitable for intensive 
cultivation. Of this land area, about 17 ,000 hectares 
is potentially suitable for irrigation, representing 
about 0.06 per cent of the arable area. If these land 
resources are used optimally, 270,000 tonnes of 
cereals, 23,000 tonnes of legumes, 70,000 tonnes 
of vegetables and 25,000 tonnes of fruits can be 
produced.I6 
Land management issues are central to the agri-
cultural development strategy, as is the judicious 
use of the land base. In ·seeking to optimize the use 
of the land resource base, the government estab-
lished a Land Policy Review Commission in J anu-
ary · 1987 which, following seven months of coun-
try-wide consultations, submitted its findings and 
recommendations to the government in October 
1987.17 The Commission found a high degree of 
mis-management of arable and grazing lands 
throughout the country and a seeming inability of 
most Basotho farmers to invest in land improve-
ments and soil conservation. Nevertheless the Com-
mission regarded the Land Act of 1979 and other. 
land husbandry laws as regulatory tools for im-
proving land use and management.Is 
In order to maximize the production of high-
value crops, on either dry or irrigated land, the 
basic policy is to consolidate existing fragmented 
holdings into economically viable farming units. 
The alternative would be to encourage land sub-
leasing from those allotted land by enterprising 
farmers or enterprises to consolidate holdings or 
optimize land use while guaranteeing the interests 
of landholders who would derive rental income 
from the sub-leasing relationship.I9 
Lesotho national policy and 
foreign aid agencies 
The introduction of asparagus production and 
processing as a pilot contract farming and out-
grower scheme was initiated by multilateral donor 
agencies, UNI?P/FAO, and implemented by the 
MOA during the first and second five-year plan 
(1971-80). In the tJ:iird plan period (1980-85) the 
scheme was transferred to the LNDC under the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, becoming an agri-
business project proper but still supp0rted by the 
UNDP/FAO for capital and technical inputs. The 
European Development Fund (EDF) under the 
auspices of the EEC/ACP-LOME Convention is 
involved in the asparagus expansion programme in 
the fourth plan period (1986-90). 
Other multilateral donoragencies, like the World 
Bank (IBRD), have played a key role in creating an 
institutional environment conducive to this agri-
cultural commercialization strategy since 1975. 
Bilateral aid agencies such as the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Over-
seas Development Administration (ODA) have also 
played an important role in shaping the govern-
ment's agricultural development strategy-the 
culmination of the fifteen years of experience with 
various multilateral and bilateral donor-funded 
projects and programmes. During this period, the 
foreign aid agencies based in Lesotho came to 
exercise overwhelming influence in determining 
the government's objectives, priorities and strate-
gies. 
In assessing its experience with foreign aid 
directed towards the agricultural sector, the latest 
policy paper of the Ministry of Agriculture notes 
that while the plans have served a useful purpose in 
· mobilizing donor and local funds, the agricultural 
production targets have never been realized except 
for the establishment of physical infrastructural 
facilities. It observes further that: 
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The transition to self-sustaining develop-
ment (in the agricultural sector) after donor 
support has been withdrawn is negative, 
thus implying wasteful and ineffective utili-
zation of resources. This situation is char-
acteristic of nearly all donor-Government 
funded projects and schemes.20 
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Thus the government is increasingly being forced 
to evaluate the usefulness, quality, and viability of 
foreign assistance projects. These projects are more 
often than not advocated by donors who, in the 
process, determine the government strategy on a 
project-by-project basis. One of the objectives of· 
the fourth plan is to initiate a decisive shift from this 
ad hoc project approach to systematic programmes 
of investment in the productive sector of the econ-
omy, building on clearly-identifiable priorities. 
The medium to loilgcterm implications of this shift 
are still to be seen. Foreign assistance agencies still 
enjoy a very influential status due to the gross 
inadequacy of domestically-generated capital in-
vestment surpluses. 
History of the Asparagus 
Production and Processing Project 
During the first five-year plan period, a study 
commissioned by the UNDP/FAO identified as-
paragus as one of the high cash value crops most 
feasible and promising in returns.21 This study be-
came the basis for initiating the scheme within the 
framework of the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development 
Project (TBRDP) in January 1974. 
Plans for field activities, nurseries, and a small 
cannery were submitted to the GOL for approval 
and to the UNDP country programme for funding. 
Farmers were selected and training sessions organ-
ized within the TBRDP project area which had 
'about 6,000 acres of soil suitable for asparagus 
production. 
TBRDP provided skilled personnel, seedlings, 
fertilizers and tractor services. Farmers agreed to 
sell all their produce to the cannery at a specified 
price. Repayment of costs by farmers was to be 
made by a check-off on the sales, and spread over 
a ten-year period. Relatively small plots (0.25-0.5 
acre) were allocated to each farmer to allow for the 
high labour requirements of asparagus. 
About twenty months after the first planting (in 
January, 1974) a first harvesting operation was 
conducted with the project purchasing asparagus 
spears at the rate of 25 cents (0.25 Maloti) per 
kilogram for first grade and 12. 5 cents per kilogram 
for second grade. The spears were then transported 
to a kitchen-type cannery in Masianokeng 
600 cans were produced as samples and sent out to 
various exporters 'throughout the world to demon-
strate the quality of the product.23 
The asparagus scheme began in January 1974 
with 5 acres and seventeen growers.By the follow-
ing planting season in December, 1974, sixty-five 
24 
more growers pledged 31 acres of their land. The 
third planting season was August 1975, and thirty-
two more growers were allowed to plant 16 acres of 
asparagus.24 By December, 1976, 54 acres had been 
planted by one hundred and seventeen growers. 
By 1975 a pilot canning plant had been built 
with the assistance of the United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) at a cost of 
US$185,000 and was in operation the following 
year. By 1977, some 12,000 cans of asparagus had 
been produced out of the output of one hundred and 
fifty-two farmers who had planted 75 acres of 
asparagus. The target for 1982/3 was for some 300 
acres to be planted with asparagus with about six 
hundred and fifteen small-scale farmers as out-
growers .. 
A May, 1978 evaluation concluded that invest-
ment in processing equipment was necessary. The 
UNCDF approved a second plant amounting to 
US$165,000 on the grounds that it would enhance 
the profitability of the scheme. 
Towards the end of the second five-year plan, 
the UNCDF received a request for an additional 
US$1,047,000 for the scheme and the plant even 
before the second approved grant could be dis-
bursed. The rationale for the· new proposal was to 
expand the processing capacity of the plant to 2.5-
3.0 tonnes of asparagus per day, especially for the 
September through December harvesting season. 
The increased processing capacity in the asparagus 
off-season would be used to process beans to be 
canned in tomato sauce. 
A feasibility study team organized by the Indus-
trial Council for Development (ICD) considered 
'the new proposal and ultimately found the proposal 
sound after assessing the long-term prospects for 
fruit and vegetable production and processing in 
Lesotho. A grant of US$1.05 million was then · 
approved by the UNCDF in February, 1980. 
In the third five-year plan period the plant was 
transferred from the MOA to the LNDC, effective 
in 1980. This transfer marked the transformation of 
the scheme from a rural development project to an 
agro-business venture under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The new 
board of the cannery was preoccupied more with 
viability and profitability than with rural develop-
ment 
The cannery was registered as a company under 
the Companies Act as Basotho.Fruitand Vegetable 
Canners (BFVC) as a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
theLNDC. 
The performance of the BFVC in implementing 
the UNCDF programmes is shown by the follow-
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ing, which it had achieved by 1987: 
• Over 500 acres had been· planted to asparagus. 
The asparagus programme set target was to 
expand the asparagus area to 370 acres by 1992. 
• Additional cannery equipment capacity had been 
installed with supplemental funding from the 
EEC counterpart food-aid funds. Apparently, 
the UNCDF fund was not able to fully equip the 
cannery. By 1988 ·the seasonal capacity was 
about 2,250 tonnes of canned asparagus.25 
In 1987 the EEC approved an ambitious aspara-
gus expansion programme for 1986-90 amounting 
to M 11.5 million (4.75 million ECU) after consid-
ering a MTI/LNDC project proposal for further 
expanding the asparagus production programme.26 
The Land Tenure Context 
Land tenure is relevant to contract farming 
because it may determine whether an agro-indus-
trial company engages in estate farming to wholly 
or partially supply itself with the raw material, or 
leaves the farming to outgrowers. Where title to 
land is easily transferable, a company may prefer 
large-scale farming, while in situations where title 
is not transferable, or there are political risks in-
volved in owning land, the company will usually 
prefer to use outgrowers as a source of supply. 
Land tenure is also relevant where it becomes 
necessary to expand production. The company may 
want to extend its existing estate farming activities 
or the outgrowers might want to use the income 
from their crop or credit facilities from a financial 
institution, to purchase land and bring it under the 
crop. In addition, the company may want to pur-
chase or lease land in order to lease or sub-lease it 
· to tenant farmers who then produce the crop on a 
contract farming basis. 
Lastly, land tenure issues are relevant in a coun-
try like Lesotho where much of the land is still 
controlled by chiefs under a traditional system that 
does not provide for its sale. Thus, any changes in 
land tenure which affect the control of land by the 
political authority will be relevant to the farmer 
who wants to engage in contract farming. 
The Land Act of 7 979 
A change in the land tenure system occurred in 
1979 which introduced limited rights over land and 
a limited market in land. Prior to 1979, land rights 
could not be sold, neither could land be mortgaged. 
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The Land Act of 1979 introduced lease-holding 
tenure and license rights. Under the traditional 
tenure, land was allocated for use annually-thus 
there was no security of tenure. Under the lease 
system, the farmer would be secure in holding his 
or her lease for at least ninety years. 
In passing the Land Act of 1979, the State had 
hoped to encourage farmers to engage in commod-
ity production, including participation in out-
grower schemes. Aspects of the Act which are 
relevant to contract farming are as follows: 
Conversion of traditional 'allocation' into/ease: 
Section 11 of the Act gives a farmer holding land 
under traditional allocation the option of convert-
ing it into land by applying to the Com-
missioner of Lands. This has a number of implica-
tions favourable to the farmer: 
it ensures that the farmer can confidently invest 
in the land knowing that it will not be taken 
away in the next ninety years 
the land under a lease can be mortgaged and 
thus give the farmer the financial ability to 
develop the land 
the farmer can dispose of his or her interest in 
the land by selling the lease (subject to obtain-
ing permission from the Minister), thus pre-
venting loss of investment 
the farmer can sublet part of the land and the 
sub-lessee could then engage in contract farm-
ing 
Inheritance. Unlike the traditional tenure sys-
tem, the Land Act makes land inheritable by a 
single heir, providing continuity in land-use with 
little risk of fragmentation, and potential for greater 
productivity. 
Consolidation. A farmer with one or two small 
fields can take over, through purchase or sub-lease, 
equally small adjacent fields so as to consolidate 
the land into one economically viable farm. Such a 
farm would enable the farmer to engage in out-
grower schemes for the market. 
Selected Agricultural Areas (SAA). Sections 50 
and 51 of the Act allow the government to take the 
initiative to improve agricultural productivity. The 
Minister is given the the power to declare a particu-
lar area a Selected Agricultural Area (SAA). Such 
land would then be subdivided into economically 
viable units and allocated to individual farmers 
who would then participate in an agricultural 
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scheme. The farmers would be selected by the 
Minis'ter upon application, to ensure that those 
selected have the ability to carry out the scheme 
proposed. 
The SAA designation is a potentially ideal frame-
work for encouraging contract farming as a strat-
-egy for agricultural development, particularly since 
farmers in the SAA scheme would be easier to 
supervise and likely to respond better to extension 
services than ordinary small-scale farmers. Credit 
would also be readily available. On the other hand, 
the more prosperous farmers would be selected to 
participate in the SAA schemes. This may con-
tradict the objective of improving the lot of 
poorer members of the rural community. 
Although the provisions of the Land Act appear 
to be favourable to contract farming, outgrower 
schemes can also thrive under a traditional land 
tenure system. Contract farming has hitherto been 
successfully practised on traditionally-held land in 
asparagus production in Lesotho, and fruit produc-
tion in Swaziland on the so-called Swazi Nation 
Land.27 
In summary, traditional land tenure in Lesotho 
does not pose a serious obstacle to contract farm-
ing. If desirable, however, commoditization of 
agricultural production through small-scale farmer 
outgrower schemes could be enhanced by imple-
inenting the provisions of the Land Act of 1979. 
However, implementation of this Act has not been 
achieved. 
Outgrowers and the Production 
System 
The outgrower 
According to company reeords there were about 
one thousand outgrowers involved in the asparagus 
scheme by the end of 1987. The survey showed that 
80 per cent of the sample of outgrowers were 
women, typical of rural farm management in Leso-
tho. This is largely because an estimated 50 to 60 
per cent of Lesotho's able-bodied male labour is 
employed in South Africa. 
Theoutgrowersarepoorpeasants,mostofwhom 
derive their means of subsistence partly from the 
land and partly from the remittances of their rela-
tives working in South Africa. According to FAO, 
60 to 65 per cent of µsotho's households benefit 
directly or indirectly from migrantS' earnings. 
Further, 75 per cent of the rural population live 
below the poverty datum line of M 355 per month 
for an average family of five people.28 Although as-
paragus growers have started to earn monthly in-
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come8 higher than M 355 per family, they still 
basically live below the poverty datum line. 
Access into the asparagus scheme is relatively 
easy since it does not make insurmountable de-
mands on the resources of the poor farmer in terms 
of land; capital or labour. Shortage of arable land 
has not affected the cultivation of asparagus. Under 
the traditional land tenure system each adult member 
of the village is entitled to three fields. Thus heads 
of households will normally have at least one field 
if not two. Due to the labour-intensive nature of 
asparagus, only small plots of land (averaging 0.5 
acres per family) are required for the successful 
cultivation of the crop using family labour. Labour 
is generally available since.most rural households 
where the asparagus is grown (Maseru District) 
have an adequate family labour capacity (four to 
five persons).29 The insistence of the MOA and, 
later, BFP extension officers that land under as-
paragus should normally not exceed 0.2 hectares 
per household is based on the assumption of such an 
availability of family labour. However, the survey 
showed that at least 50 per cent of the outgrowers 
interviewed employed wage labour, 70 per cent of 
them employing at least one to two persons. Lastly, 
no capital outlay is required on the part of the 
farmer. Tractor services are provided by, BFP, 
which, through the outgrowers' co-operative also 
sells seedlings and necessary inputs. The only 
factors expected of the farmer are labour and land. 
The entry procedure 
Recruitment into the asparagus outgrower 
scheme has been the duty of extension officers 
since the conception of the scheme in 1974. At first 
it was theMOA/TBRDPextension staff, thenMOA 
and BFVC staff, and today its done by MOA and 
BFP extension staff. 
Extension officers identify a village with poten-
tial for asparagus cultivation after satisfying them-
selves of the· suitability of the soil and access to 
roads. They then invite applications from people in 
the village who are able and willing to engage in 
asparagus production. Successful applicants are 
selected on the basis of: possession of land, dis-
tance of the field from the village asparagus collec-
tion centre, and availability of adequate family 
labour to tend the crop. 
Entry into the scheme, however, is controlled. 
The reason for control is to avoid excess supply of 
asparagus beyond the plant capacity of BFVC. 
However, following the successful experiment of 
exporting fresh asparagus-which appears more 
profitable than canned asparagus-the BFP may 
Contract Farming and Outgrower -Schemes: Asparagus Production in Lesotho 
decide to relax this control. Nevertheless, the pres-
ent practice is that of planned rather than unre-
stricted expansion . 
Asparagus production process 
Until 1987, asparagus in Lesotho was produced 
in two ways: through an outgrower contract farm-
ing scheme and through estate farming by the 
BFVC. In 1987, however, estate production of 
asparagus was discontinued and the land, previ-
ously leased from the government, was leased out 
to outgrowers on a sub-tenancy basis. 
Estate asparagus farming was abandoned for 
three reasons. Firstly, .there were labour relations 
problems involved in employing farm labour, and 
administrative costs incurred in full-time supervi-
sion of field operations as compared with occa-
sional monitoring of outgrower farm activities. 
Secondly, hired labour is not as efficient as self-
employment with regard to asparagus. Asparagus 
production is a clear case of self-exploitation: out-
growers working on their own fields work long 
hours without regard to returri for their labour, 
whereas hired wage earners work on the basis of a 
fixed working day or otherwise have to be paid for 
overtime.30 Thus it is cheaper and more profitable 
for the BFVC to buy asparagus from outgrowers 
than. to produce it. 
Thirdly, the justification for estate farming in 
terms of quality control and ensuring sufficient 
supply no existed in the case of asparagus. 
Quality contrql is not only assured through semi-
nars conducted by MOA and BFP agronomists and 
extension staff, but is also an objective of the 
outgrowers co-operative whose senior, experienced 
outgrowers help in educating new outgrowers on 
how to obtain a high quality crop. In terms of sup-
plying sufficient raw material to the cannery, the 
EEC expansion project-coupled with the absence 
of alternative markets for asparagus-will ensure 
sufficient supplies to meet the cannery's present· 
and expanded capacity. 
Estate farming operations are now limited to 
producmg green beans, peas and fruits (peaches 
and apricots). This is done on an irrigated nucleus 
farm on leased from local farmers and is under 
the management of BFP not BFVC. 
The outgrower scheme 
Asparagus is a labour-intensive crop; it is very 
sensitive to weeds and requires careful an_d con-
stant weeding. Harvesting is also labour-intensive. 
Asparagus spears have to be timed as they emerge 
out of the soil in the early hours of the morning. For 
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this reason, and because the poor farmers cannot 
afford to employ much wage labour, the MOA and 
BFA agronomists insist that the land planted with 
asparagus should not exceed 0.2 hectares How-
ever, once outgrowers have shown the ability to . 
keep their asparagus fields free of weeds and to 
harvest on time, they may be allowed to extend 
production. 
The sensitivity of asparagus to weeds prevents 
intercropping. At the same time, since asparagus is 
a perennial crop with annual harvesting for eight 
years without replants, the asparagus field will not 
be available to the outgrower for other crops for at 
least eight years. However, given the small size of 
the asparagus plot and the fact that the average land 
holding in Maseru is 1.5 hectares per household, 
food production is not prejudiced by asparagus 
production. 
In this contract farming/outgrower scheme, the 
BFP prepares the soil (ploughing and harrowing), 
plants and provides seedlings-a factor limiting 
participation in asparagus production. Just before 
the harvesting season begins, BFP tractors heap up 
the soil into mounds to cover the asparagus plants 
so that spears can emerge protected from direct sun. 
Outgrowers and their family members har-
vest and deliver asparagus spears to the village 
collecting centres where they are washed, weighed, 
and put on a BFP truck to be transported to the 
factory. 
To ensure the quality of the asparagus delivered 
to the canning factory, the village committee of the 
Setlabocha Co-operative sort out the asparagus at 
the collection centres before it is weighed. The 
weighing and recording of weights is done by an 
employee of the co-operative, a task previously 
performed by BFVC officials. The asparagus i,s 
weighed again by the BFVC official at the factory 
gate and any shortfall in weight due to evaporation 
is absorbed by the co-operative. The cooperative is, 
of course, unhappy about this. 
The farmers are present during the weighing 
and process. Because most of them are 
illiterate or semi-literate, they are unable to follow 
closely the weighing and recording of their pro-
duce. However, they are less concerned now that 
their own employee, rather than that of the com-
pany, does the weighing and recording. Previously, 
outgrowers felt the BFVC officials were cheating 
them during weighing and recording. 
Contractual arrangements for pro-
duction and sale 
When the scheme started in 1974, farmers signed 
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an agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA) whereby they were to grow asparagus 
under certain conditions. Under the agreement, the 
farmeragreed to set aside a field on which he bound 
himself to grow nothing but asparagus for a period 
of not less than six years. The farmer agreed to tend 
the crop, harvest it, and sell all of it to the processing 
plant which was then operated by the TBRDP. The 
Ministry, on the other hand, agreed to prepare the 
soil, provide fertilizer, insecticides and 
pesticides and provide harvesting implements. The 
Ministry further agreed that during the harvesting 
period (after a year) it would pay for the crop on a 
weekly basis atan agreed price. Expenses incurred 
by the Ministry were to be recovered by deductions 
from asparagus sales paid to the farmer. Sub-
standard produce was to be rejected. The Minis-
try's extension officers kept a record of all transac-
tions with the growers and the growers were given 
cards on which such transactions were entered. 
These basic terms of the contract between the 
outgrower and processing partner. were retained 
when the processing cannery was transferred from 
MOA to LNDC, except that growers were no 
longer given written contracts. Nor were they given 
the record cards showing what produce they had 
delivered, what deductions were to be made for 
services, inputs and implements given to them, or 
the payments to which they were entitled. There 
was instead an oral contract: after the extension 
officer accepted the application of the farmer to 
join the scheme, the farmer was simply informed of 
what was expected of him or her and the price the 
farmer would receive when the asparagus was 
ready. This left room for uncertainty as to the terms 
and conditions of the arrangement. Farmers could 
riot be sure that figures were not manipulated by the 
cannery employees. 
In 1984 LNDC formed a new company, the 
Basotho Farm Produce Ltd. (BFP), to deal with the 
agronomic aspects of production, leaving BFVC to 
co.ncentrate on processing and marketing. BFP 
took over the task of providing tractor services, 
farm inputs, and implements to asparagus farmers. 
However, the company did not deal with the farm-
ers directly but went through the Asparagus Grow-
ers Co-operative Association which had been 
formed in 1979. Today, all agricultural inputs from 
BFP to the farmers are channeled through the 
association. So is the payment for such inputs by 
the farmers. The sale of asparagus to the cannery 
and payment by BFVC to the farmers is also done 
through the association. 
Since this arrangement involves the farmers, 
their association, BFVC, and BFP it is difficult to 
determine who has a contract with whom. It may be 
said that there are three contracts involved in the 
scheme. Firstly, there is a contract between Set-
labocha Co-operative Society and BFVC whereby 
the co-operative, on behalf of its members, agrees 
to sell and the latter agree to buy all asparagus 
which satisfies certain quality standards, at a price 
fixed at the beginning of each season. The second 
contract is that between BFP and the Co-operative. 
The terms of the contract are that BFP supplies 
inputs, tractor 'services, extension services and trans-
port for asparagus from the village collection centres 
to the factory. The Co-operative, on the other hand, 
undertakes to supply the inputs and farm imple-
ments to the farmers and recover their cost from the 
farmers in order to pay BFP. 
The third arrangement, which can be called 
contractual, is between the outgrowers and the co-
operative. By paying a 10 maloti fee, members 
become entitled to certain rights and services as 
contained in the by-la';'S of the association. Set-
labocha advances farm inputs and implements to 
the member farmers and collects and records the 
asparagus delivered by the outgrowers. The out-
grower agrees that the cost of inputs shall be de-
ducted from the price paid at a rate fixed by BFP 
and Setlabocha. 
This seems like a fairly complex set of relations 
establishing various legal rights and obligations. In 
practice, the relations are not so complex. Although 
in law BFP is a separate company from BFVC, if 
the "corporate veil" is pierced, it is clear that the 
·two are different divisions of the same company. 
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This position is recognized by the parent company 
of the two subsidiaries. In a paper prepared by 
LNDC, it is acknowledged that: "farmers assisted 
by Basotho Farm Produce are the sole suppliers of 
asparagus to Basotho Canners. Basotho Farm Pro-
duce is, however, administratively run by Basotho 
Canners."31 In practical terms, BFP, as the agron-
omy division of BFVC, deals with Setlabocha in 
relation to production of asparagus. Though BFVC 
purports not to have any direct relationship with the 
outgrowers, it is in constant contact with them 
through extension officers (both the MOA and BFP 
extensionists). Thus BFVC is able to monitor pro-
duction and quality control while unloading some 
of its previous administrative duties onto the co-
operative. 
Basotho Farm Produce (Pty) Ltd. 
Given the need to guarantee the supply of ade-
quate raw material (asparagus) of desirable quality, 
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the UNCDF project provided for the establishment 
of a nucleus farm. This model estate farm was to 
produce and supply some agricultural products to 
the cannery as well as supply outgrowers with 
inputs and extension services. The nucleus farm 
enterprise was incorporated in 1984 as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the LNDC, named Basotho 
Farm Produce (BFP). The objective of establishing 
such an agronomic and extension subsidiary of 
LNDC was to expand asparagus production by 
assisting asparagus farmers to establish and main-
tain their farms. 
Assistance to outgrowers was extended in the · 
form of medium-term credit (3 to 4 years) for 
establishing asparagus farms. This assistance cov-
ers the supply of asparagus crowns (seedlings), 
fertilizers, seed, tractor services and · technical 
advice. The BFP also supplied fruit tree seedlings 
to outgrowers in order to enhance the supply of 
non-asparagus farm products. 
Since commencing its activities in 1984, BFP-
in collaboration with the Crops and Extension 
Division of MOA-has expanded the total hec-
tarage of asparagus cultivation from 50 hectares in 
1984 to 100 hectares in 1987. This enhanced culti-
vation enabled the BFVC to process over 500 
tonnes of asparagus in 1987. 
Ministry of Agriculture 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) is involved 
directly in the asparagus production programme, 
especially its Crop Division and Extension Divi-
sion. The Ministry had undertaken to safeguard the 
supply of adequate amounts of the raw material and 
to stimulate the production of the diversified raw 
material product requirements of a cannery with 
expanded processing capacity. 
Price determination 
The price of asparagus to the outgrowers is 
determined once a year at the beginning of the 
harvesting season. The price is fixed according to 
the prevailing world market prices. Outgrowers 
have had no control over the price determination 
since they had no basis for demanding a different 
price. In addition, BFVC is the only buyer of as-
paragus in the country. However, as Setlabocha 
Co-operative is now represented on the Board of 
Directors of BFV C it has access to the information 
held by the company and is getting into a position 
where it can negotiate a higher price for its mem-
bers. The 1988 season price for asparagus spears is 
M 1.65 per kilogram, having risen from M 1.45 in 
1987andM1.00in 1986. Thefarmersarepaidonce 
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a month during the harvesting season, from Sep-
tember to December: BFVC pays one cheque to the 
co-operative for all the outgrowers, and the co-
operative pays the individual farmers. 
In addition to the fixed price paid to the out-
growers they also receive an extra payment desig-
nated "bonus". The bonus is paid around March, 
after BFVC has sold asparagus on the European 
markets. The rationale, as stated by the general 
manager of BFVC, is that at this time the company 
knows whether it has made a profit or not and what 
proportion of that profit can be passed on to the 
farmer and what proportion needs to :be ploughed 
back into its productive activities. Although in the 
past the bonus appeared to be an arbitrary gift to the 
outgrowers, this will change since Setlabocha Co-
operative is represented on the BFVC Board and 
can negotiate what part of the profits should be paid 
to farmers as bonus. 
The Asparagus Processing and 
Marketing System 
Basotho Fruits and Vegetables 
Canners (Pty) Ltd. 
The canning factory is located at Masianokeng, 
Maseru District, within a hinterland that was iden-
tified by the MOA as most suitable for asparagus 
production. The cannery was registered in 1980. as 
a company named Basotho Fruits and Vegetable 
Canners (BFVC) when the pilot asparagus canning 
project was taken over from theMOA bytheLNDC 
under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
BFVC is a wholly-owned subsidiary oftheLNDC. 
The most important activity of the cannery is pro-
cllring asparagus spears from outgrowers and pre-
paring and processing them for marketing as fresh 
or canned asparagus or as asparagus soup. The 
main destination for the exported asparagus prod-
ucts is Western Europe, in particular, France, Bel-
gium and the Federal Republic of Germany. BFVC 
is the sole marketing and distribution channel for 
all asparagus cash crop production. · 
The expansion of the cannery processing capac-
ity has been the main concern of the LNDC and the 
Ministry of Agriculture ever since the 1979/80 
asparagus season when the processing capacity of 
the cannery had reached its limits. This precipitated 
a bottleneck which resulted in some outgrowers 
abandoning asparagus production. The expansion 
of the cannery's processing capacity to its present 
level of2,250 tonnes per annum has been financed 
by the UNDP's Capital Development Fund with 
supplemental funding form the EEC-Counterpart 
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Food.Aid Funds.32 
The rationale for expanding the processing 
capacity of the cannery was the seasonality of the 
asparagus harvest, which occurs from September 
through December. The 2,250-tonne capacity is to 
coyer the peak harvesting season: · 
The key to the ,cannery's manage-
ment is the need to cover overhead costs and at least 
break even during the asparagus off-seaso11 of 
January to August. The commercial viability of 
BFVC clearly depends on: · 
the viability of adequate, reasonably priced, 
agricultural raw materials 
competitive access to international markets or 
domestic and regional markets33 · 
In order to make the BFVC viable, the opera-
tions of the cannery have been diversified to in-"' 
elude other product lines. With the end of the 
asparagus harvesting season, the cannery proc-
esses peaches, apricots andgreen beans. From June 
to July the cannery produces baked beans in tomato , 
sauce. The total product range ofBFVC is beans in 
sauce, green beans, peaches, peach jam, peach 
nectar, peach pulp, apricots and asparagus spears. 
Despite this diversification, the management of the 
cannery acknowledges that asparagus is the only 
profitable product ofBFVC.34 
The legal status of BFVC 
BFVC was accorded "pioneer industry"· status . 
under the Pioneer Industries Encouragement Act of 
1969 on therecomn.iendationof theLNDC. Through 
this Act, the Government of Lesotho can offer 
incentives to manufacturers operating in Lesotho 
through the Pioneer Industries Board. Although the 
Act was aimed at attracting foreign investors to 
Lesotho some indigenous manufacturing indus-
tries have been offered the status. BFVC gained 
this status on the basis that its operations qualified 
as manufacturing and it met the government policy 
objectives of creating employment, prooucing for 
export and using raw materials.35 
The status entitles a company to be exempted 
from company tax on its income for a period of six 
years or to get certain tax allowances for such 
expenditures as machinery, new buildings, build-
ing depreciation, and training allowance. These 
allowances can· be as high as 145 per cent. Thus 
· BFVC has been exempt from tax since1983. As its 
status is expiring in 1989 it is in the process of 
' applying for renewal.36 
The marketing scenario 
· The major marke.t destinations of both canned 
and fresh asparagus are Germany, Belgium and 
France. According to both the management of 
BFVC and the EEC .country mission 9fficials, 
prices for asparagus in the importing countries are 
firm likely to increase due to a decline in 
production in traditional exporting countries like 
Taiwan, and overall stagnation in production from 
European producers like Spain.37 These develop-
ments provide marketing advantages for Lesotho 
asparagus whiCh is exported during the European 
off-season. 
The BFVC started to export fresh asparagus in 
Octdber 1987 which, according to BFvC manage-
. ment, ·is very profitable. It ultimately exported 40 
tonnes of fresh asparagus out of a total season 
production of 500 tonnes, most of which was canned 
or made into sciup. The projections of the 1988 
September-December season are that out of 700 
tonnes of asparagus, about 100 tonnes will be made 
up of fresh asparagus. The market scenario is most 
1 favourable to a fledgling asparagus enterprise. 
Key Factors Determining the 
Success of. the Asparagus 
Scheme 
This study has identified several key factors 
which determine the form of contract farming in 
Lesotho: land and land.use patterns; the small-
holder family model of production; agro-climatic 
conditions and choice of cash crop; exten-
sion services; and existence of market guarantees 
for the cash crop. . · 
Land and land-use patterns 
In Maseru District (where asparagus production 
· has now become established) only 4.1 per cent of 
the District's 4,279 sq. km. is most suitable for crop 
cultivation. Land under cultivation per rural hous(f-
hold is 1.52 lia., similar to land distribution in other 
districts. This 1.52 hectares usually consists of two 
or three distinct pieces of land. This fragmented 
land-use pattern has been successfully adapted to 
asparagus production where the established policy 
is that the average size of an asparagus plot is 0.24 
hectares 
This practice has enabled asparagus production 
to co-exist with food production since the house-
hold's other fields can be set aside for producing· 
food crops like maize, beans arid peas. The particu-
lar form in which asparagus production has been 
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adapted to the fragmented land-use pattern has 
resulted in a co-existence of cash crop production 
with food production. 
The smallholder family model of 
production · 
Asparagus production has also been adapted 
successfully to the smallholder characteristics of 
Lesotho's rural society. The key feature of Lesotho 
rural households are: 
national average family size, or persons per 
rural household, of 5.03 persons 
national average area of land under cultivation 
per household of 1.29 hectares, very close to the 
average land holding size of 1.32 hectares 
average landholding size in Maseru Distiict of 
1.5 hectares 
women as de facto decision-makers at the farm 
level (due to the pervasive migratory labour 
system), playing a central role in the production 
of both food and cash crops 
Entry into asparagus production is relatively 
easy for the average rural household, provided that 
there is an effective extension service offered by 
the cannery or the MOA that provides inputs and 
technical advice. In addition, the established prac-
tice of limiting the average land area planted with 
asparagus to 0.24 hectares ensures the intensive 
labour requirements demanded of the household to 
produce high quality asparagus. This production 
model has produced consistently high quality as-
paragus spears. The high quality of both canned 
and fresh asparagus exported by BFVC to W estem 
Elirope satisfies the asparagus consumer market, 
particularly in Germany and France.38 
Agro-climatic conditions and 
choice of cash crop 
Agro-climatic conditions in Lesotho are not 
very favourable to intensive rain-fed crop produc-
tion. The summer period, from October to April, is 
warm to hot with erratic rainfall. This is when much 
of the moisture needed by crops is supplied. The 
winter period, from May to July, is cold and dry 
with cold conditions setting in quite early. Drought 
spells are teri years there is a three 
or four-year drought period. In addition to inade-
quate rainfall, other climatic constraints to crop 
production include severe hail in the lowlands, 
frost, and low temperatures and snow in winter. 
Given such agro-climatic conditions, the choice 
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of asparagus as a crop to be produced on the basis 
of con tract farming was most appropriate since it is 
perennial and drought and hail resistant. The crop, 
thrives even on marginal land regarded as unsuit-
able for food crop production. Such a hardy peren-
nial crop considerably reduces the risk of crop loss 
and guarantees recovery of costs of establishing it. 
The cost of establishing a hectare of asparagus in 
the first two years is M 1,588. This is before any 
crop can be harvested. A field three years old is in 
its first year of production and produces an average 
of 2.5 tonnes per hectare. With good land hus-
bandry, a yield of five tonnes can be expected 
annually from year four to year thirteen. In com-
parison, green beans produced under irrigated 
conditions have an annual yield of 3 tonnes per 
hectare.39 
Effective extension services 
A key factor in the success of asparagus contract 
farming is the availability of effective extension 
services. The two institutions which provide exten-
sion services for the horticultural production pro-
grammes are MOA through its crops and extension 
divisions, respectively, and BFP, the LNDC sub-
sidiary that runs the 200 hectares nucleus farm and 
also provides extension services to asparagus out-
growers. Both the MOA and BFP have been ex-
plicitly charged with facilitating the production of 
asparagus and other horticultural products to be 
used as raw mate.ial inputs for the cannery .40 The 
MOA has a large extension service which employs 
more that 250 extension officers. It also has a 
Farmers Training Section with five Farmers Train-
ing Centres and an agricultural information service 
which issues printed information and runs a farmer 
broadcasting service on the national broadcasting 
service. Some of the most experienced extension 
officers from MOA have been seconded or at-
tached to the cannery and BFP in order to comple-
ment BFP's extension personnel and agronomists. 
The combined extension service effort of the 
MOA and BFP has been fairly effective-in estab-
lishing and expanding the asparagus production 
programme. Such extension services are effective 
particularly in the following areas: · 
ensuring the supply. of tools, seedlings and 
other inputs and providing technical advice to 
outgrowers 
ensuring a high standard of quality of asparagus 
spears 
safeguarding the fertility of the soil and pre-
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venting the depletion of soil nutrients by ensur-
ing the application of organic and chemical 
fertilizers 
Market guarantees for asparagus · 
A key determinant of the viability of the whole 
asparagus production and marketing programme 
has been the existence of favourable market condi-
tions for asparagus in Western Europe, where it is 
consumed as a luxury food item. Prices for both 
canned and fresh asparagus are steady and even 
increasing due to a decline of production from 
traditional asparagus exporters and overall stagna-
tion of production in Europe. The successful ex-
perimentation by BFVC with exporting fresh as-
paragus-which is preferred by consumers over 
the canned type-promises to make the whole 
enterprise even more profitable. 
It is important to note that Lesotho's asparagus 
exports enjoy a seasonal market advantage since 
the peak harvesting season of September to De-
cember coincides with the off-season phase of 
other asparagus producers. The cannery, through 
the LNDC, is also taking advantage of the preferen-
tial trade arrangements under the EEC-ACP Lome 
Convention, by applying for a waiver of customs 
and excise duties within the EEC.41 
These are the key factors that determine the 
form that asparagus contract farming has taken in 
Lesotho and the viability of the enterprise both at 
the farm level and the level of the cannery. Under-
1 ying all these factors, however, is the availability 
of concessional aid resources which significantly 
subsidize both the production of asparagus and the 
expansion of the processing capacity of the can-
nery. 
Evaluation of the Asparagus 
Scheme 
Evaluation of the asparagus scheme's perform-
ance is based on the main actors-the government, 
the outgrower and the firm-achieving their objec-
tives 
Government objectives 
In initiating the asparagus scheme under the 
TBRDP, the Government of Lesotho was pursuing 
the following policy objectives: 
.. 
increasing the contribution of the agricultural 
sector to national income 
creating employment for the rural population 
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increasing the incomes of the smallholder farm-
ers 
increasing national foreign exchange earnings 
through producing and exporting a high-value 
crop 
These objectives have ill large measure been 
achieved. Although the BFVC registered a loss 
from 1980/81to1983/84, it started to show a profit 
from 1984/85. In the 1987/88 season BFvC made 
a profit of M 200,000. If it is seen as a profitable 
enterprise within the LNDC parastatal, then it may 
be argued that it is contributing to national income. 
Government objectives have probably been best 
in of employment Asparagus pro-
duct10n has created on-farm employment by in- , 
creasing the working time of family members by 
twenty-four work days per household.42 Our sur-
vey showed that' in 75 percent of the households in 
the sample, all members of the outgrower's family 
participated in the asparagus production. Taking 
the average family size in Maseru District of five 
persons and assuming that all the family members 
participate at least during the peak periods of 
weeding and harvesting, the present 1,000 aspara-
gus outgrower farms should be providing on-farm 
employment for up to 5,000 people. Without as-
paragus, these people would at best be under-
employed1 or engaging in subsistence farming. 
In addition, some outgrowers employ casual 
wage labour to assist-largely in weeding and 
harvesting. Thus the survey showed that just over 
50 per cent of the outgrowers in the sample em-
ployed labour. These wage earners are the rural 
lumpen proletariat who have neither land nor regu-
lar employment. They earn an average of M 2.00 
per day. 
The employment objective has also been met 
through hiring almostexclusivel¥ female labour by 
the BFVC factory for processing and canning. 
Since these women form an important part of the 
asparagus project, their employment is treated in 
greater detail later. Incomes of at least a section of 
the rural population have certainly been increased. 
The objective of increasing foreign exchange 
earnings has been achieved in that the production 
and processing of asparagus requires minimal for-
eign exchange since most of the machinery and 
other equipment used comes through concessional 
aid from the UNDPandEEC. It is estimated thatthe 
ratio of the project-induced imports to exports at 
full production is 1:2.5. Moreover, imports here 
include those from South Africa w!lich is within the 
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same currency zone. 
Outgrowers objectives , 
The major objective of the outgrowers in join-
ing the asparagus scheme was to derive income 
from their produce. Improvements of farming 
methods through extension services may be an-
other objective. It is clear that outgrowers. have 
increased their on-farm incomes through participa-
tion in the scheme. Unfortunately, our survey was 
unable to get exact figures of incomes derived from 
asparagus production as the out growers interviewed 
were either reluctant to disclose their incomes 
(presumably for fear that it would affect their tax 
assessment) or they were genuinely unable to 
remember what amounts were specifically earned 
from asparagus sales. 
The latter explanation is more likely since these 
illiterate or semi-literate farmers tend not to keep 
records of their incomes from various sources (such 
as selling farm products other than asparagus, 
remittances from migrant relatives and beer brew-
ing). 
The data do show that 76 per cent of those 
interviewed put money incomes as the only benefit 
from the scheme. Many mentioned their ability to 
pay school fees for their children. According to 
EEC calculations, earnings from the Maseru Dis-
trict average smallholder farm of 1.52 hectares 
without asparagus are M 276, while earnings from 
the same size farm with asparagus come. to M 
1,158.00, about four times as much.44 
It is difficult to measure the outgrowers' im-
provement in farming techniques from the survey 
since there are many factors affecting the success or 
failure of non-asparagus crops in addition to tech-
nical knowledge and good husbandry. 
One incidental benefit of the asparagus contract 
farming scheme to outgrowers and the community 
at large is the introduction of clean water at the 
village collection centres by the cannery and now 
by theBFP. 
Main Areas of Performance 
Regarding the Scheme 
·Food production 
Food production is not an objective of the as-
paragus outgrower scheme since asparagus is nei-
ther an indigenous food crop nor a traditionally 
imported foodstuff which could replace imports if 
produced locally. Asparagus was specifically aimed 
at the export market. However, a smali amount of 
asparagus is bought by larger local hotels which are 
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mainly patronized by tourists, and some locally-
based expatriate residents. 
What is relevant is that asparagus production 
has not undermined food production. Returns from 
traditional grains on the 0.2 hectares occupied by 
asparagus would be negligible. For instance, reve-
nue from beans planted on 0.3 hectares is estimated 
at M 36. Thus it is worthwhile for a farmer to grow 
asparagus on the 0.2 hectares of a plot and continue 
to produce traditional grains-maize, beans or 
sorghum-on the rest of the land. In any case, it 
would require at least four to five times as much 
land as farmers presently possesses to grow enough 
grain to take them through from one season to 
another. Among the outgrowers interviewed, only 
56 per cent said they produced enough food stuffs 
to last them from year to year. Of those who do not 
have enough, 70 per cent have to purchase the 
balance while the rest have to depend on gifts or 
food loans from neighbours and relatives. 
The other question relevant to food production 
is whether growing asparagus impinges on the 
labour time necessary for food production. The 
research showed that the only asparagus activities 
requiring a substantial share of the growers' labour 
time are weeding and harvesting. Whereas weed-
ing could take a substantial amount of labour time, 
harvesting is done during the first three hours after 
sunrise so that the rest of the day is available for the · 
farmer to attend to food crops. 
As far as the effect of asparagus growing on soil 
fertility is concerned, we have not been able to 
confirm whether the fact that asparagus is har-
vested from the same plot of land for eight to ten 
years without replanting exhausts the soil. How-
ever, it would seem certain that retaining soil fertil-
ity would depend on effective application of or-
ganic and chemical fertilizers. 
Extension · 
It was not easy to determine the effect of exten-
sion services on the farmers involved in the aspara-
gus scheme. Extension services to the outgrowers 
are provided by government (MOA), BFP exten-
sion officers and BFVC agronomists. These exten-
sion officers hold induction seminars to inform 
farmers of what is involved in asparagus growing, 
the need to follow instructions for caring for the 
crop and the use of fertilizers and other necessary 
inputs. They are also involved in selecting farmers 
who may join the outgrower scheme. 
The survey revealed certain problems relating 
to extension services. First, there appears to be a 
possibility of conflict of interest on the part of the 
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MOA extension officers/agronomists. They are as 
concerned about the requirements of BFVC for 
profit maximization as the company's own exten-
sion officers. This is likely to lead to subordination 
of other equity or development-oriented issues 
faced by small-scale farmers. Most outgrowers in-
terviewed were not aware that it was MOA exten-
sionists/agronomists who visited them. Thus 74 per 
cent of those interviewed said they had never been 
visited by a government extension officer. Yet the 
extension officer best known to most farmers, Mr. 
Ntsoti, is a government employee. The only expla-
nation is that outgrowers regard him as a company 
representative. This view was confirmed when 
outgrowers were asked: Which of the two, govern-
ment and company extension staff, were better. Of 
the respondents, 92 per cent were unable to answer 
the question. 
It follows that if the outgrowers have problems 
with the processing company, they cannot confide 
in the extension officers, even the MOA ones. Yet 
mediation between outgrowers and the agri-busi-
ness concern should be one of their functions. 
A related problem is lack of follow-up by exten-
sion staff. A senior member·ofthe outgrowers' co-
operative told the interviewing team that extension 
officers merely give lectures and do not follow up 
these instructions with farmers in the field. He 
suggested that the extension staff should get in-
volved in the practical operations in the fields with 
the growers. However, the BFP, with its emphasis 
on improving the farming abilities of outgrowers, is 
presently fielding more extension staff and there 
may be improvements in this respect 
Extension staff seem to exercise undue power 
and patronage over outgrowers. The fact that they 
have the power to accept or reject the application of 
a potential outgrower makes the outgrowers feel 
indebted to the extension staff responsible. 
Further, the extension staff do not appear to 
explain therights of outgrowers, which they should 
· do. Instead, they issue instructions to them and 
make the whole transaction appear as a favour to 
the outgrowers. 
Finally, whereas extension may have been suc-
cessful in getting farmers to use fertilizers and 
insecticides to keep their asparagus fields free of. 
weeds and produce a high quality of crop, it is not 
clear whether the acquired farming techniques have 
been employed in the production of other crops. 
There is little evidence of the farmers in the schemes 
engaging'in intensive agriculture other than aspara-
gus. 
Input supply 
All outgrowers are required to follow the in-
structions of the MOA/BFVC agronomists as to the 
farming methods to use including the use of a 
specific type of fertilizer. Thus the survey of out-
growers showed that 100 per cent of them used 
fertilizers provided on credit by the company (BFP). 
Only one out of246 outgrowers interviewed claimed 
he used non-company fertilizer. 
. The supply of inputs, other than seedlings, has 
recently been taken over by the Setlabocha Co-
operative. Unlike previously, when the farmers had 
no option to purchase their inputs outside the BFVC/ 
BFP network, Setlabocha Co-operative now buys 
the fertilizer from Co-op Lesotho at a lower price. 
The fertilizer is stillprovided on credit to outgrow-
ers. Other items provided on credit by Setlabocha, 
are the asparagus-specific implements. Gone are 
the days when these things were heavily subsidized 
by the TBRDP. 
Setlabocha deducts the money owed for the 
inputs and implements from the outgrowers' sales 
at therateof0.55 maloti per kg. until the debt is paid 
off. M 0.1 per kg. is paid back to the outgrower in 
January. This is a form of compulsory saving. The 
aim of the co-operative is to help its members by 
providing the inputs, implements, and services at 
the lowest prices. However, the outgrowers do not 
know how much they owe for these things or how 
the rate of deduction is arrived at. It would be in the 
interest of both parties if these issues were ex-
plained to the outgrowers. 
Evaluation of BFVC/BFP Combine 
The following evaluation of the performance 
and viability of the asparagus production, process-
ing and marketing complex, (the BFVC/BFP 
combine) is made within the context of the major 
objectives of the parent corporation, the LNDC, 
itself an investment promotion corporation owned 
by the Government of Lesotho. 
The BFVC and the BFP are legally registered 
. separately as companies and are therefore audited r 
separately on behalf of the LNDC at the end of 
every financial year. However, they share senior 
management of the BFVC. The major objectives of 
the LNDC in establishing these two companies are 
quite clear. BFVC was established in 1980 when 
the pilot asparagus project was taken over from 
MOA by the LNDC. The key objective was that the 
cannery should provide a processing and market-
ing channel for the established asparagus produc-
ers. The processing capacity of the cannery plant 
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· had to be expanded in order to handle the increasing 
production of asparagus spears by outgrowers. 
With the assistance of the UNDP/UNCDF and the 
EEC, the processing capacity of the cannery plant 
is now 2,250 tonnes. 
Such an expansion in processing capacity en-
tailed an accompanying expansion 'in asparagus 
prciduction and other agricultural prciducts in order 
to safeguard raw material supplied to the cannery. 
A nucleus farm was therefore established under the 
UNCDF project, cultivating an area of200 to 250 
hectares adjacent to the cannery. It is managed 
through a capital-intensive strategy using tractors, 
machinery and extensive irrigation facilities. In 
1984 a separate company was floated by LNDC to 
specifically take care of the nucleus farm. This 
became the agronomic affiliate of BFVC, con-
cerned with prciducing beans, peaches and apricots 
for the cannery and servicing the asparagus out-
growers. 
The central question is how successful has this 
BFVC/BFP combination been in generating an 
economic surplus. Is it an economically viable or 
profitable enterprise? In seeking to answer that 
question, we should make the following prelimi-
nary observations. Firstly, the costs of establishing 
asparagus in the outgrowers' fields are highly 
subsidized by donors (UNDP/UNCDF and EEC). 
Secondly, the costs of establishing and expanding 
the cannery plant are also highly subsidized by the 
same.donor-funded schemes. Thus, if the various 
subsidies are properly taken into account, it is very 
doubtful whether the BFVC/BFP would show a 
positive rate of return on old investments. This 
. means that any profitability that may be recorded 
by the cannery should be considered within the 
context of concessional aid flows that the LNDC 
and the MOA have been so successful in attracting 
to Lesotho. 
If we then examine the BFVC as a functioning 
economic concern we find that the cannery buys 
fresh, cleaned and wet asparagus at the village 
collection sheds at a price that will invariably 
guarantee a profit after processing and marketing. 
According to BFVC management, the cannery's 
pricing policy is determined by company prof-
itability concerns and incentive considerations to 
the asparagus outgrowers.45 
· The cannery has been taking advantage of its 
ability to impose prices and of favourable EEC 
markets to guarantee itself a profit, particularly 
since the 1984/85 season. It generated a profit of M 
191,502 and M 51,536 in 1985/86. Accumulated 
losses were reduced to M 96,736. 
A consultant's report on the BFVC maintains 
that if profits stayed at the 1985/86 average of M 
121,519 the cannery would break even by March 
1987 and pay offtheinvestmentofM 1,364,107 (as 
ofMarch 1986)injustovereleven years, from 1987 
to 1998.46 Since 1987, the cannery's affiliate BFP 
has been exporting fresh asparagus to EEC markets 
which has proved to be even more profitable. The 
announced profits for fiscal 1987 /88 were M 200,00 
forBFVC.47 
It is important to note that asparagus is still the 
only profitable product line of BFVC. Other prcid-
ricts are prciduced only if they contribute towards 
paying overhead, particularly during the asparagus 
off-season.48 The processing of other prciducts does 
not guarantee full utilization of capacity and there-
fore does not ensure profitability due to problems in 
raw material supply and marketing. The cannery's 
non-asparagus products compete with similar South 
· African products for the domestic market. In any 
case, the agricultural sector in Lesotho (including 
the nucleus farm) is unable to supply the requisite 
quantities of these products. 
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In conclusion, although BFVC and BFP are 
subsidiaries of LNDC, they have not fully experi-
enced the effects of agri-business normalization. 
There has not been any significant shift-particu-
larly with respect to BFP-from promotional and 
concessional policies to strict profit and loss modes 
of operation. Presently, BFP, as the agronomic 
branch ofLNDC, is implementing the EEC-funded 
asparagus expansion programmes whose aims are 
to subsidize the costs of establishing asparagus for 
2,550 households with the ultimate objective of 
supplying 2,250 tonnes of fresh asparagus to BFVC 
for processing. 
The key challenge facing the LNDC is to guar-
antee the viability of the BFVC/BFP after the 
donor-funded promotional project phase has 
ended.49 The LNDC is presently considering vari-
ous organizational alternatives for BFVC/BFP, due 
to what is regarded as the non-profit orientation of 
BFP whose original role was to extend agronomic 
services to asparagus outgrowers, and promote 
other horticultural products. Whereas BFVC is 
pushing to be allowed to formally and legally 
absorb BFP, which it controls in practice, the out-
growers, through their organization-the Setlabo-
cha Co-operative Society-want the BFP to re-
main autonomous, with Setlabocha being allowed 
a substantial measure of participation. 
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Workers at the Cannery 
One of the objectives of the Lesotho govern-
ment and its donors in starting the asparagus con-
tract farming scheme was to create employment at 
the processing stage. One of the perceived suc-
cesses of the BFVC as a developmental enterprise 
is that it has created much-needed employment for 
rural women who live in the hinterland of the 
canning factory. It is therefore important to evalu-
ate the performance of the BFVC in this respect 
The company needs labour to load and off-load 
asparagus, to wash, peel, and otherwise prepare for 
canning and packing for export Much of the labour 
requirements are seasonal-September to Decem-
ber. However, from January to about May, the 
cannery needs some labour for processing fruits for 
jam, and green and dry beans. 
In September 1988, the research team carried 
out a small sample survey of the canning factory. 
Fifty-six women and one man (a security guard) 
were interviewed. It was difficult to interview the 
women since management would not agree to their 
being interviewed on the premises and they would 
not have been free to say what they wanted. It was 
equally difficult to interview them in their homes as 
they work in shifts on all days of the week including 
Sunday. However, it was felt by the researchers that 
a sample of about 50 out of the total of 340 could 
give a good idea of the nature of employment at the 
cannery. 
The survey found that the women employed at 
the cannery were largely between twenty and forty 
years old (79 per cent). These are women in the 
prime of their lives who have personal and family 
responsibilities thatrequire a regular cash income. 
Fifty-seven per cent were married, 13 per cent 
divorced or widowed, while 29 per cent were 
single. Even more important regarding the need for 
income, it was found that 86 per cent of these 
workers had children who were fully or partially 
dependent on them. · 
A large number of them (61 per cent) were 
unhappy about the working conditions, and par-
ticularly the low wages and the casual nature of 
their employment. They stated that they could not 
afford to go seeking employment in places far away 
from home. 
The company employs about340 casual labour-
ers during the peak period of three months, while 
for the other five months or so, labour is reduced to 
about 40. These more regular workers are appar-
ently paid a fraction of their wages for the three to 
four months they are out of work to enable them to 
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have a continuous income. This, however, is said to 
be gratuitous on the part of the company since 
legally, being casual workers, they would not be 
entitled to any pay during the period when they are 
not at work. 
No written contracts are issued to the seasonal 
labourers or to the "regulars". The workers merely 
register their names and are verbal! y informed of 
the terms of their employment, such as wages and 
hours of work. As far as wages are concerned, 
company policy has . been to pay the statutory 
minimum wage, although currently it pays slightly 
more. In November 1987, the BFVC revised the 
wages to M 0.95 per hour for cannery workers, 
following the new minimum wages gazetted by the 
government. Some workers interviewed stated that 
the increase was a result of a strike which led to 
wages rising from M 0.68 to M 0.95 per hour. 
Workers have complained about low wages but 
the company feels no obligation to pay more than 
the statutory minimum wage. The company says 
that wages are reviewed after realizing net income 
from exports. This, however, is unsatisfactory in 
that wages cannot depend on the variable margin of 
profit. There should be a regular Systematic method 
of determining wages through collective bargain-
ing. 
As far as working hours are concerned, the 
company again claims to stick strictly to the law. 
The workers are grouped into three shifts, the first 
one starting at 6 a.m. and working for eight hours a 
day. Thus, the canning factory is able to operate 24 
hours a day with three shifts. Previously there were 
only two shifts and the workers used to put in a few 
hours of overtime, which prolonged the working 
day to the maximum of 12 hours (within the limits 
set by the Employment Act).50 However, the work-
ers interviewed complained of the strain of work-
ing too many hours in a job where they had to stand 
all the time. Further, they complained that they 
were paid the same rate for Sundays as they are paid 
on other days. Management explained that clock-
ing cards were used to be sure of the number of 
hours worked by each employee. However, it is not 
clear whether the workers are paid the statutory 
overtime wage of one and a quarter times normal 
hourly pay, or twice the normal rate when they 
work on public holidays, as required by the Em-
ployment Act.51 
There is no active trade union organization at 
the cannery, although the Lesotho Food Canning 
and Allied Workers Union is meant to serve this 
group of workers. The reason for lack of organiza-
tion is clear. Since the workers are casual labourers 
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paid on an hourly basis, liable to be dismissed at a 
day's notice, they are difficult to organize. Organi-
zation needs fairly stable labour. Not only are these 
workers casual labourers, but they are seasonal. A 
union official who was interviewed gave the same 
explanation for the lack of strong union activity at 
the cannery. Some of the few workers who stay for 
all or most of the year at the cannery belong to the 
union. The union official claimed that 60 per cent 
of the "regulars" were members of the union. 
Nevertheless, even those who are members of the 
union say they are afraid of being active as manage-
ment makes them aware of the army ofunemployed 
waiting at the gate to take their place. The union 
official claimed that management was very arro-
gant towards union officials and was not interested 
in collective bargaining over issues affecting union 
members. However, the union has managed td get 
one dismissed supervisor reinstated, and one secu-
rity guard has been paid his terminal benefits by the 
company. 
The conditions of work are not the most congen-
ial. Those who prepare asparagus work under cold 
and wet conditions to keep the asparagus fresh. 
Their hands are constantly in icy water and they 
complain of stiffness of the joints. Although, there 
is a company doctor, there is no health service for 
the workers. It is reported in the survey that acci-
dents occasionally take place: workers fall and cut 
themselves on the machines, get burned, or pass out 
because of dizziness resulting from standing for 
hours. Management admitted, during an interview, 
the need for regular medical checks on the workers 
and promised to work on the matter. The lack of a 
health service may be explained again in terms of 
the nature of the labour in question. Since most of 
the workers do not stay longer than three months in 
a year the Company does not feel an obligation to 
take care of their health as it does for the higher 
rank, long-term employees. The workers also do 
not complain because if declared unfit, for what-
ever reasons, they would lose their jobs. 
One noticeable feature of the factory employees 
engaged in the processing of fruits and vegetables 
is that they are almost exclusively female.52 Kusterer, 
in his study of asparagus canning in Peru also found 
that almost 90 per cent of the canning workforce 
was female. When questioned on why this is so at 
Basotho Canners factory, a representative ofBFVC 
management said women are very good at the 
canning business. It was said that in their homes 
they can peaches and apricots, that peeling is al-
most natural to them since they do it all the time and 
are very fast. The idea of the woman's place being 
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in the kitchen is still entrenched in Lesotho as in 
many other parts of the Third World. The few male 
labourers at the factory are engaged in lifting heavy 
loads, loading and unloading. 
However, there are other factors which encour-
age the female-based composition of the workforce. 
Women are assumed to be. easier to manage and 
more difficult to organize industrially. In addition,. 
in Lesotho they have many financial responsibili-
ties that make industrial action almost unthinkable. 
Since a large proportion ofBasotho male labour is 
employed in South African mines, it is the·women 
left behind who form the reserve army of cheap 
labour for agri-business. 
Opportunity for Participation of Out-
growers: 
The Co-operative 
Setlabocha Farmers Co-operative Society ca-
ters specifically to the interests of the asparagus 
outgrowers. It was started in 1979 as a voluntary 
association of asparagus farmers, formed with the 
encouragement of the TBRDP which was at the 
time managing the asparagus pilot project. Accord-
ing to one of the founding members, Setlabocha 
· was formed with the expectation that it would take 
over the assets of the pilot project, including the 
canning plant itself, the tractors and the buildings. 
This expectation explains the put on 
scientific.production of cash crops for export in the 
by-laws of the association. As it turned out, the 
processing aspect of the pilot project was handed 
over to LNDC, while part of the premises were 
handed over to Co-op Lesotho. 
In 1983, as the BFVC became established as a 
commercial agri-business concern, outgrowers felt 
they needed a stronger organization capable of 
negotiating with BFVC. In November 1983, Set-
labocha Association was registered with the Regis-
trar of Cooperatives as a Co-operative. Its by-laws 
list a number of objectives including to: 
• promote production of a selected cash crop 
• expand cash crop production 
increase yields through modern scientific meth-
ods 
• improve quality for overseas markets53 
Setlabocha Co-operative was formed with the 
aim that it should eventually manage the extension 
Eastern Africa Economic Review, Special Issue, August. 1989 
aspe€t of asparagus growing. The current struggle 
between BFVC and Setlabocha over the control of 
· BFP, the extension wing of BFVC, should be 
viewed in this context. 
Organizational structure of 
Seflabocha 
Setlabocha is managed by an executive com-
mittee of fifteen members elected by a an electoral 
college consisting of executive committees of vil-
lage branches of the co-operative. 
The President, Treasurer and General Secretary 
form the executive committee, whose terms of 
office are five years. This rather long term is 
justified by the members of the executive on grounds 
of continuity and the need to acquire experience in 
running the co-operative. Membership of the co-
operative is open to asparagus outgrowers on pay-
ment of the 10 maloti fee. · 
Functions of Setlabocha 
Setlabocha performs the important function of 
acting as the agent of the outgrowers in their deal-
ings with the BFVC. It collects the asparagus of the 
outgrowers from the village collection centres, 
talces it to the cannery gate, and ensures that the 
produce of each outgrower is weighed and the 
weight correctly recorded. 
The second major function of Setlabocha is to 
negotiate on behalf of its members with BFVC over 
matters such as the prices of the product, the bonus 
and the asparagus quality. For instance, an issue 
regarding quality is that third class (green) 
gus which used. to be accepted for purposes of 
making soup is no longer accepted, and white but 
hollow or tubular asparagus (pompo) is not ac-
cepted. Setlabocha is supposed to negotiate on 
what can be done with this produce which is said to 
be unsuitable for export. Setlabochaalso negotiates 
with BFP over and traction charges to 
farmers. 
Thirdly, Setlabocha is presently involved in 
providing extension services to its members. It 
supplies fertilizer and tools such as wheelbarrows, 
trowels, knives, basins and brushes. These items 
· were originally provided at highly subsidized rates 
under the TBRDP and UNDP/FAO phases. The 
subsidy has now been withdrawn and Setlabocha 
deducts the costs of these inputs from the farmers' 
sales. 
The performance of extension services by Set-
labocha has made the job of MOA and BFP exten-
sion staff much easier. Setlabocha explains that it 
must get involved in imparting technical knowl-
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edge to its members to save their members from 
making losses. Members also expect that once they 
pay their M 10 subscription, Setlabocha will ensure 
that their produce is not rejected by the company. 
Thus, Setlabocha will ensure that outgrowers un-
derstand the preconditions for a quality product. 
Even the BFVC management expects Setlabocha 
to monitor its member's produce. 
Setlabocha is important to the processing firm 
in terms of providing extension and reducing 
administrative costs. It is also beneficial to the firm 
in that ii institutionalizes the relations between the 
firm and what would otherwise be a disorganized, 
inarticulate group of farmers. Kusterer has ob-
served with relation to his Peru study that "the asso-
ciation has been mutually beneficial since it legiti-
mizes grower concessions almost as it represents 
grower demands".54 
It is probably the realization of this dual role of 
a farmers' co-operative that has led the EEC to 
require that, as part of its asparagus production 
expansion aid package, the outgrowers' organiza-
tion should be represented on the governing board 
of BFP and BFVC and should be able to purchase 
shares in the company. Setlabocha is already repre-
sented on the governing boards of both BFVC and 
BFP. It is expected that this participation in deci-
sion-making will minimize potential areas of con-
flict between outgrowers and BFVC. 
Evaluation of Setlabocha's 
representative role 
Since Setlabocha handles the sales and pay-
ments for asparagus purchased by BFVC, all out-
growers are forced to become members of the co-
operative. However, not all outgrowers seem to 
know the role and importance of the co-operative. 
Whereas a substantial majority of outgrowers in-
terviewed in the survey knew of the existence of the 
society (71 per cent), those who did not know (29 / 
per cent) are quite a substantial number. This is 
rather slirprising considering that all sales and 
payments are done through Setlabocha. It seems 
that in the past the co-operative has served more as 
a communication channel between the firm and the 
outgrowers than as a collective bargaining tool. 
Only 56.5 per cent of the outgrowers thought the 
organization was useful to them, although some did 
not seem to appreciate the nature and role of a 
farmers' co-operative. For instance, a number of 
respondents stated that the society was useful be- . 
cause it paid a certain amount for burial expenses 
when a member or a member's relative died. Others 
thought the society was there to collect money from 
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members who could then help each other in times 
of trouble. Thus the objective of collective bargain-
ing vis-a-vis the firm did not feature as a priority, if 
at all, for the members. 
Whereas the leadership of Setlabocha has, from 
its inception expected to have a greater role in the 
production and preparation of asparagus for export, · 
its membership does not seem to want it to assume , 
tasks performed by BFVC. When asked whether 
they would like some of the tasks hitherto per-
formed by the company to be performed by the co-
operative, 54 per cent of the outgrowers inter-
viewed answered in the negative, 21 per cent were 
prepared to let the co-operative do some of the · 
tasks, while 25 per cent did not know. 
These figures suggest a lack of confidence in 
Setlabocha, or at least lack of politicization of the 
membership, neither of which reflects well on the 
co-operative. In an interview, a senior member of 
Setlabocha leadership admitted that the member-
ship was not sufficiently conscientized but attrib-
uted this to the fact that s.etlabocha was formed by 
a small group of the more enlightened farmers with 
specific objectives, rather than as a grass-roots or-
ganization. The leadership was still trying to edu-
cate the mass ofoutgrowers on the more important 
issues relating to asparagus production. 
Despite the problems of organization faced by 
Setlabocha, the idea of a strong outgrowers'. or-
ganization is important, if not indispensable. More 
frequent contacts between the leadership of the co-
operative and the outgrowers at the village level is 
necessary to make Setlabocha effective! y represen-
tative. It is also suggested that the governing board · 
of BFVC be expanded to increase the number of 
Setlabocha representatives. The present "army" of 
participating but non-voting observers from LNDC 
and BFVC normally present· at board meetings 
should also be reduced to a minimum to avoid 
undue influence on the proceedings of meetings. 
In conclusion, to promote the rural development 
objective of self-reliance, farmers should be en-
couraged to manage agricultural production and 
the marketing of their produce through their or-
ganizations. With more experience in financial and 
administrative matters, therefore, Setlabocha should 
be given a greater role in managing the production 
and marketing of asparagus. 
Constraints to Replicability 
In discussing prospects for replicating the as-
paragus contract farming model, it is important to 
initially establish whether the this example can be 
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termed a success or a failure in the context of 
Lesotho's development efforts. It is interesting to 
observe that the asparagus production and process-
ing scheme is commonly cited as one of the most 
successful examples of agricultural development 
in Lesotho. The success is viewed from the produc-
tion, processing and marketing perspective. The 
elements of this success are the good quality of the 
asparagus spears processed by BFVC, arthe 
tory gate, processing stage and final destination.ss 
This asparagus production and processing model 
·can be regarded as a qualified success with certain 
specific features. Some of these features may con-
strain the replicability of the model. The most 
significant factor is the availability of concessional 
capital resources which have been invested in both 
the asparagus production programme and in the 
cannery plant The cannery, whose present proc-
essing capacity is 2,250 tonnes, has been financed 
by the UNCDF and EEC Counterpart Food Aid 
Funds, which have also provided for technical 
personnel. 
At the prOduction level, the UNDP/FAO and 
now the EEC have significantly subsidized the 
costs of extension, necessary infrastructure (roads, 
collection sheds, bore holes, etc.) and technical 
personnel. The MOA has also subsidized part of the 
extension services by seconding or attaching its 
most experienced agricultural extension officers to 
the asparagus scheme to service outgrowers. 
We have already observed that as a cash crop, 
asparagus is unique in many respects. As a durable 
perennial crop it virtually eliminates the risk of 
possible crop loss and therefore guarantees retlirns 
on investments if good husbandry is exercised. 
At the marketing level, asparagus which is 
exported to Western Europe enjoys favourable 
market conditions. 
These are the specific features which make the 
asparagus production and processing scheme to be 
a qualified success. Even if the scheme does not 
satisfy strict economic criteria, it would seem to be 
most attractive from the perspective of Lesotho, 
given the ability of the Government of Lesotho to 
attract considerable flows of concessional aid and 
resources. 
In the original UNCDF project mission report, 
the rationale for expanding the capacity of the. 
cannery was that it would also process particular 
crops other than asparagus: green beans, Brussels 
sprouts, onions, sweet corn, peaches, apricots, soft 
berries, baby carrots, beetroot, potatoes, dry beans 
and dry peas.s6 
Among those crops the cannery is producing 
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and processing are beans in sauce, green beans, 
peaches, peach jam, peach nectar and peach pulp. 
None of these crops are produced under contract 
between the BFVC and outgrowers. Some of the 
crops are grown on the BFP nucleus farm on a 
highly capital-intensive basis. Yet in spite of the 
fact that the costs of running the nucleus farm are 
highly subsidized, their contribution to_BfYC's 
profitability is not significant. Asparagus ts still the 
most profitable product line of the cannery. 
In conclusion, prospects for replicating ·the 
asparagus production model of contract farming to 
other horticultural crops are not very bright given 
the functioning of the model in the context of 
Lesotho. 
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Abstract 
This study of the Smallholder Sugar Authority (SSA) in Nkhota-Kota District and the Small-
holder Tea Authority (STA) in Mulanje-Thyolo District of Malawi was conducted from the 
1986/87 to 1987/88 season. A survey was undertaken to examine the performance of the 
projects and isolate factors which lead to the results achieved, from which policy recommen-
dations could be proposed. The survey was based on a census of all the growers in SSA and 
a target sample of 20 per cent of the growers in STA. Growers sign contracts with the 
authorities to grow the cash crop, they sell it through the authorities to the processing factories 
'and they receive their revenue tbrough the authorities. Both authorities benefited from their 
monopsony powers. Growers disliked the relative cane payment system (RCPS) for determin-
ing the sugarcane tonnage. Customary land tenure provided more opportunity for women and 
security of tenure among the growers as the authority found it difficult to envisage eviction. 
Introduction 
Tea is the major cash crop in the densely-
populated southern region of Malawi. Both tea and 
sugar are major export crops of the country and are 
classified as "special crops" with smallholder pro-
duction regulated by smallholder authorities. 
Smallholder authorities were established by the 
colonial legislature in 1963 under the Special Crops 
Act. The Act was amended by the independent 
republican Government in 1969 and again in 1972. 
The stated purpose of the Act was, and still is, to 
provide "for the development and marketing of 
.special crops and for the establishment of Special 
Crop Authorities". 
Under the Special Crops Act, the Minister re-
sponsible for agriculture may declare any crop to 
be a special crop if he is satisfied that its develop-
ment should be promoted or fostered under the Act. 
The Minister is then obliged to establish an author-
ity to promote and foster the special crops develop-
ment in such ;rreas as he may determine. An Au-
thority is to be a body corporate, vested with all the 
normal powers and rights of a corporate body in 
Malawi. 
When the special crop has been declared and 
the authority established, no person is allowed to 
grow, sell, barter or buy the crop unless he or she 
holds a valid licence to do so. Infringement of this 
provision makes a person liable to a fine, which 
may include an order that the special crop of the 
offender be.forfeited. 
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Smallholder authorities in Malawi are statutory 
bodies and come under the control of the Depart-
ment of Statutory Bodies. Smallholder authorities 
currently include the Smallholder Sugar Authority 
(SSA), Smallholder Tea Authority (STA) , Coffee 
Smallholder Authority (CSA), and Kasi.mgu Flue 
Cured Tobacco Authority (KFCTA). The authority 
boards have representatives from the Ministry of ' 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance and the grow-
ers them.selves. Certain sections in the authorities' 
operations are financed directly by the Malawi 
Government and they submit their budgets to the 
Government for scrutiny. This study describes the 
SSA in Dwangwa in Nkhota-Kota District north of 
Lilongwe on Lake Malawi, and the STA in Mu-
lanje-Thyolo District in the southern tip of the 
country, respectively. 
The SSA is established to promote.and foster 
the development of sugarcane grown by smallhold-
ers in areas to be declared by the Minister. The 
Authority has the power to make regulations to 
control· the relationship between the smallholders 
and the management. The Authority effected the 
Special Crop (Sugarcane) (Licensing) Regulations 
in 1979. These regulations provide for temporary 
and permanent licences to occupy holdings in the 
settlement areas to be issued. The regulation also 
provide for the issuing of sugar growers' licences. 
These two types of licences are dependent on each 
other. The licensee undertakes not to lend or trans-
fer the holding to any other person. The farmer 
undertakes to grow on the holding such acreage of 
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sugarcane as may be required by the Authority. 
Smallholders must manage their holdings in 
accordance with the farming practices laid down by 
the Authority, and must maintain all irrigation 
canals, drainage channels and other works pro-
vided on the holding by the Authority. They should 
obey the instructions of the authority and are sub-
ject to warning or to court trial if they infringe the 
parent Act or the subsidiary regulations. 
Smallholder sugarcane growing is supervised 
by the Smallholder Sugar Authority atDwangwain 
Nkhota-Kota District. The growers are grouped 
into thirty-seven blocks of fields and five settle-
ment villages for admillistrative purposes. All cane 
plots are on "public land", which is sub-leased from 
Dwangwa Sugar Corporation (DSC) by the author-
ity on behalf of the smallholder growers. All grow-
ers received some training in sugarcane growing 
for one season before being asked to enter into a 
. contract with SSA. The backgrounds of the grow-
ers are diverse because they were recruited from 
twenty-three out of the twenty-four administrative 
districts of the country (no growers had come from 
Salima District). 
The cane is sold to the DSC which sells the 
processed sugar to outside markets. To expedite the 
repayment of credit the proceeds are channelled 
through the SSA to the smallholders. The SSA 
deducts all the costs associated with its services 
from the individual growers' gross income. The 
SSA receives 60 per cent of the proceeds and DSC 
receives 40 per cent. The growers are paid from the 
SSA's share. 
The Smallholder Tea Authority: 
Project development and 
experience 
The Smallholder Tea Authority was established 
on January 20, 1967 under the Special Crops Ordi-
nance to encourage the involvement of smallhold-
ers in tea production. Smallholder tea growing is 
supervised by the ST A in Thyolo and Mulanje 
districts. The growers are grouped into ten blocks 
for administration purposes, . with the tea plots 
being on either public land or customary land. 
Public land is typically land previously owned and 
cultivated by large-scale tea growers but bought off 
by the Government for re-allocation to smallhold-
ers. One result of this has been some noticeable 
differences between public land and customary 
land cultivation-which is often broken up by 
Table 1: Annual P /anting and Yields of Green Leaf 
MULANJE THYOLO TOTAL 
YEAR Area Total Yield Area Total Yield Area Total Yield 
planted area Green leaf planted area Green leaf planted area Green leaf 
(ha.) (ha.) (kg.) (ha.) (ha.) (kg.) (ha.) (ha.) (kg.) 
Pre-1969 84 217 89,110 13 71 1,107 97 288 90,217 
1970 166 333 164,575 18 89 3,297 134 422 167,872 
1971 159 492 396,593 20 109 8,823 179 601 405,416 
1972 160 652 384,022 32 141 25,504 192 793 409,526 
1973 103 755 695,534 32 173 45,936 135 928 741,478 
1974 124 879 1,432,312 38 211 95,698 162 1,090 1,528,010 
1975 145 1,025 1,547,422 45 256 149,233 191 1,281 2,299,583 
1976 169 1,194 2,051,019 55 311 248,564 224 1,505 2,299,583 
1977 106 1,300 2,579,004 79 390 307,194 185 1,690 2,886,198 
1978 130 1,430 2,910,324 55 445 393,955 185 1,875 3,304,279 
1989 85 1,515 3,436,081 36 481 520,906 121 1,996 3,956,284 
1980 85 1,600 4,100,527 43 524 1,036,410 128 2,124 5,216,937 
1981 71 1,671 4,603,988 32 556 1,319,113 103 2,227 5,923,010 
1982 65 1,736 4,850,932 35 591 1,228,406 100 2,327, 6,079,338 
1983 1 1,737 5,483,557 8 599 1,502,380 9 2,336 6,985,937 
1984 1 1,738 6,199,599 11 610 1,567,602 12 2,348 7,767,201 
1985 1 1,739 8,291,068 - 610 1,917,908 1 2,349 10,208,976 
1986 - 1,739 10,479,387 12 622 2,841,380 12 2,361 13,320,767 
Source: Smallholder Tea Authority, 1987. 
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settlements and sometimes displays gaps among 
the tea bushes due to poor management 
When green leaf started to be harvested by 
smallholders the ST A contracted with commercial 
estates to purchase the leaf for manufacturing into 
black tea Owing to an increase in production 
volume the STA began constructing its own factory 
Table 2: Growers' Earnings (Kwacha) 





















in Mulanje in September 1973. Manufacture of 
smallholder green leaf by the Malawian Tea Fac-
tory Company Ltd. (MA TECO) commenced in 
December 1974. Annual plantings and yields of 
green leaf and growers' annual earnings in both 
Thyolo and Mulanje areas from 1969 to 1986 have been modest successes on both a per hectare and p_er 
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* Includes only the initial payment at the time of writing as the level of the second payment 
had not yet been approved. 
Source: Smallholder Tea Authority, 1987. 
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basis (Tables 1 and 2). 
smallholder Sugar Authorities: 
Project development and 
experience 
Project development and eStablishment at 
Dwangwa was initiated by Lonrho (Malawi) Ltd. 
which provided finance to develop the Dwangwa 
Sugar Company (DSC). The initial forty-three set-
1 tlers of the SSA were former employees of the 
DSC. The major physical targets were only met at 
the Dwangwa Delta where 663 hectares of irrigated 
land was developed, leaving out the rainfed compo-
nent. Although 330 smallholders were planned to 
be settled by 1982, by 1984 only 306 farmers had 
been settled. Soil variability on some. plots was 
found to make them unsuitable for smallholder 
settlement. SSA farmed the balance of the plots as 
a commercial area. Table 3 shows the progress of 
smallholder settlement over time. 
As a result of the substantial rise in the level of 
Lake Malawi, submerging part of the DSC estate, 
the DSC requested SSA to relinquish the original 
smallholder food and housing land to replenish 
their lost cane area. This would be in exchange for 
a larger site, but of poorer soils which could not 
produce sufficient food for the farmers. 
The price of sugar was projected to rise, stabi-
lizing in 1983 (Table 4). From 1980 to 1981, the 
world sugar price exceeded the price estimated. All 
profits from the high sugar price were distributed to 
smallholders without provisions against future price 
decline. From 1982 to 1984, the sugar price de-
clined with a negative effect on smallholders' in-
comes and the domestic market failed to expand as 
expected. The Malawi Government was asked for . 
assistance to meet development loans repayments 
and safeguard farmers' incomes. For three years 
SSA survived on the Government's subventions, 
contrary to the original objective for the establish-
ment to be self-sufficient. The SSA Board's at-
tempts to re-structure the authority meant cancel-
ing services such as cane transport and the me-
chanical workshop and building department which 
had not been contracted to DSC. 
The number of smallholders has been reduced 
to 200. These farmers, seen to be hard working, had 
their cane area increased from 2 to 3 hectares each 
of a 600 hectare area, the balance being farmed by 
SSA as a commercial area. The Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) staff were re-
placed after training the local staff as they were an 
expensive component.1 · 
The growers' average net income rose steadily 
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from K 859 in 1979 to K 2,305 in 1981, with the 
minimum net income always above K 500.2 From 
1982 onwards, net income declined due to falling 
prices. This reduced ayerage net income and some 
growers experienced negative incomes (Table 5). 
The Relative Cane Payment System Formular 
(RCPS) used to calculate cane tonnage for the 
growers was also a source of discontent. The system 
seeks to reduce the wide variations in incomes 
among growers due to factors beyond their control 
such as sub-optional harvesting (by the authority) 
and soil type variations. The system tends to be 
regarded with suspicion by those growers affected 
negatively. 
Methodology and Survey Results 
The survey of smallholder· sugarcane growers 
was based on a census of all 187 growers under the 
scheme. There were 4,550 tea growers under the, 
STA in the Thyolo and Mulanje areas from which 
a target sample of 20 per cent were to be inter-
viewed. The sample growers were selected system-
atically from the growers register. However, in 
order to take full account of possible effects of 
gender in grower performance it was decided to in-
clude as many female growers as practical. Since 
female growers were a small minority some male . 
growers in the sample were replaced by the nearest 
female grower in the register. Thus the sample had 
a purposeful bias with respect to gender. Growers 
were listed in the register chronologically by when 
the grower joined the scheme. Systematic sampling 
would therefore take care of the effect of such 
variables as type of land tenure (public vs. custom-
ary land), size of land holding, and location (Mu-
lanje vs. Thyolo districts). 
The results have been organized to consider 
sociological aspectS, land use and productivity, 
welfare and income, organization, technology and 
contractual arrangements for each smallholder 
authority. 
Smallholder Tea Authority (STA) 
Sociological aspects 
Fully70percentoftheSTAteagrowerssampled 
were male. Most ( 42 per cent) were between 35 and 
54 years old. Members from the area accounted for 
97 per cent of the sample, the remainder having 
come from outside the area. Clearly, the scheme 
caters for local people, due in a large part to land 
security in the area. 
Before joining the scheme, farming or wage 
Table 4: Total Sugarcane Production and Sugar Price 
1977• 
Harvested cane (ha.) 600 
Total cane production (tonnes) 68,000 
Yield (tonnes cane/ha.) 103 
Est. recoverable sucrose(%) 10.87 
Total sugar production (tonnes) 7 .394 
Yield (tonnes sugar/ha.) 11.20 
CDC price projections at 60% ex-mill 
share (kwacha/tonne sugar) 
Actual sugar price at 60% ex-mill 
share (kwacha/tonne sugar) 
Ex-mill sugar price (govt. subsd.) 
a. Estimated. 
Source: Smallholder Sugar Authority, 1987. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
75ffi "ffi · ... .. I 
11 
1::: 1::; 1;:::: 1:::: 1:::: 1:::: 1:::: 1182 1298 1269 I 
126.83 162.74 182.47 129.45 142.95 166.08 210.85 242.80 250' 250' 
NIA NIA NIA NIA 175.26 184.55 NIA NIA fN 
Table 5: Smallholder Sugar Authority, Dwangwa Smallholder Sugar Project: Smallholder Yield and Income Variability" 
Number of Smallholders 





























b. Income using RCPS and after subsidy from Government 
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employment had been the source of livelihood for 
76 per cent of the farmers in the sample (31 per cent 
and45 percent, respectively). Some 15 percent had 
tried other business ventures. The remainder had 
hitherto been unemployed and were being finan-
cially supported by parents or other relatives. For 
the non-immigrant growers, 78 per cent of the 
sample had received their initial plot from the vil-
lage headman or chief. Thus most farmers were 
growing tea on their customary land. 
Land use and productivity 
Justoverhalf(50.1 %) of the plots were between 
0.4 and 1.3 hectares (1.0 to 2.9 acres). Only 5.6per 
cent had plots larger than 2.8 hectares (7 acres). For 
most growers (57 per cent) the initial plot had been 
between 0.4 and 1.3 hectares. Only 9 per cent had 
more than 2.2 hectares (5 acres). Where existing 
plots were enlarged it was done under the existing 
customary rules, i.e., taking over a relative's plot. 
This kind of annexation accounted for about 90.7 
per cent of the land expansion that had taken place. 
Only 8.7 per cent of the growers had extra plots 
from the Tea Authority. The majority of growers 
(77.4 per cent) felt the available plot was inade-
quate for their needs. 
Welfare and income 
When asked about how they had benefited from 
the scheme, 41 per cent of the sampled growers first 
mentioned access to input credit facilities, particu-
larly for fertilizers. Money, food and clothing ac-
cruing to them were mentioned first by only 19 per 
.cent of the growers. However, there were mixed 
feelings regarding which of the benefits was 
the most important. Acquiring knowledge through 
new farming techniques and access to input credit 
facilities, particularly for fertilizer, were reported 
by 19 per cent and 18 per cent of the growers, 
respectively, as the most important benefits from 
the scheme. Money earned and the availability of 
enough food and clothing were reported as the most 
important benefit from the scheme by only 12 per 
cent of the respondents. Using fertilizers is essen-
tial for increasing yields on most Malawi soils. 
Given the relatively low income levels among 
smallholder farmers and relatively high fertilizer 
prices, the provision of a credit facility for these 
types of inputs in the agrarian economy of Malawi 
is an important inducement to increasing produc-
tivity. . 
The majority (87 per cent) of the sampled 
growers in the STA reported having had problems 
with the scheme's operation. In order of severity, 
too .little cash payment from principal crop sales, 
insufficient food, and deductions considered by 
growers to be too high were the major problems as 
reported by 39 per cent, 11 per cent and 3 per cent 
of the respondents, respectively. 
With regard to the possibility of selling tea to a 
buyer other than the Authority, only two respon-
dents indicated that it was possible. None indicated 
. that they had actually done so. One reason for this 
may be unfair terms of other buyers. However, this 
is unlikely to be a major reason since only six 
respondents indicated that they were aware of other 
buyers' terms (all six felt that they were unfair). 
In terms of cash income, the highest proportion 
of growers receiving income other than from sell-
ing tea or other crops was 24 per cent in 1986. In 
1985 it was only 16 per cent, and in 1987 it was 21 
per cent. For the majority (60 per cent in each year) 
of those deriving cash incomes from non-crop sales 
the incomes fell in the lowest categories (0.00 to 
99 .99 kwacha). This reflects the lack of opportuni-
ties to generate non-farm cash income typical in 
Malawi's rural areas. Those generating income 
from crops other than tea were always less than 40 
per cent in the three years (1985, 1986 and 1987), 
of whom nearly 90 per cent derived incomes ofless 
than K 100 per year. · 
This suggests that farmers rely heavily on tea as 
the major single source of cash. This is corrobo-
rated by the distribution of income from tea. The 
proportion of growers with incomes from tea sales 
of less than K 99 never exceeds 23 per cent. This 
implies that the majority earned gross incomes of 
over K 99. For all the three years, nearly 90 per cent 
of sample households incurred costs of less than K 
200 on the tea and nearly 95 per cent of the house-
holds did not incur "other miscellaneous" costs 
exceeding K 100. This implies that costs associated 
with tea were the major ones, usually including 
fertilizer costs. 
Table 6 shows the effects of the deductible 
costs on growers' net income and its distribution. 
The majority of net incomes for tea (over 50 per 
cent of households) were below K 300. Most of the 
remaining growers' net incomes cover a wide range, 
up to K 2,000. Temporal variations in the net 
· income distribution suggests that in 1986 more 
farmers were better off than in 1985 and 1987 since 
the proportion of those in the low income cate-
gories (less than K 300) was lower in 1986 (54 per 
cent compared to 57 per cent in 1985 and 67 per 
cent in 1987). Although a large proportion of grow-
ers earn a low net income, the level of additional 
income (apart from tea) is low. 
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Table 6: Net Income for Ted' (Kwacha) 
Income category (k) 1985 1986 1987 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
0.00 - 99.99 323 35.49 259 28.46 355 39.01 
100.00 - 199.99 130 14.29 140 15.38 150 16.48 
200.00 - 299.99 74 8.13 107 11.76 110 12.09 
300.00 - 399.99 64 7.03 59 6.48 65 7.14 
400.00 - 499.99 58 6.37 50 5.49 54 5.93 
5oorn- 599.99 50 5.49 47 5.16 40 4.40 
600.00 - 699.99 33 3.63 32 3.52 29 3.19 
700.00 .- 799.99 28 3.08 . 35 3.85 20 2.20 
800.00 - 899.99 21 2.31 23 2.53 18 1.98 
900.00 - 999.99 16 1.76 20 2.20 11 1.21 
1,000.00 -1,999.99 '80 8.79 95 10.44 47 5.16 
2,000.00 - 2,999.99 . 21 2.31 24 2.64 5 0.55 
3,000.00 - 3999.99 5 0.55 9 0.99 2 0.22 
4,000.00 -4,999.99 .3 0.33 5 0.55 1 0.11 
500.00 - 9,999.99 4 0.44 5 0.55 3 0.33 
10,000.00 and over 
Total 910 100.00 910 100.00 910 100.00 
a. All tea was sold to the Authority except in 1985 when one grower sold his tea elsewhere for a total 
value of K 314.90. 
Source: Field Survey, Smallholder Tea Authority,_ 1987. 
The maximum net income (K 5,000) indicates 
that there is scope for earning good incomes under 
the scheme. Extremely high net incomes are proba-
bly related to resource availability, especially of 
land and labour. For the majority of households in 
the Thyolo-Mulanje area, land would be in short 
supply due to high population densities and the 
concentration of large-scale tea estates.3 Thus higher 
incomes from tea would depend heavily on good 
land and crop husbandry such as using capital-in-
tensive inputs, such as fertilizers, as well as a high 
labour intensity for picking. 
When asked what livelihood growers would 
pursue if they left the scheme, over half (55 per 
cent) responded that they would continue farming. 
Over one fifth (21 per cent) of the respondents said 
they would revert to wage employment, while only 
13 per cent would engage in· other income-generat-
ing business ventures (Table 7). These results agree 
with Machika and Nankumba's observations on 
the dynamics of customary lanct' tenure systems and 
smallholder farmers' aspirations.4 They observed 
that, given various choices within the context of 
customary land, most (62.8 per cent) SIJlallholders 
would rather run their own farms than work for 
someone else. Over one third (34 per cent) of the 
respondents opted for non-farm ventures, suggest-
48 
ing that those opting for farming would find them-
selves locked into subsistence farming if they left 
the scheme since they would have inadequate land 
outside the scheme. 
When asked whether the. scheme's establish-
ment had lead to people being displaced and conse-
quent hardship, 19 per cent of the respondents 
knew some people who were displaced by the 
scheme. Of these, about 11 per cent indicated that 
displaced people were compensated and had settled 
elsewhere. These small percentages suggest that a 
considerable proportion of farmers were not dis-
placed but instead became more involved in the 
scheme using their own land. 
Organization 
The majority (97 per cent) of the respondents 
belonged to some farmers' organization. A small 
proportion (3 per cent) did not belong to any grow-
ers organization, over half (55 per cent) of whom 
had attempted to form some growers' organization 
but did not succeed, mainly because of lack of co-
operation among growers. In spite of this lack of 
co-operation, the growers acknowledged the use-
fulness of a growers organization, particularly with· 
respect to reporting growers' problems and assist-
ing them in farming methods (Table 8). 
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Table 7: Livelihood Desired if Left the Scheme, STA 
Frequency Per Cent 
Farming 
Business 
Earning a salary 
Farming and salary 
Business and farming 
Salary, farming and business 
Doesn't know 
Supported by parents/relatives 
Join another scheme 
Not applicable 
Total 
a. Does not total 100 per cent due to rounding 



















Activities Current Past Potential 
Activities of new activities activities activities 
organisation 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1. Representation 76 
2. Buying inputs 9 
3. Help in farming methods · 4 0 392 
4. Lend some help 1 0 81 
5. Report farmers' probs. 5 0 111 
6. Reported with no results .5 
7. Settling disputes 100 
8. None 2 0 1 
9. 7&3 81 
10. Welfare activities 2 0 12 
11. Help obtaine loans 3 0 5 
12. Fertilizer, not free 1 0 1 
13. Fight for price increases 1 0 1 
0. Not applicable 892 98 36 
Total 910 98° 910 
a. Does not total 100% due to rounding. 
Source: Field Survey, Smillholdcr Tea Authority, 1987. 
The data in Table 8 also show that almost half 
(43.1 per cent) pf the respondents who belonged to 
a growers' organization felt that their organization 
provides assistance in fanning operations. About 
11 per cent of the respondents acknowledged that 
the organization played theroleofacourtin settling 
growers' disputes. Although only 1 per cent of the 
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8 5 0 67 7 
0 2 0 23 3 
43 3 0 36 4 
9 1 0 . 27 3 
2 52 6 
10 1 3 0 
11 2 0 3 0 
0 522 57 
9 3 0 
1 3 0 28 3 
0 - 19 2 
/ 
.0 2 0 
0 2 0 
4 882 97 43 5 
98• 910 98' 910 98" 
respondents reported that their organizations' rep-
resentation of the growers was fruitless, half (57 
per cent) of the respondents suggested that there 
were no other tasks to be done by the organization. 
The success of growers' organizations in the 
STA scheme may be attributed to the leadership's 
ability to handle disputes and encourage the grow-
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ers to help each other. Field data. show that the 
majority (89 per cent) of the respondents felt that 
the organizations listen with ease to farmers' con-
cerns. 
Technology 
Fully 98 percent of the growers started growing 
tea only after joining the scheme, suggesting that 
there may be important barriers to entry for non-
scheme growers. These barriers are likely to be 
mostly technological. For example, 95 per cent of 
the 444 households who indicated that they had 
experienced increases in yields said that the major 
determinants were factors such as fertilizer appli-
cation and farming methods. On the other hand, 
those who did not experience yield increases blamed 
non-technological factors, such as unfavourable 
rainfall and aging bushes. For the 22 per cent who 
experienced increased profits, technological fac-
tors, such as "new farming method", "yield in-
creases" and "good crop variety", may explain the 
change. 
The quality of tea had improved for 80 per cent 
of growers while they had joined the scheme, 
primarily due to good crop husbandry. Sixty-four 
per cent of the growers still used farming practices 
that were recommended when they first joined the 
scheme, while 27 per cent indicated that the prac-
tices were changed often. The extension workers 
who reached growers were mostly based at the 
scheme rather than from the Government (for 87 
per cent and 13 per cent of the respondents, respec-
tively). Most (97 per cent) of the sampled growers 
actively sought extension advice, which the major-
ity of growers (97 per cent) believed was free of 
charge. Moreover, 96 per cent of the growers to-
tally relied on the techniques they were taught 
under the scheme because they did not know of bet-
ter alternatives. 
Regarding farm level decision-making, 79 per 
cent of the growers felt that the scheme made 
decisions their behalf, most likely through the 
extension advice. 
Seventy per cent of the sampled growers used 
hired labour, implying that smallholder tea grow-
ing under the scheme geqerates additional employ-
ment This should not be surprising given the 
labour intensity of tea picklng. However, the ma-
jority (89 per cent) hired fewer than six workers. 
The tasks done by hired workers mentioned most 
frequently were weeding and harvesting (55 per 
cent), weeding (14 per cent), harvesting (i 1 per 
cent) and pruning, weeding and harvesting (10 per 
cent):Thus weeding, pruning and harvesting are 
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the main tasks of hired labour. 
There is no uniformity in the way the wage rates 
for workers are calculated. The most popular method 
seems to be on a monthly basis (44 per cent), 
followed by a per field basis (30 percent) anda daily 
basis (23 per cent). For those who hired labour, 93 
per cent indicated that they actually paid less than K 
20 per month, which is qilite low considering that 
the statutory monthly minimum wage is K 26.70. 
Some of the workers engaged may themselves be 
subsistence farmers working for the tea growers on 
a part-time basis. 
Contractual arrangements 
A significant proportion (87 per cent) of grow-
ers signed their contracts on joining the scheme. 
Only two-thirds (67 per cent) of the respondents 
acknowledged the authority's commitment to the 
contract; about one fifth (21 percent) expressed dis-
content over the authority's commitment. Accord-
ing to the respondents, the contracts are violated in 
several ways. The most important violations in-
clude: deductions that are too high; not allowing 
growers to decide whether loans be in cash or in 
kind; and rejecting tea due to delays in the authority 
providing transport for picked leaf. 
There have also been cases of growers not 
abiding by the contract, as reported by 19 per cent 
ofrespondents. The majority (81 per cent) of grow-
ers did not know what happened to those who did 
not abide by the contract; 15 per cent indicated that 
warnings were issued to such growers, while cases 
of eviction were reported by only 2 per cent of the 
respondents (Table 9.). These results suggest that 
harsh treatment of growers by the ST A was not a 
common practice. In the Thyolo-Mulanje area land 
is so scarce that growers on public (STA) land have 
to abide by the contract and the authority must be 
rather sympathetic to the growers. 
The low proportion of growers evicted may be 
explained partly by the sympathetic and educa-
tional approach adopted by the authority towards 
non-complying growers. Also, about three-quar-
ters (74 per cent) of the growers cultivate their own 
land. Disagreements between the ST A and the 
growers' organizations were so rare that 79 per cent 
of the respondents knew little about any disagree-
ments. This may be due to the educational approach 
adopted by the authority. There were, however, 
disagreements between the authority and the grow-
ers over payments and the weighing of the har-
vested leaf during sales. The highest proportion of 
respondents reporting these cases were 4 per cent 
and 3 per cent, respectively (Table 10). · 
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Table 9: Results of Contract Violations, STA 
Action taken against 
·non-complying grower Frequency Per cent :·11 ··1 
Warned 
Withdrawn 
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Table l 0: Disagreements Between the STA and Growers or Growers' Organizations 
How often/ ·sT A vs. growers ST A vs. growers' organizations 
occasion (frequency) (per cent) (frequency) (per cent) 
Often 60 7 
Rarely 344 38 
Never 437 48 
During Payments 39 4 
During weighing 25 3 
Don't know 5 
Total 910 100 
Source: Field Survey, SmallholdeIS Tea Authority, 1978. 
According to the survey, 96 per cent of the 
respondents felt that the ST A rarely undertook · 
tasks which could be done by growers. Only 3 per 
cent of the respondents indicated that pest control, 
road mainte.nance, the procurement of inputs, con-
servation or planting are done by the authority. The 
majority (95 per cent) of respondents objected to 
asking the growers' organizations to undertake 
these tasks, thereby leaving them to be done by the 
authority (as requested for planting) or the growers 
themselves. 
From the growers' point of view, 85 per cent felt 
that the authority had not lived up to their expecta-
tions. Low profit and little money due to high 
deductions were disappointments cited by the 
majority (72 per cent) of respondents. In a few 
cases expectations were exceeded-such as when · 
bonuses or fertilizer loans were received-accord-
ing to 14 per cent of the respondents. 
Smallholder Sugar Authority (SSA) 
Sociological aspects 









virtually all men, with the exception of one wid-
owed woman. The largest category of farmers were 
between 35 and 44 years of age (44 per cent). A 
majority of the growers (70 per cent) had attained 
at least the senior primary level of education (Stan-
dard 5) and could thus be assumed to be literate. 
The average number of children per family 
among sugar growers was five, the number of 
children ranging between one and seventeen. Over 
70 per cent of families had six or fewer children. 
Family size constrains families' standard ofliving 
to the extent that the children stay with the families 
or are dependent on theni. The severity of this 
constraint depends on the availability of resources, 
such as land for food-crop cultivation, and whether 
the children contribute to the family's labour needs. 
Incontrast to the smallholder tea growers, only 
16 per cent of the sugarcane growers lived in the 
area before jol.ning the scheme. Thus over 80 per 
cent were immigrants to the area. The regional dis-
tribution of origin indicates that Nkhota-Kota and 
nearby Nkhata Bay districts accounted for only 21 
per cent of the growers. The rest came from further 
away: Central Region (47 per cent), the Southern 
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Table 11: Livelihood before Joining the SSA Scheme 
Livelihood Frequency ·Per cent 
Farming 90 
Business (non-fann) 7 
Wage employment 73 
Farming/Wage employment 2 
Business/Farming 1 
Farming/Employment/Business 1 
Supported by parents 7 
Was in another scheme 4 
Other 2 
Total 187 
a. Does not total 100 per cent due to rounding. 
Source: Field Survey, Smallholder Sugar Authority, 1987. 
Region (33 per cent) and the remainder from the 
Northern Region. The relative importance of the 
Southern Region in supplying growers for the 
scheme is likely due to the heavy population pres-
sure there, while in the Northern Region the popu-
lation pressure is relatively light. 
By the time of the survey, the vast majority of 
the farmers (99 per cent) had had at least four years 
of experience in the scheme. Most (48 percent) had 
been farmers in their previous occupations or had 
been in wage employment (39 per cent), probably 
in agriculture (Table 11). 
Land use and productivity 
Land is the smallholders' primary resource. 
Fully 85 per cent of the growers indicated that they 
did not have enough land under the scheme for their 
farming requirements-to increase both food and 
cash crop cultivation. The vast majority of these 
growers (94 per cent) indicated that they planned to 
acquire more land. Considering the pred.ominance 
of immigrants among growers, it is not surprising 
that 89 per cent of the growers experiencing land 
constraints saw the SSA as their only possible 
source for increasing their land holdings. For grow-
ers from within or near the scheme, their respective 
traditional authorities--<:hiefs or village headmen_:_ 
would be a natural source for a solution to the land 
problem. 
A high proportion of growers (79 per cent) 
indicated that their food harvest was not adequate. 
The most important reason, stated by 60 per cent of 
all growers, was land shortage, to which family size 
contributed significantly. Ninety per cent of the 












event of food shortfalls with purchases, suggesting 
that cash incomes have an important role. 
Welfare and income 
There were many benefits derived from the 
scheme, buttherespondents indicated that the most 
importantwasreceivingknowledgeaboutimproved 
farming techniques (35 per cent). The availability 
of general credit facilities and credit for fertilizer 
was the second-most important category of bene-
fits, followed by medical care and the cash earn-
ings, food and clothes associated with the scheme. 
Transport and infrastructure had much less impact 
on the growers. 
Over 90 per cent of the growers indicated that 
they had experienced problems related to the 
scheme. Over 70 per cent of the respondents men-
tioned problems to do with their income: no profit, 
deductions, poor pay, the relative crop payment 
system (RCPS), late payments and general short-
age of money. 
Sugarcane growers on the scheme generally 
have gross annual earnings in excess of K 4,000. 
Moreover, these gross earnings showed a marked 
increase over the 1985-87 period. For example, 98 
per cent of the growers derived gross earnings ofK 
4,000andabovein 1985, while in 1986,97percent 
derived gross earnings of K 4,500 or above, rising 
further to K 5,000 and a1>9ve in 1987. However, 
various deductions are made from these earnings at 
the source so that the actual earnings received by 
the growers iri return for their labour and effort can 
be far below the gross earnings. 
Table 12 shows the pattern of net incomes after 
all deductions (for respondents for whom data were 
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available). Net incomes are much lower than gross 
earnings, reflecting that expenses deducted for 
various services and inputs provided by the SSA 
account for much of the gross earnings. For 1984 
and 1985 most net incomes fell between K 100 and 
K 499. During these years, few growers had net 
incomes from sugarcane above K 700, sharply con-
trasting with the gross earnings of above K 4,000. 
Net incomes earned in 1985 appear to have been 
worse than those experienced the year before (Fig. 
1). However, net earnings for 1986 were a marked 
improvement over both of the earlier years. In view 
of the improvement in gross earnings noted earlier 
between 1984 and 1985, the net income compari-
son between those years suggests heavy deductions 
in 1985 compared to 1984. 
The net incomes indicated in Table 12 cannot 
be considered to be high for most of the growers. 
However, these incomes from sugarcane could be 
supplemented by other income generating activi-
ties. Levels of income generated from sale of other 
agricultural_ produce suggest that this soiirce of 
income is not a promising one for the majority of 
the growers. In each of the three years (1984, 1985 
and 1986) over 60 per cent of the growers derived 
no incomes from selling other agricultural produce. 
For those few for whom this source was a possibil-
ity, the incomes so earned were generally less than 
K 100. 
A quantitative and qualitative profile of the 
deductions from growers' incomes are shown in 
Table 13. The data suggest that the heaviest costs 
incurred by growers are associated with extension 
service and development machinery costs for har-
vesting and fertilizer issue. These are responsible 
for significantly reducing net incomes below the 
gross levels. 
Organization . 
At the time of the survey, there was no farmers' 
organization in the SSA although farmers elected a 
representative to present their problems and sug-
gestions to the SSA Board. However, the organiza-
tions observed by the study allowed for election of 
Village Chiefs who were to deal with social prob-
lems within their settlements. 
Technology 
At the time of the survey, most of the growers . 
(99 per cent) had had at least four years of experi-
ence in the scheme. As discussed earlier, the largest 
proportion had been farmers in their previous occu-
pations or had been in wage employment (Table 
11). Thirty-nine per cent had grown the principal 
crop prior to joining the scheme using traditional 
methods. This category of growers felt that the new 
methods they learned at the SSA were better than 
the traditional method. 
Table 12: Net Income from Sugar Growing (Kwacha) 
1985 1986 1987 
Income category Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
. 0.00- 99.99 17 9 18 10 1 1 
100.00-199.99 30 16 36 20 3 2 
200.00-299.99 35 19 39 21 3 2 
300.00-399.99 29 16 38 21 15 8 
400.00-499.99 36 19 30 16 8 4 
500.00-599.99 16 9 14 8 30 16 I 600.00-699.99 8 4 5 3 27 15 700.00-799.99 8 4 1 1 22 12 ,,. 
800.00-899.99 5 3 2 1 15 8 :· 
900.00-999.99 16 9 
1,000.00-1,499.99 2 1 31 17 
1,500.00-1,999.99 10 5 
2,000.00 and over 4 2 
186 100 183 101· 185 101· 
a. Does not total 100 per cent due to rounding. 
Soiuce: Field Survey. Smallholder Sugar Authority, 1987. 
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Table 13: Quantitative and Qualitative Profile of peductionsfrom Growers' Gross Incomes, SSA 
Deductions 
Amount for over 95 per cent of farmers (kwacha) 
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(Generally from K 800 to over K 1,000) 
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Table 14: Estimated Technical Coefficients Influencing Income from Principle Crop at STA, 
.1985-87 (Regression Statistics for Experience (E,). Land (L,). Gender (G) and Age (A) of Grower) 
Parameter Estimates" for Function, 
YP = + b1EP + b2LP + b3G + b4A by year 
Explanatory Variable 1985 1986 1987 
EP: Experience growing principle crop (years) (bl) 251.387b 320.681b 186.555b 
(7.862) (7.502) (6.623) 
L : Land devoted to principal crop (hectares) (b2) 7.692 6.595 
P . I (1.491) (1.4,51) 
G: Gender of grower (dummy) (b3) -272.166° -281.191b -220.044° ' 
(4.878) (3.770) (4.477) 
A: Age of grower (years) (b4) '58.909b 81.151 b 51.828b 
(3.476) (3.582) (3.472) 
Other Regression Data: 
Intercept (C) -216.870 -307.127 -146.337 
R-2 .158 .136 .129 
F-statistic 36.256b 40.394b 28.838b 
a. Figures in brackets are t-statistics 
b. P=0.001 
Source: Field Survey, Smallholder Tea Authority, 1987. _ 
' 
Contractual arrangements 
An overwhelming majority (98 per cent) of the 
farmers receive a comprehensive package of serv-
ices related to sugar-growing, including extension 
services and planting, haulage and harvesting the 
cane crop. The cost of these services is deducted 
from the growers' gross earnings from the scheme 
and, ultimately, it can affect their perception of the _ 
financial benefits of remaining in the scheme. 
Generally, chemical inputs provided under the 
scheme were not readily available from other sources 
and growers had little choice of source. 
Despite the general importance of rice cultiva-
tion in Nkhota-Kota District, the sugar growers 
consider maize to be by far the most important food 
crop. Land availability and allocation to food crop 
production generally reflects the national pattern. 
Sixty-six per cent of the growers had 0.4 hectares or 
less under food crops, with a further 25 per cent 
having up to 0.8 hectares. This indicates that the 
SSA abided by this aspect of its contracts. How-
ever, there were cases where growers were with-
drawn after several warnings from SSA because 
they did not abide by the terms of the contract. Of 
the twelve interviewed, about half had received 
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three warnings. The total number of people who 
withdrew was twenty-four while those who re-
signed were seventy-three, indicating some dis-
content over the contracts with the SSA. 
Factors influencing income levels 
from principal crop ' · -
Multiple regression analysis was performed to 
determine explanatory variables of income from 
the principal crop. The following regression model 
was used: 
YP = C0 + b1EP + b}-P + bp + b4A 
where, Y = Income from principal crop p 
(kwacha) 
E = Experience in growing the principal p 
crops. (years) 
L = Land devoted to principal crop (hec-
P 
tares) 
G =Gender of grower (dummy variable) 
A= Age of grower (years) 
-C = Constant 
' 0 
b1 - b4 =Coefficients to be estimated 
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Table 1 Technical .coefficients Influencing Income from Principle Crop (Y) at SSA, 1987 
(Regression Statzsticsfor Experience (E) andAge (A) of Grower) . · p . 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
R-2 = .127 
F-statistic = 37 .693• 




Source: Field Survey, Smallholder Sugar Authority, 1987. 
• 
· Regarding tea production, for all three years the 
multiple regression analysis indicates that income 
from the principal crop (tea) was positively and 
significantly (P = .0.001) associated with the 
grower's age and his or her years of experience in 
growing the principal crop (Table 14). These re-
sults establish that the number of years in tea 
growing, as a proxy for experience, is an important 
variable in tea production. This phenomenon was 
also observed among tenants growing Burley to-
bacco in Malawi. s 
There was a significantly negative (P = 0.001) 
association between income from tea and the gen-
der of the growers, indicating that female growers 
were producing better quality tea, which fetched a 
higher price and culminated in a relatively high 
income. Field experience has shown that women 
(including young girls) are generally employed to 
harvest tea in the tea estates because they tend to be 
meticulously careful and harvest better quality than 
their male counterparts. Tobacco graders at the 
Lilongwe Auction Floors have expressed similar 
views regarding women's excellent workmanship 
in grading, despite reservations that women tend to 
pick less in a given time period. 
The land area devoted to the principal crop (tea) 
did not explain any variation in the levels of income 
from tea. This is not surprising because in the 
Thyolo-Mulanje area there is such a shortage of 
land that the areas allocated to tea are very tiny and 
virtually identical. This is also true for growers on 
customary land since for those on public land the 
ST A allocates the same number of hectares to each 
grower on the scheme. It has been indicated earlier 
that decisions regarding land allocation to the prin-
cipal crop were made by the ST A; this applying to 
growers on ST A land. 







Sugar Authority data was restricted to one season 
(1987), and to only two variables: experience and 
age of sugarcane growers. Land area was quite 
homogeneous and all growers were male except 
forone widowed woman. Similar to the case of tea,· 
the analysis indicates a significant (P = 0.001) and 
positive association of income of the principal 
crop (sugarcane) with age and with the years of ex-
perience in growing sugarcane (Table 15): 
Policy Implications 
Contract farming in Malawi is generally lim-
ited to two export and processed commodities: 
sugar and tea. The production and processing tech-
nologies are complex and new to most growers and 
some operations involve economies of scale. Pro-
ducing these crops also requires large quantities of 
specialized inputs with a high capital outlay. The 
specialized nature and capital initially required to 
operate tea and sugar processing facilities restricts 
their application to processing indigenous food 
crops and other cash crops. Unless multinational 
corporations are encouraged to engage in produc-
ing and processing basic food grains and other 
vegetable crops, contract farming does not form 
the basis of a·general rural development structure. 
Where public land is involved, contract farm-
ing seems to be biased against female farmers, as 
observed in the SSA. To avoid this problem, con-
tract farming should involve farmers operating 
their own land under customary law. Smallholder 
authorities should have theirown processing plants 
if this implies direct access to outside markets for 
the processed commodities concerned. There were 
· relatively fewer problems in ST A than ii:i SSA in 
terms of delays in harvesting the principal crop and 
in paying proceeds to the growers. This was proba-
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bly because the STA had acquired its own factory. 
Potential growers should have experience prior 
to their being recruited since experience in growing 
the crop has been shown to be a significant factor in 
increasing yields and quality of tea and sugarcane. 
According the functions proposed for the authori-
ties, they should establish training fanns or provide 
funding to some training institution to assist in 
training potential growers in the field. · 
.Farmers should have legal representation when 
signing contracts to assist them in their interpreta-
tion. To minimize variation in commodity prices, 
the contract should suggest that the Government 
prescribe prices of commodities. Alternatively, a 
national board could be set up to small-
holder farmers making contracts in order to bargain 
for better prices with contracting organizations. 
Credit facilities should be provided to small-
holder farmers either by way of loans, overdrafts, 
or Government loans. Credit should not be re-
stricted to production inputs per se. Consumption 
credit is necessary to the growers operating on 
contract because large areas are reserved for cash 
crops as opposed to food crops. This has been 
advocated by Vitals who argued that allocative 
efficiency may be of only minor importance com-
pared with X-efficiency since the reasons for con-
siderable variation in output must not be restricted 
to observable measurable inputs.6 The element.S of 
a contract may not be fully specified; it may be 
impossible to specify every detail of labour's obli-
gations and not all factors that contribute to output 
are marketed. Motivation of the workforce can 
considerably affect both quality and quantity of 
output (X-efficiency) but it cannot be purchased as 
with other inputs. The question offood is as impor-
tant as the question of proper housing for the 
growers operating on public land. 
Concluding Remarks 
Generally, prices projected at 60 per cent ex-
mill have been lower than those realized (see Table 
4). This indicates that the aspirations of the SSA 
and the DSC as organizations have been achieved. 
However, smallholder farmers' incomes have been 
much lower in the sugar authority than in the tea 
authority mainly because of high deductions and 
use of the RCPS form ular to calculate the cane pur-
chasing ppce. The RCPS system needs to be re-
viewed, if not abandoned, because it contributes to 
low productivity and unnecessary unrest both among · 
the tenants and between the tenants and the author-
ity. 
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Contracts which set a fixed price do not neces-
sarily reduce risk for the growers or the buyer and 
can even increase risk for both, depending on 
specific market characteristics. Thus risk should 
not be thought of as a zero-sum game. Contract 
farming should not be viewed as a method by which 
agribusiness "controls" agriculture while transfer-
ring all risks to the growers. Successful schemes 
generally involve the development of mutual trust 
between a buyer and growers. Contract violations 
by the company are likely to be the sign of poor 
management or a failing concern. 
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Vuvulane Irrigated Farms and Mphetseni 
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Vincent Majozi Sithole and Clasina C.M. Boeren 
Social Science Research Unit, University of Swaziland 
Swaziland 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the role of contract farming in Swaziland by examining 
samples from Vuvulane Irrigated (sugarcane) Farms, and Mphetseni Pineapple 
Settlement Scheme. The performance of the schemes is evaluated against their failure 
or success in achieving objectives of the Swaziland Government, the scheme 
members and the processors. Possibilities ofreplicating the scheme in the country are 
assessed. 
Introduction 
Contract farming defined 
· In their definition of contract farming and out-
grower schemes Neocosmos and Testerink point 
out that the schemes constitute a relationship be-
tween (sections of) the local peasantry and transna-
tional agribusiness enterprises, often in combina-
tion with the local Government. This relationship 
involves the transnational controlling the more 
profitable sector and marketing the final product 
(through its privileged and exclusive access to the 
world market) while restricting smallholders to a 
production process which it indirectly controls. 
The transnational is able to exercise control over 
production through its exclusive control over the 
market. It also provides managerial and technical 
services and means of production to the contracted 
peasantry on an easier basis than that available on 
a free market.1 
For the relationship to qualify as contract farm-
ing the transnational must have near to total mo-
nopoly of the market. If other markets exist and the 
transnational offers services to producers so that 
they will choose to sell to the transnational rather 
than to other buyers, then this is not contract farm-
ing as defined above. Rather, it is common com-
petitive practice. 
However, this definition appears to be too nar-
row. This paper adopts a definition used by Minot: 
Contract farming is defined as agricultural produc-
tion within the context of a commercial agreement 
between the grower and the buyer which affects 
important production decisions. The contractor-
frequently a processor or an exporter-often pro-
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vides seeds, fertilizer and other inputs on credit 
along with technical assistance, on the condition 
that the producer agrees to sell the output to him.2 
In Swaziland there are several outgrower 
schemes and contractual relationships between 
growers and buyers, both on title deed land and on 
Swazi Nation land.3 This paper discusses Vuvulane 
Irrigated Farms (VIP) scheme and the Mphetseni 
Pineapple Settlement Scheme where the principal 
crops are sugarcane and pineapples, respectively. 
Sample 
Primary and secondary data sources were used 
to assess both the VIP and Mphetseni schemes. 
Secondary data sources were from the Social Sci-
ence Research Unit (SSRU) of the University of 
Swaziland (UNISWA), UNISW A Library, annual 
reports from the sugar and pineapple industries and 
Government publications. Very little literature is 
available on the two schemes, particularly the 
Mphetseni pineapple scheme. 
To supplement and update the information inter-
views and discussions were held with the personnel 
at VIP, Swazican, Tibiyo Taka Ngwane (Tibiyo), 
ManangaAgricultural Training Centre (Mananga), 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), 
Mphetseni Scheme's Cooperative Management, 
and SSRU staff members. 
Personal interviews were used to collect pri-
mary data at both schemes, primarily using a ques-
tionnaire with both pre-coded and open-ended 
questions. Tape recorders were used mainly for 
open-ended questions. 
At VIP a list of the 263 scheme members was 
obtained, of which 60 farmers were selected at 
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random. Interviews were held in the farmers' 
homesteads. At Mphetseni, 9 out of a total of 19 
farmers were interviewed. The intention was to 
interview all 19 farmers, however the Co-operative 
Management Committee objected to the other 10 
farmers being interviewed. 
Land tenure . 
The Concessions (Partition) Act 28 of 1907 1 
resulted in expatriate settlers obtaining two-thirds 
of the land in Swaziland. The remaining one third 
was reserved for Swazis. Swazis who were on the 
alienated land were given five years to move, 
unless they made arrangements with the new land-
owners.4 
Land given to the settlers was-and. still is-
title deed land (TDL), governed by Roman Dutch 
law. It may be held in freehold or in leasehold. Title 
holders may use the land any way they deem fit, 
provided they do not exceed the limitations im-
posed by public and private lll,w.5 " 
Land that given to the Swazis under the 
terms of the Act is, in principle, held under tradi-
. tional tenure, herein referred to as Swazi Nation 
land (SNL). SNL is held in trust by the King for the 
Nation and is divided into chiefdoms for adminis-
trative purposes. The chiefs allocate land to house-
holds on behalf of the King for cultivation and 
establishing a home site in exchange for a cow, 
loyalty and tribute labour. Unallocated land is open 
to communal grazing.6 
Currently SNL constitutes about 55 per cent of 
the total land area of Swaziland, while TDL ac-
counts for the remaining 45 per cent. The increase 
in SNL from some 33 per cent in 1907 has been due 
to land repurchase under the Lifa Fund (financed 
from a cattle levy), through Native Land Settle-
ments (allowing eviction of settlers failing to util-
ize the land satisfactorily), and through individual 
or company purchases by Swazis themselves. After 
independence the Lifa Fund was replaced by a 
British-funded land repurchasing scheme. 
Native land settlements are at present governed 
by Swazi Law and custom. Land repurchased under 
the Lifa Fund programme and iinder the British-· 
funded land repurchase programme is registered in 
the name of the Ngwenyama (King) in trust for the 
Natjon. Part of this land was made available to 
chiefs fortheRuralDevelopmentAreasProgramme 
(RDAP) and is administered in accordance with 
Swazi law and custom. The remainder is used by 
Tibiyo or Tisuka7 as agricultural projects, indus-
trial projects, or housing projects, or administered 
. by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives as 
agricultural projects.8 The legal status of these 
lands is a cause for confusion. Some people believe 
that the land becomes SNL, others that the land 
remains TDL.9 This confusion is caused by the 
definition of "Swazi Area" in the Natural Re-
sources Act (71/1951) and the use of "Swazi Na- · 
tion" in the Vesting of Land in King Order (45/ 
1973). One may argue that as long as the land has 
not been made available to chiefs, it remains title 
deed land governed by Roman Dutch common law. 
. In this case the land should be referred to as title 
deed land registered in the Ngwenyama, since 
several statutes that impose restrictions to private 
tenure land do not apply to land registered in the 
Ngwenyama in trust for the Nation. In so doing, one 
reserves the term SNL for land governed by Swazi 
Law and Custom, be it registered or unregistered. 
In terms of the Vesting of Land in King Order, 
the Government is not allowed to deal with land 
registered in theNgwenyama in trust for the Nation 
or with rights to minerals in that land. This restric-
tion does not apply to Tibiyo or Tisuka. 
Another category· of land in Swaziland is 
"crown" or "Government" land. This type of land 
is controlled by the Government for public pur-
poses. Since 1973, all land and real rights in land 
owned by the Government are vested in the King 
and registered as crown land. The Government is 
allowed to let and sublet crown land on behalfof µie 
King. The Government, however, in principle is 
not allowed to sell, exchange or mortgage crown 
land without the written authority of the King. Ac-
cording to Armstrong, Government farms are on 
Crown Land.10 
Sugarcane production 
Land in sugarcane production is carefully pre-
pared to meetall requirements ofirrigation. Crawler 
tractors or ordinary tractors are used to pull heavy 
disc harrows and sub-sailers for cultivation. This is 
followed by furrowing to prepare for planting. 
Pieces of unburnt cane stock are used as seeds and 
are planted in rows to allow the movements of 
tractors and other machines for fertilization, weed-
ing and harvesting. 
A weeding programme is necessary in order to 
protect the small plant at its early stage. Three 
weeding methods are available to sugarcane pro-
ducers: human labour for hoeing, mechanical cul-
tivators or chemical control with herbicides. Chemi-
cals are applied both manually and mechanically, 
and sometimes aeroplanes are used for spraying. 
Chemicals are used to control pests and dis-
eases whenever necessary: Sugarcane ripens after 
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twelve to fifteen months. It is burned to prepare it 
for harvesting, and human labou is employed to cut 
the caner-using bush knives. The cane is then 
transported to the sugar mill where it is processed 
into raw (brown) sugar. The raw sugar is trans-
ported to refineries and markets overseas. What 
happens with the molasses and other sugarcane by-
products is still being negotiated by farmers and 
VIF management. 
Pineapple production 
Preparing the land for pineapple production 
involves ploughing or sub-soiling to improve sub-
surface drainage. The topsoil is disced to a fine tilth 
for maximum plant growth, and beds are prepared 
for the pineapple where it will be arranged in . 
double rows. Pre-plant fertilizers are applied a the 
time of bed preparation. · · · 
Three main types of planting matetial are avail-
able to farmers: 
tops: the green leafy tops of the fruit 
slips: the vegetable growth that develops on the 
stem of the fruit 
suckers: which emerge from the base of the 
plant 
Weeds may be controlled by cultivation-hoe-
ing is commonly used-or he!bicides. Pesticides 
are applied to control pests and diseases whenever 
necessary. 
Pineapples are induced to flower prematurely 
with compounds that have flower-initiating prop-
erties. This permits harvesting to be either concen-
trated or spread out. In the case of Swazican this 
"forcing" makes it possible to regular I y supply fruit 
to the factory. The flower induction programmes 
are scheduled so that the plant crop ripens in Feb-
ruary and March and the ratoon crop ripens be-
tween August and September. Pineapples have a 
five-year cycle. 
Contractual arrangements at VIF 
The Commonwealth Development Corpora-
tion (CDC) bought TDL land from Swaziland 
Ranches in the lowveld north-eastern part of 
Swaziland, where VIF and other CDC projects 
stand today. The VIF scheme was established in 
1962 after a series of successful trials from 1959 .. 
The trials were on a limited scale involving SwaZi 
smallholders growing sugarcane, cotton, maize and 
vegetables under irrigation. 
Farmers were recruited from throughout the 
country.:' A successful applicant had to be Swazi, 
healthy and of good character willing to make VIF 
his home and be recognized as a "good farmer".11 
By 1975 the scheme had settled 263 farmers on in-
dividual plots averaging 10 acres. 
A lease contract was drawn up between CDC 
and the individual scheme members. Additional 
·agreements were concluded between CDC and the 
scheme members with provisions for water to be 
provided to the farmers in their capacity as iessees, 
services and assistance provided by CDC, organi-
,zation and supervision by CDC of all matters relat-
ing to production and harvesting of sugarcane and 
. a joint account system. 
A requirement that at least 70 per cent of the 
land has to be put under sugarcane (as stated by 
management and farmers during interviews) is not 
expressly stated in the contract of lease. It is to be 
found in a document that the authors could not 
obtain.· 
The average area per farmer under the principal 
crop in the 1986/87 season was 8.2acres,represent-
ing 74 per cent of the land; The rest of the land was 
used to produce maize, cotton, jugo beans, vege-
tab_les (potatoes, carrots, cabbages, tomatoes, spin-
ach and onions) and sweet potatoes. · 
The scheme is managed by CDC which pro-
vides a variety of services to the farmers. Irrigation 
water· from Inyoni Y ami Swaziland Irrigation 
Scheme (IYSIS)-is provided at a fixed charge per 
acre.12 
VIF ·management organizes harvesting of the 
. cane in farmers' fields (bums, cuts and transports to 
the mill), an obligatory service provided to guaran-
tee timely supplies of sugarcane to the mill. Farm-
ers are charged for this service according to the 
cane tonnage-regardless of distance to the mill-
at E 10.00 per tonne.13 
There is a joint account system in which each 
grower has to authorize Barclays Bank of Tshaneni 
to receive all money due to·the growers for cane 
delivered to theMhlumeMill and credit his account 
at the bank for that amount. The joint holders of this 
account are VIF Ltd. and the individual farmers. . 
The bank is authorized by the farmer tO pay all 
cheques drawn against the account if each such 
cheque is signed by the grower and by any of the 
signatories authorized by CDC, provided the ac-
count shall not be overdrawn. 
Farmers expressed dissatisfaction over terms of 
their lease agreements as early as 1964. They 
refused to have their cane cut and were not prepared 
to pay for some services they had received. As a 
result CDC consulted with the Swaziland Govern-
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ment which was to decide on the future of the 
scheme. Recruitment of new members was sus-
pended at the end of 1974. In 1982 the land was 
given to the King in trust for the Swazi Nation, free 
of charge, changing the land from TDL to SNL. 
VIF Ltd. was bought by Tibiyo Taka Ngwane for a 
symbolic amount ofE 100 and was transferred into 
anew company registered under the name Swaziland 
National Agricultural Dev.elopn:ient Corporation 
(SN ADC). Tibiyoenteredinto amanagementagree-
ment with CDC and in 1986 VIF. was transferred to 
Tibiyo. 
A new contract is currently being drawn up as 
the twenty-year lease signed by the farmers has 
expired. However, as long as no decision has been 
taken on the question of the land tenure, or a new 
lease implemented, the present lease contract ap-
plies on a monthly basis. 
Contractuql arrangements at 
Mphetseni 
The Mphetseni Pineapple Scheme is on 250 
hectares ofTDL which was bought by the Swaziland 
Settlement Company (SSC) from Usuthu Pulp 
Company Ltd. in the Malkerns Valley. After being 
consulted by the SSC the Government initiated a 
smallholder scheme on the land. The adjacent pine-
apple cannery made pineapple production attrac-
tive for the scheme. In 1964 the land was divided 
into twenty-seven plots of about 9 hectares each. 
The Government formed the Pineapple Settle-
ment Company (PSC) and charged it with the 
responsibility of running the scheme. A contract of 
lea8e was drawn up between the SSC, PSC and the 
individual farmers. The marketing of processed 
pineapples was to be done by the pineapple cannery 
with a contract oflease for a period of twelve years: 
In 1981 the Government withdrew from the scheme, 
thereby effectively liquidating thePSC. TheMphet-
seni Farmers Cooperative purchased the consoii-
dated farm and currently manages it. 
At present the relationship between the cannery 
and the farmers is regulated by a pineapple canning 
contract for the sale and delivery of the growers' 
to th(f Swaziland Fruit Canners (Pty) 
Ltd. Farmers are obliged to sell all the pineapples to 
the cannery, and the cannery is obliged to buy the 
pineapples from farmers provided it is of the right 
quality and sold during the correct season. 
The land to be put under pineapple production 
is agreed upon by the company and the grower. The 
contract starts on the date of signature and contin-
ues until the first ratoon crop has been harvested 
from the planting last notified to the company. The 
contract has provision for the proper care of the 
crop by the grower during the period of the con-
tract; instructions to be given by the company and 
to be followed by the growers concerning pesti-
cides and their application; practices affecting de-
livery; settlement of disputes between the company 
and the grower; and the termination of the contract. 
Swaziland Government policy 
towards outgrower schemes 
Outgrower schemes in Swaziland have a his-
tory dating as far back as the early 1960s. Contract 
farming schemes were mentioned in the country's· 
First (post-Independence) Development Plan of 
1969. However, the second and third plans are 
silent on the schemes, and it is only in the Fourth 
Development Plan that contract farming schemes 
are mentioned again. The Swaziland Government, 
through the Fourth National Development Plan, 
. states that: 
Given the need to improve the elasticity of 
employment and develop the country's irri-
.· gation potential in the most productive way, 
it is widely recognized that future agricul-
tural development in the modern sector 
should concentrate on more labour-inten-
sive irrigation schemes on the nucleus/ 
smallholder model. The experience of 
Vuvulane is considered to provide a suc-
cessful example in this respect.14 
The Government believes that the existing 
outgrower schemes have proven to be a success, 
thus the strategy should be followed to enhance 
rural development. Mkhabela supports this asser-
tion when she says "VIF farm incomes are higher 
than farm incomes in communally-held areas in 
spite of the decline of sugar prices".15 
Key Determinants· 
Swaziland Government's objectives 
The Swaziland Government recognizes the 
economic importance. of rural development in 
general, and agricultural development in particu-
lar. Until recently, the Rural Development Areas 
Programme (RDAP) has been the Government's 
main vehicle for promoting rural development in 
· the country. 
62 
RDAP was initiated by the Government in 
1970. After seventeen years in 'operation, opinions 
about its results are mixed but there is convincing 
evidence to show that the RD AP has been a failure. 
The programme has led to increases in cropproduc-
Contract Farming Schemes In SWazlland: 
Vuvulane Irrigated Farms and Mphetseni Settlement Scheme 
tivity through introducing improved fanning tech-
niques; but there has been a simultaneous decrease 
in area under crop production.16 Consequently there 
ha8 been no increase in crop production. The pro-
gramme has also failed to ease the overstocking 
pFOblems. · 
The main aim of the country's agricultural 
policy is to assist and encourage Swazi farmers to 
move from subsistence activity to semi-commer-
cial and commercial farming.17 Through the RDAP 
the. Government aimed at increasing the incomes 
and living standards of rural Swazis. Through the 
outgrower schemes the Government hopes to attain · 
its objective of transforming Swazi Nation land 
farmers from subsistence to commercial farming. 
As one official said, the Government "wants to 
eradicate the attitude that land is used just for sub-
sistence which must be supplemented by paid 
employment elsewhere. We want to make people 
aware that they can be self-employed, that farming 
can be a lucrative business .. "18 
Even though RDAP has failed, the develop-
ment aims and objectives of the Government have 
not changed: failureof theRDAP is seen as a failure 
of the means to attain the end. Adopting contract 
farming schemes is therefore an alternative means 
to attain most of the objectives that were targeted 
under the RDAP. Through the outgrower schemes 
the Government wants to: 
• extend farm services, marketing, credit and co-
operative facilities 
strengthen the crop and livestock extension 
services, making them more available to farm-
ers· 
• increase employmeht opportunities for Swazis 
Growers objectives 
A VIF applicant must have been recognized by 
his or her community as a "good fanner".19 These 
are the farmers who were producing crops for com-
mercial purposes on SNL prior to joining the scheme. 
To them, joining the scheme is a venture that will 
help them expand their commercial farming. Their 
main objective in joining a contract farming scheme 
is to increase their family incomes through com-
mercial fanning. The packages that come with such 
schemes are seen by the farmer as the means to 
attain this objective. 
Contracting firms' objectives 
The shareholders in contracting firms at VIF are 
Tibiyo (the owners ofVIF), CDC and the Swaziland 
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Government (shareholders at Mhlume Sugar Mill). 
At Swazican the shareholders are Swazican, CDC 
and the Swaziland Government. Even though these 
are different companies they have many common 
objectives towards contract farming schemes: 
to be involved in "training and equipping of the 
nationals to ensure that senior management 
posts of its projects are staffed by qualified 
nationals at the earliest possible moment"20 
to spread investment to benefit as large a num-
ber of rUral families as possible in order to best 
serve the interest of the recipient country 
to have guaranteed supply (in terms of quality 
and quantity) of the principal crop, without 
being involved in the direct production of the 
product. In the process, the companies are saved 
the trouble of organizing labour for production 
to attain positive profits in their operations 
Evaluation of Performance 
Marketing facilities 
Fanners are not generally just faced with pro-
duction issues; they also need to have access to a 
market for their production. Depending on the 
product, inaccessibility-of markets may be due to 
an absence of buyers. Recent history of Swaziland 
shows that even fanners who have surplus maize to 
sell often find the Swaziland Milling Company 
faced with financial and storage problems. Farmers 
have to line up for days and often, in the end, leave 
without selling. Some of the farmers end up selling 
at low-priced markets because of lack of transport 
to take products to higher priced markets. 
Fanners at VIF have a guaranteed market for 
their sugarcane. The Mhl ume Sugar Mill purchases 
all the farmers' cane and the VIF management 
transports the cane to the mill. Thus VIP fanners 
are assured of access to the sugarcane market. 
However, VIF farmers also produce other crops. 
For these crops the fanners are faced with market-
ing problems often resulting in highly perishable 
vegetables rotting in the farms. Farmers sell the 
crops individually and this is l.ess efficient than if 
they were sold collectively. 
Fanners at the Mphetseni scheme produce only 
pineapples and the Swazican factory provides a 
relatively guaranteed market for the pineapple fruit. 
The co-operative runs a transportation depot from 
which the farmers' pineapples are transported to 
the factory without problems. 
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Thus, for the principal crops in the two schemes 
there are no marketing problems. There is a need, 
however, to improve the marketing of the other 
crops. A well-managed farmers' co-operative can 
provide this service at relatively low cost. 
Extension advice 
Farmers on both the VIP andMphetseni schemes 
are provided with better extension advice than off-
scheme farmers on Swazi Nation land. At VIP and 
Mphetseni the extension worker to farmer ratio is I 
to 65 and l to 19, respectively. These ratios are 
superior to the I to 400 off-scheme ratio on SNL. 
At VIP 73.3 per· cent of the farmers reported 
having no problems getting extension advice. One 
factor may be that VIP extension workers have 
more readily available transport than those off the 
scheme. At VIP the extension advice is not re-
stricted to sugarcane, as farmers get extension 
advice for their other crops as welt Thus farmers 
benefit not only for the purposes of being in the 
scheme, they can use this know ledge off the scheme .. 
Although the Mphetseni scheme has no full-
time employed extension workers the farmers have 
access to such advice. The farm section of the 
factory is always available to provide advice and 
the co-operative has a good relationship with the 
former extension worker who provides advice 
whenever sought. This was affirmed by 66.7 per 
cent of the interviewed farmers who reported that 
they have no problems with getting extension advice. 
Although the inputs are not directly applicable out-
side the scheme, farmers in the scheme learn that 
use of modem inputs will increase crop yields. 
Consequently they can be expected to readily re-
ceive innovations off the scheme. 
Both schemes are contributing towards the 
Government's objective of providing increased 
extension advice to Swazis. Farmers have bene-
fited since they can illcrease their crop yields and 
consequently increase their incomes. The facto-
ries/mills benefit in terms of getting high quality 
products and enough supplies from the farmers. 
Credit and farm input facilities 
A desire for credit arises whenever the scale of 
intended operation exceeds the resources immedi-
ately available. In the case of Swaziland, and many 
other developing co tin tries, extension workers dem-
onstrate efficient farming techniques to small-scale 
farmers. However low rates of adoption of the 
techniques indicate that farmers have no funds to 
invest in improved inputs. 
Availability of agricultural credit to farmers 
induces increases in agricultural output. It pro-
motes increases in incomes and subsequentiy in-
creases in the standard of living and thus helps the 
Government control rural-urban migration. Where 
there are credit problems, farmers are notable to get 
enough farm inputs, and inputs are not obtainable 
in time. 
Small-scale farmers have various sources of 
credit in Swazilarid. The main source of agricul-
tural credit is the Swaziland Development and 
SavingsBank.OutofGumaandSimelane'ssample 
of 200 borrowers, 92 used this source of credit 
Commercial banks (Barclays, Standard, Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International) provide an 
alternative source of credit. Because these are pri-
vately-owned and profit-oriented they are very 
particular about what loans they give, and few 
farmers utilize such loans (9 out of 200). 21 
Co-operative societies are another source of 
credit to farmers, although their loans are usually 
restricted to co-operative members. Seventy-five 
of the 200 surveyed borrowed from co-operatives. 22 
Cotton ginneries in Swaziland also provide 
credit, including Swaziland Cotona Cotton Gin-
nery Company (Matsapa), Swaziland Oil Seeds· 
Mills (Big Bend), and J .L. Clark Ltd (Natal, South 
Africa). Such credit facilities are restricted to cot-
ton ·growers. Credit comes in the form of inputs and 
farmers are obliged to sell their output through 
. these ginneries. 
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Friends and relatives are another source of 
credit. In addition, "Shylocks" giving credit have 
been known to charge interest rates higher than 30 
per cent per month. Based on the basic laws of 
demand and supply the ability to charge such high 
interest rates-and . still maintain demand for 
credit-indicates a deficit in credit availability. 
This can be blamed on the type of security de-
manded from SNL farmers due to the land tenure 
system. 
The Swazi Law and Customs are such that SNL 
farmers cannot use the land as collateral for loans. 
Cattle is commonly required as security by formal 
lending institutions. This puts such credit facilities 
out of reach of a large group of farmers who do not 
own cattle, about 45 per cent of SNL farmers.23 
Lending institutions that do not require security, 
such as co-operatives, have a record of high defaul-
ters, and consequent financial problems. 
Credit is available to VIP scheme members for 
building materials and-farm inputs (such as cane 
seed, fertilizers and pesticides). This credit facility 
is not restricted to sugarcane inputs. Regardless of 
the crop, the loan is repaid from sugarcane reve-
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nues, at an interest rate 1 per cent above the com-
mercial banks' prime lending rate (averaging 12 
per cent per annum in 1987). 
AS a result of the ease of getting loans at VIF, 
scheme members get enough inputs and in time. 
Over 70 per cent ofVIF farmers reported having no 
problems in obtaining inputs, and 80 per cent 
reported getting services (such as harvesting and 
transportation) in time. Of the farmers, 77 per cent 
know of no cheaper sources of services. Through 
the credit facilities farmers get equipment (such as 
tractors) on time, to which over 70 per cent of the 
farmers attested, while 56. 7 per cent of whom knew 
of no cheaper sources. 
AtMphetseni, the management committee keeps 
records of individual farmers. It provides the farm- · 
ers with credit facilities, through which farmers get 
all their required inputs. The company pays the 
farmers for pineapple sales through one cheque to 
the scheme, sent to the committee. The committee 
then pays individual farmers after deductions of 
their outstanding loans. 
About 78 per cent of the farmers at Mphetseni 
reported having no problems with getting farm 
inputs. The same percentage reported getting serv-
ices and equipment in time, while 88 per cent of the 
farmers knew of no cheaper equipment and serv-
ices sources. 
Thus the two schemes ·have extended credit 
facilities to farmers, without the requirement for 
the latter to have the conventional collateral. A 
financial system-through which distribution of 
crop proceeds are controlled by the lender -makes 
this possible. Farmers are assured of enough and 
timely inputs, services and equipment The scheme 
members in this aspeet fare better than those off the 
scheme. 
The repayment rate in the Mphetseni scheme is 
high compared with off-scheme rates, and the 
scheme reports no problems in this respect At VIF 
the low repayment is due to misunderstandings 
·between management and farmers about the con-
tracts signed. At presentthe funds are tied up in the 
bank, thus there is no direct loss to either party. 
Employment 
Swazican employs the largestnumberof women 
in a company in the country, and is therefore seen 
to be contributing to employment creation. The 
whole factory employs about 3,500 people during 
the peak season.1A The scheme contributes to this by 
providing the basic input (pineapple fruits) to the 
company. In addition, scheme members on average 
employ 3 people to weed, plant and harvest, rang-
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ing from 2 to 4. 
Scheme members at VIF on average employ 7 .7 
people, ranging from 0 to 32 per homestead. The 
scheme as a whole thus provides employment to 
more than 2,000 people. 
Sugar is key in the Swazi economy and domi-
nates the country's exports. All classes of Swazi 
society are represented in the sugar industry; from 
directors or artisans to the majority employed as 
unskilled labourers. About 14 per cent of the coun-
try's population-is estimated to be wholly or partly 
dependent on employment in the sugar industry. 
Increased incomes 
Mkhabela that VIF farmers make more 
income than those on SNL.25 During the days of 
good sugar prices farmers at VIF benefited from 
high sugarcane prices and were the envy of many 
Swazi farmers. High ownership of cars by scheme 
members was an indication that large profits were 
being made in the scheme. 
Low ownership of particular assets, like cars 
and tractors, today indicate that all is not so well in 
the scheme compared to the past. About 4 2 per cent 
of the scheme members have cars while only 18per 
cent have tractors. However, these figures still 
show the scheme members faring better than off-
scheme where only 3.3 per cent of all SNL farmers 
own one or more tractors26 and probably a lot less 
than 40 per cent own cars. 
About47 percentofthefarmers feel they have 
benefited from jpining the scheme, but only 35 per 
cent feel that the 'scheme has lived up to their 
expectations. Consequently, only 41.7 per cent of 
the farmers state that they have no intention of 
leaving the scheme. . 
The scheme does not seem to be highly profit-
able any more. This can be expected in the light of 
the low sugar prices in the last few years. However, 
one needs to take a close look at the figures and 
compare the profitability of sugarcane with other 
crops. 
Farmers at VIF do not keep proper farm rec-
ords, making it difficult to calculate profit. Figures 
obtained from the survey are inconsistent and in-
complete, making calculations based on them 
impossible. However, the Mananga Management 
Training Centre (Mananga) has been involved in 
teaching scheme members the basics of farm rec-
ord keeping since 1984. Figures obtained from 
them are more reliable than those based on the 
survey figures. 
For the period 1985/86, Mananga calculated 
the gross margin on sugarcane in the scheme to be 
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E 3,006 per hectare.27 This is comparable to the 
gross mean calculated by VIF management for the 
1986/87 season of E 3,830 per hectare for the 
scheme members.28 This is lower than the average 
ofE 4,600 per hectare for farms operated by VIF 
management over the same period. Sugarcane is 
quite competitive compared with other crops pro-
duced in the scheme according to the 73.3 per cent 
of the farmers who felt that sugarcane was profit-
able. Gross margins for the 1985/86 season show E 
2,270 for green maize, E 5,060 foronions, E 670 for 
cotton, E 1,533 for cabbages and E 3,006 for 
sugarcane per hectare.29 
At Mphetseni the gross income per five-year 
crop cycle was estimated at E 6,024.17 .3° Farmers 
at Mphetseni scheme seemed to be making profits. 
Ownership of cars by 67 per cent of the scheme 
members supports this. The prices of pineapple in 
the world market are currently high. Since there are 
no other crops produced in the scheme, no compari-
son could be made. Due to the chemicals used in the 
pineapple production the land is useful only for that 
crop, as growing other crops would require the land 
to be left fallow for about three years. 
About 78 per cent of the farmers feel that 
pineapple growing is profitable and 77 .8 per cent 
have no intention of leaving the scheme because 
they feel they make more money in the scheme than 
they would make outside. Of the sampled farmers, 
67 per cent feel the scheme has lived up to their 
expectations, while all the farmers indicated that 
they have benefited from joining tpe scheme. 
Guaranteed supply 
VIF provides only a small frar;tion of the total 
sugarcane supply to the Mhlume Sugar Mill. For 
this portion of the supply the mill does not have to 
· bother about organizing production or managing 
the required labour. 
VIF management controls the quality of the 
output, supplies the inputs and inspects the crop to 
control diseases. Extension workers on VIF man-
agement's payroll provide advice to ensure the 
quality is maintained. Quantity supplied is con-
trolled through the quota given to the scheme. To 
make the quantity control more effective farmers 
are obliged to put at least 70 per cent of theit land 
into sugarcane production. Management regulates 
the supply byundertaking the harvesting functions. 
This way management is able to provide cane when 
the mill needs it 
Farmers at Mphetseni undertake the production 
aGtivities. The farm section of the factory works 
with the scheme to control diseases. A new produc-
tion technology-such as new seeds and chemi-
cals-prescribed by the factory is communicated 
to the scheme by the farm section. The farm section 
controls and guarantees delivery of pineapple fruit 
to the factory through forced ripening. 
Farmers are not allowed 1to sell pineapple to 
other buyers, and little is actually sold to Mahlanya 
fresh fruit market. The pineapple sold to this mar-
ket is often of low grade. Thus virtually all pine-
apple produced in the scheme finds its way to the 
factory. Thus the quantity and quality of the pine-
apple prOduced is guaranteed to Swazican. 
Spread of investment . 
Farmers at VIF benefit from the scheme in 
· many ways. With the extended family situation in 
·Swaziland the 263 homesteads who directly bene-
fit from scheme also pass it on to relatives. The 
scheme is located in rural areas where the sugar in-
dustry is based. The sugar industry has prompted 
multinationals, like CDC, to invest in infrastruc-
ture in the rural areas. The VIF scheme, if anything, 
has justified provision of infrastructure in the area. 
In the scheme there is a primary school, high 
school, clinic, post office and a shopping centre. 
However, there are still improvements needed at 
VIF, such as to provide clean piped water and 
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improve sanitary services. . 
Swazican is located in the Malkems Valley. 
Located around the factory is a clinic, post office, 
primary and secondary schools, shopping centre 
and police station. The Malkems area is well con-
nected to the rest of the country by paved road. 
Company profits 
The first 'company operating the pineapple 
cannery, John Heath Canners, faced financial prob-
lems; in 1968 the cannery went into liquidation. 
Despite the fact that a rescue operation was under-
taken by the Swaziland Government and local busi-
nessmen, the growers were not paid for the pine-
apples they had delivered for quite some time. In 
1979 and 1980 the cannery, under ownership of 
Nestle South Africa, recorded losses as a result of 
low prices of pineapples and rising production 
costs. 
From 1982 the cannery was taken over by 
Swaziland Fruit Canners (Pty) Ltd. The cannery 
recorded losses in its first year, but from 1983 
onwards it has made profits. Future prospects for 
the company look bright as prices are not expected 
to decline for a while and -the world markets are 
expected to being stable. 
In contrast, while CDC makes positive profits 
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in projects undertaken in the country the VIP scheme 
is recording losses. The losses par,tly caused by 
low sugar prices experienced in the last few years. 
However, prices are not expected to decline fur-
ther. Problems in the scheme, specifically caused 
by farmers refusing to sign joint accounts, have led 
to over E 1 million being tied up in the bank. 
This does not seem to cause CDC great concern. 
The losses incurred at VIP are offset by profits 
made in other CDC projects. While it would be 
good to earn positive profits from VIP the losses are 
not expected to result in CDC's withdrawal. 
Local participation in · 
management 
Members' participation in the project is vital to 
the scheme's success. Participation could come in 
the form of a farmers' association being involved in 
the management, as clearly illustrated in studies. 
At VIP the farmer's co-operative, registered 
under the Cooperative Societies Act 28/1964 in 
1967, is currently dormant. If anything the co-
operative exists only in name, and40 per cent of the 
farmers sampled reported that. there was no co-
1 operative. Only one third of the sample were 
members of the co-operative. 
The co-operative has been faced with poor 
management practices that are common in devel-
oping countries, which tend to discourage farmers 
from joining. Some of the farmers have viewed the 
co-operative committee as working for the VIP 
management against the rest of the farmers. 
There seems to be general agreement from the 
farmers, VIP management, Government officials 
and Tibiyo that revival of the co-operative is vital. 
The co-operative should undertajce some of the 
functions currently provided by VIP management 
and is expected to provide this at a lower cost. 
Among the services that it could provide is running 
the farm input depot. It ·would be easy for farmers 
to understand the loan operations if some of them 
undertake the depot's m'anagement. Currently farm-
ers feel they get overcharged for the inputs. 
If well organized, the co-operative could ar-
range transportation of sugarcane to the mill by 
having transport facilities available to farmers on a 
hire basis. The co-operative could also run the 
equipment hire pools. 
The failure of the farmers to participate in the 
management has led to the root problem of the 
scheme: farmers feel that the management is ex -
plaiting them by charging high prices for all the 
service provided. On the other hand, VIP manage-
ment can not help but such prices if it is to 
provide the' services efficiently to the scheme 
members . 
. The Mphetseni scheme is a qualified success 
. story, 31 mainly attributed to the farmers' participa-
tion in management The co-operative society 
manages the scheme with no outside help. 
The co-oj>erative began running the ·scheme 
late in 1982. At the time of the takeover, the scheme 
was facing problems similar to those VIP is cur-
rently facing. Farmers felt that the management 
was cheating them or overcharging them for serv-
ices provided, and failed to understand how some 
of their expenses were accumulating. There was a 
· high level of indebtedness. Lotringer partly blames 
this indebtedness on rising administration and man-
agement costs?2 Rising costs of production also 
contributed since there was no corresponding in-
crease in price of pineapple fruit. Fariners had no 
recognized representation in the setting of prices. 
The co-operative now runs the input and farm 
implements depot and it also provides loans to 
members. The executive of the co-operative is 
elected every two years and meets once a week to 
discuss farm operations. Through the co-operative 
farmers have been able to come up with a unique 
labour hire system33 that ensures timely perform-
ance of labour-intensive activities. The factory 
does not have to deal directly with each member 
when introducing new technologies, techniques, 
delivery schedules or payment for sale proceeds. 
Since the co-operative took over the scheme has 
made progress. The co-operative has repaid loans 
and has successfully acquired the right of owner-· 
ship in the land under the scheme. Factory manage-
ment has reported that many of the farmers have 
repaid outside loans. Farmers are making profits 
from the operations. The small size of the scheme 
makes it possible for the committee to run the 
. scheme smoothly on a part-time basis without pay. 
Constraints to Replicability 
· The pineapple market is not only close to the 
production centre but is virtually the only one, as 
the fresh fruit market is insignificant. This monop-
. oly of the market makes a major contribution to the 
relative success of the pineapple scheme. The farm-
ers' co-operative is managing the scheme success-
fully and has the confidence of the scheme mem-
'bers. The small. size of the scheme-in terms of 
membership-makes it easier to manage. How-
ever, a possibility ofhaving a similar scheme where 
'the co-operative-not the individual farmers-has 
title to land, does not appear bright. 
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The problem ofland tenure associated with VIP 
makes it inadvisable to replicate such schemes 
elsewhere in the country. On Swazi Nation land a 
contract of lease is out of the question as it is not 
possible for the contracting firm to evict farmers 
who breach the contract on the land allocated by a 
chief. In addition, farmers fail to understand the 
need to pay for irrigation water and other infra-
structure provided in a scheme on SNL as, by 
definition, such are provided to farmers at no charge. 
Although not directly coming out of the above 
analysis we suggest that a contract of sale· and 
delivery of a product between a processor and 
farmers on SNL can be considered. Under this 
system farmers would use the land already allo-
cated to them by the chiefs, thus eliminating prob-
lems associated with settlements. 
Where the principal crop requires setting up 
costly infrastructure which farmers would be ex-
pected to pay for, such as irrigation, such projects 
should be restricted to TDL and crown land. On 
such land the farmers would understand the need to 
pay for the infrastructure and there would be no 
problem effecting a contract of lease in addition to 
one of sale and delivery. 
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Abstract 
This report analyses the existing relations between growers, the companies and the 
state in outgrower schemes in Tanzania. Thal extension services, credit and inputs are 
predominantly supplied by state institutions, which also control the marketing insti-
tutions, is identified as one of the main reason why outgrower schemes in Tanzania 
have not been very successful. Policy options necessary to create more effective and 
democratic relations between the growers, the companies and the state are suggested. 
Introduction 
This report is part of a regional study in East and 
Southern Africa on the contract and outgrower 
farming system. This study looks at the relations 
between the core farm and/or processing faetory 
and the outgrowers and the system's ability to 
improve agricultural production and the welfare of 
the outgrowers. 
Tanzania's is the only country in the region 
without a typical contract farming system. Contract 
farming involves contractual, and therefore legally 
binding, relations. between a group of outgrower 
household producers, a core processing plant and/ 
or a corporate plantation (estate or core farm). 
Contractual concerns include the quality of agricul-
tural produce, delivery of inputs, provision of ex -
tension services and marketing. Since production 
systems operate within political boundaries, the 
state is an extremely important actor in any viable 
contract farming system although its role remains 
largely regulatory. · 
In Tanzania, as we shall discuss in greater detail, 
the only farming system that approximates contract 
farming is what is loosely referred to as "outgrower 
schemes". These involve an interplay of three ac-
tors-the state, outgrowers, and the company-in 
the most important stages of agricultural produc-
tion, transportation, marketing and processing. 
However, there aie no legally-binding contracts. 
The intervention of the state in extension, trans-
portation and marketing processes would seem to 
pre-empt any viable contract farming system. 
The study focuses on sugarcane and tea cultiva-
tion and processing for three reasons. First, they are 
the only crops in which the outgrower farming 
system is practised on a fairly extensive scale and 
has been practised for a sufficiently long period to 
allow, for accurate and generalisable scientific 
enquiry. Second, the end-products of the two crops-
black made tea and sugar-have got a strong urban 
demand which, by virtue of its political weight, has 
. tended to influence state interventionist policies in 
producer price determination, control of extension 
services and marketing. Third, both crops have the 
potential foreign exchange, although it is tea 
that was introduced, particularly among smallholder 
farmers, to inci:ease foreign exchange earnings. The 
predominance of the state in sugarcane production 
and processing is largely due to the need to reduce 
sugar imports. All the sugar processing factories 
are, primarily import substitution industries. This is 
not, of course, peculiar to Tanzania. Even Kenya, 
the most successful African country in sugar pro-
duction, was motivated by import substitution' when 
it began encouraging sugarcane cultivation. Kenya 
still processes sugar largely for home consump-
tion.1 
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Basic Issues in Contract Farming and 
Outgrower Schemes · 
Policy and institutional framework 
A country's overall agricultural policy deter-
mines the nature of the relationship between the 
outgrowers, the core farm and processing factory 
and the state. As a general rule, where state inter-
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vention dominates the most important stages of 
crop production, processing and marketing it is 
difficult to establish a contractual relationship be-
tween the outgrowers and the core farm or process-
ing factory. This is especially so where the state 
hopes to maximize its foreign exchange capadty by 
having firm control over the conditions of house-
hold production and sale of agricultural produce. 
This was the case of Tanzania, particularly between 
1975 and 1986, and remains so today.2 
Alternatively, where state intervention in the 
conditions of peasant household production is lim-
ited to the most essential roles, a better atmosphere 
is created for the core farms to enter into legally-
binding and enforceable contracts with the sur-
rounding outgrowers. This conducive atmosphere 
does not necessarily mean that the conditions of 
household production become freer, or that the 
outgrowers determine the conditions of their exis-
tence any better than where state institutions domi-
nate. Many writers have shown, arguing from dif-
ferent perspectives, the "enslaving" situation of 
farming contracts entered into with multinationals, 
even in the best conditions where the outgrowers 
have a fairly effective association like the Mumias 
Outgrowers Company of Kenya.3 
Nevertheless, it is true that contract farming 
schemes with influential outgrower associations 
have tended to produce better results in terms of 
increased exports (e.g., Kenya Tea Development 
Authority-KIDA) and meeting the home market 
demand of important urban consumer items as 
sugar (Mumias Sugar Company of Kenya) even 
though this success might have been accompanied 
by immense social stress.4 
In Tanzania, the state is omnipotent in the econ-
omy's productive and distributive functions. The 
·state influences all forms of household production, 
whether in villages far from core farms or in those 
surrounding the core farms. Peasant household pro-
duction has moreover been affected by frequent 
institutional changes, particularly in marketing, input 
distribution and credit provision. · 
There are three important phases of such major 
institutional changes. The first main institutional 
change took place in the 1970s, with the dissolution 
of the local Government Councils in 1972 and 
dissolution of the Co-operative Unions in 1976. 
The Co-operative Unions had for many years pro-
vided an important interface between peasants 
(including the outgrowers) and the state in the key 
function of input distribution, marketing and provi-
sion of loans. Up to to 1976, the government, 
through the Ministry of Agriculture, had been re-
71 
sponsible for providing extension services t9 peas-
ants both within and outside the outgrower schemes. 
With the dissolution of the Co-operative Unions 
government institutions dominated all spheres of 
agricultural production and distribution until 1984. 
The Marketing Boards of the various export crops 
that were responsible for the export market were 
expanded and took over the Co-operative' s func-
tions in distributing inputs, providing extension 
services, purchasing and selling export crops and 
providing loans. Of more interest to outgrower 
schemes was the transfer of extension services from 
the Ministry of Agriculture to the Crop Authorities 
(formerly known as Marketing Boards) and the 
transfer of other key services (e.g., internal trans-
port and purchase of green tea leaves) from the Co-
operative Union to the Crop Authorities. 
The rapid and extensive intervention of the state 
in almost all spheres of agricultural production, 
brought with it immense problems. The Crop Au-
thorities' increasing over-head costs began to eat 
into the producer prices of the farmers, widening 
marketing margins. Increased borrowing from the 
banks to run the ·loss-making parastatals fuelled 
inflation. In addition, the often grossly over-valued 
exchange rate did not allow the state any leeway to 
increase producer prices. The result was a slow 
withdrawal of the peasant commercial producers 
from the official market into the parallel market 
(where alternative markets existed). For most ex-
port crops, farmers slowly but.steadily diversified 
their production away from traditional export crops 
to food crops liilld fruits with high internal demand. 
The resultant foreign exchange crisis and gen-
eral decline in agricultural production forced the 
policy-markers to change their approach (Table 1). 
In 1982 there were further rapid policy changes. 
The Co-operative Unions and local government 
councils were reinstated; subsequent years saw 
other major ·policy changes like the June 1986 
Economic Recovery Programme. The Crop Au-
thorities returned to their old role of dealing with the 
external market; and the local currency has been 
devalued, temporarily enabling the state to push up 
nominal producer prices.5 · 
Most important for the outgrowers, particularly 
of tea, the responsibility for extension services has 
gone back to the Ministry of Agriculture and Live-
stock Development while the other functions of 
marketing, providing inputs and loans are slowly 
going back to the Co-operative Unions as they 
consolidate themselves. For sugarcane, however, 
the Sugar Companies-which are under Sugar De-
velopment Corporation (SDC)-are still providing 
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most of _the essential services although they are 
considering handing over the provision of exten-
sion services to the relevant ministry due to increas-
ing losses in part due to high over-head costs.6 
·A key policy aspect of agricultural production 
should also be considered here: the land tenure 
system. In most countries where contract farming 
has led to significant increases in production the 
land tenure system seems to have played a signifi-
cant role-although not always been beneficial to 
the outgrow er. Where there is a freehold land tenure 
system or a "controlled" freehold land tenure sys-
tem, as in Kenya, a core farm can sub-leased to the 
growers. In this context, the land to the 
growers becomes a key component of the contract. 
Continued use of the land depends on the strict 
observance of all aspects of the contract. This 
arrangement, of course, forces the·outgrower to use 
the sub-leased land primarily for cultivating the 
designated crop, failing which the use of the land is 
forfeited. · · 
In Tanzania, the state is the overall owner of 
land and has allowed two forms of land tenure to 
operate: the deemed right of occupancy (traditional 
and based on use-right) and the granted right of 
occupancy (granted by the state for commercial 
purposes).7 Most of the outgrowers are governed by 
the deemed right. of occupancy and the company 
has no legal authority whatsoever on their land. 
This land tenure system has both advantages 
and disadvantages. For the sugar companies or the 
government-owned tea processing factories it is not 
easy to enforce good agricultural practices. Out-
growers can refuse to implement recommended 
practices and yet retain their land. On the other 
hand, this arrangement is beneficial to the out-
grower particularly when poor macro-economic 
policies (such as. regarding producer prices) and· the 
general inefficiency of the companies leads to poor 
returns to labour of the outgrowers. In this case, 
they can always resort to other income-generating 
crops and non-farm activities without losing the 
right to use the land they own. However, outgrow-
ers owning land through use right (i.e., without any 
legally.!hinding title deed) can always lose their 
land to a more powerful farmer or even to the state. 
These rapid institutional changes and the vague 
land tenure system in Tanzania are reflected in the 
performance of outgrower schemes. The implica-· 
tion of these issues will become clearer, particularly 
when evaluating outgrower scheme performance . 
The crop production processing 
system 
While almost all crops, whether for domestic 
consumption or export, can benefit from outgrower-
core farm relations, there are certain crops which, 
by virtue o(their biological qualities and agronomi-
cal demands, stand to gain more from these rela-
tions. Tea and sugarcane are two of the few crops 
Table 1: Mainland Tanzania's Foreign Trade Balance (US$ Millions) 
Year Exports Imports Balance Balance as Per Cent 
1973 367 495 (128) 35 lj 1974 403 753 (350) 87 j] 1975 376 770 (394) 105 
1976 490 638 (148) 30 '.@ ·>j 
1977 546 750 (203) 37 
' 1978 477 1144 (667) 140 I 1979 537 1100 (562) 105 1980 506 1219 (713) 141 .ffl 1991 554 1161 (607) 110 
1982 415 1113 (698) 168 
1983 380 815 ,(437) 115 
1984 388 874 (486) 125 
1985 286 999 (713) 249 
1986 348 1047 (700) 201 ®. 
1987° 380 1150 (779) 203 @. ·/,:), 
e. Estimated ':>.: 
Source: Bank ofTanzania, 1987. 
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whose nature can greatly benefit from a well-func-
tioning outgrower system. , , 
Sugarcane production and processing. Sugar-
cane grows best in tropic;al conditions, especially 
with thefollowing environmental conditions: high 
temperatures (in excess of21°C); fairly evenly dis-
tributed rainfall of about 1500 mm per annum;8 high 
natural soil fertility or fertilizer application; and 
good drainage. It takes from twelve to fourteen 
months from seed cane planting to harvest. Cane 
from ratoons is grown for ten to twelve months, and 
is limited to four ratoon crops. 
Cane growing involves land preparation (in-
cluding providing drainage), cane-seed prepara-
tion, planting, weeding (twice per year), harvesting 
(cane cutting), and transporting (haulage) the cane 
to the factories. Outgrowers are also encouraged to 
provide firebreaks around their cane plots to avoid 
accidental fires. 
Sugarcane cultivation is clearly labour inten-
sive. Outgrowers mostly use family labour to plant, 
weed and clear land for firebreaks. For land prepa-
ration (fallowing), harvesting and haulage the 
majority depend on the core farm or company. The 
companies provide these services on interest-free 
credits which are recovered annually after cane 
sales. An efficient transport system is essential 
since cane has to be processed the same day it has 
been harvested. If more than twenty-four hours 
elapse from cutting to processing, internal chemical 
reactions take place making renderment (sugar 
recovery) and crystallization difficult and ineffi-
cient. To avoid this, the company has to guarantee 
available transport for those outgrowers who need 
it once it has agreed to buy (and cut) the cane. Table 
2 shows the costs involved for the outgrower. 
Tea production and processing. Tea grows well 
in areas with a cool climate and adequate rainfall. 
Annual rainfall in tea-growing areas in .Tanzania 
ranges from 1,000 mm to 2,500 mm. Like sugar-
cane cultivation, tea cultivation is also labour inten-
sive, particularly during the period of .establish-
ment. Plucking consumes a significant amount of 
the outgrower's labour. According to a study made 
in the four areas with tea outgrowers by the Market-
ing Development Bureau (MDB) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, plucking takes up to 53 per cent of the 
growers' labour.9 
Apart from the labour-intensive nature of pluck-
ing, the plucked green leaves must be carried to 
collection points by the growers. From there they 
are transported as soon as possible to the processing 
factories by the companies or the government. The 
proximity of the collection points to the farm and 
efficient transportation of the green leaves to the 
factory are important in determining the quality of 
the made tea. Green leaves cannot withstand high 
temperatures for a long time and any delay will 
reduce their quality. 
Another important factor in ensuring high qual-
ity leaves is the constant use of fertilizers, particu-
larly fertilizers rich in nitrogen compounds. Apply-
ing 1 kilogram of nitrogen increases yields by about 
10 kilogram of made tea equivalent.10 It is therefore 
crucial that the existing institutional set-up guaran-
tees timely and adequate supply of fertilizers. 
The firm, growers, and contracting 
relationship 
The case for tea. Tea in Tanzania is mainly 
grown and processed on large-scale private farms 
or by companies with factories primarily estab-
lished to process green leaves from theirown farms. 
In rare cases private factories process the green 
leaves from smallholders where smallholder farm-
ers are located far away from the state-owned· 
processing factories. Of the estimated 18,7000 
hectares currently under tea cultivation, 44 per cent 
is managed by private estates, 7 per cent by the 
Tanzania Tea Authority (TT A, a parastatal respon-
sible for tea) and 49 per cent by smallhoiders. 
Private estates produce about 70 per cent of the · 
Table 2: Services Offered to Sugarcane Outgrowers and Associated Costs, 1986187 
Type of Service Price (TSh) 
Land preparation• 
Harvesting/cutting 
Loading and transport 
Cane seedb 
a. Clearing, tilling and harrowing. 
b. Including loading and transport. 
Source: Field Officers, Kilombero and Mtibwa, 1987. 
1,500 per acre _ 
40 per tonne or 40 per day per cane cutter 
170 per tonne 
150 per tonne (up to 11/87); 300 per tonne (since 11/87) 
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national tea production, state-owned estates about 
2 per cent and the smallholder about 28 per cent.11 
Almost all the tea outgrowers own small pieces 
of land. The national average smallholder tea farm 
is about OJ hectares, whereas in the study area the 
average farm size was 0.6 hectares (for Rungwe 
and Lupambe) and 0.28 hectares for Usambara in 
Tanga Region (Table 3). 
The tea farming system in Tanzania can be 
summarized thus: 
1. · Large-scale private estates with processing 
factories 
2. Large-scale private estates (core farms) with 
processing factories and outgrowers structur-
ally linked to government services except for 
processing 
3. Large-scale state-owned estates with process-
ing factories and outgrowers 
4. State-owned processing industries and outgrow-
ers 
The first type is the dominant farming system. 
Case studies of the second and fourth type were 
conducted: the Dindira Tea Estates Company 
(owned on an equity sharing basis between the 
Government of Tanzania and a London-based pri-
vate company), and the Ambangulu Tea Estate 
Company, a fully privately-owned company. The 
two companies are located in the Usambara Moun-
tains in Tanga Region. For comparative purposes, 
research was also conducted in Rungwe District 
whose outgrowers supply green leaves to the facto-
ries owned by the Tanzania Tea AuLhority (a paras-
tatal) and has no tea estates. 
The case for sugarcane. In Tanzania the state 
dominates sugar production. Sugarcane is grown 
mainly as an estate crop by four factories: the 
Tanganyika Plantation Company (TPC) in Kili-





























Table 4: Size of Out grower holding for Cane, Paddy Rice and Maize, Kilombero and M tibwa 
LandArea Sugarcane Paddy ·Maize 
(ha.) Frequ. Per Cent Frequ. Per Cent Frequ. Per Cent 
0.0- 1.4 39 39.8 45 45.9 38 38.8 
0.5- 2.9 28 28.6 33 33.7 39 39.8 
3.0- 4.4 16 16.3 10 10.2 11 11.2 
4.5- 5.9 1 1.0 2 2.0 1 1.0 
6.0- 7.4 2 2.0 1 1.0 5 5.1 
7.5- 8.9 2 2.0- 3 3.1 2 2.0 
9.0- 10.4 3 3.1 0 0 2 2.0 
10.5- 11.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.0- 13.4 2 2.0 4 4.1 0 0 
13.5- 20.19 5 5.1 0 0 0 o· 
Average size 3.4 99.9 2.2 99.9 2.2 
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. manjaro Region, Kilombero Sugar Company (KSC) 
·and Mtibwa Sugar Estate (MSE) both located in 
Morogoro Region, and the Kagera Sugar Limited 
(KSL) in Kagera Region. This study was based on 
and MSC. 
Outgrowercontribution to total cane supply and 
equivalent processed ·sugar is insignificant. The 
outgrowers contribute only 10 per cent of the total 
supply of sugarcane in the country, and are only 
associated with KSC and MSE. 
Farms cultivated by sugarcane outgrowers are 
generally small. In the study area, about 70 per cent 
cultivate 3 hectares or less, and only about 7 per cent 
were larger than 10 hectares (Table 4). At the 
national level, it is estimated that outgrowers culti-
vate 4,505 hectares out of a total of 23,736 hec-
tares-about 19 per cent of the total land area that 
was expected to be cultivated in 1987/88.12 · 
Sugarcane outgrowers have more links witl\ the 
company than tea outgrowers, although relations· are not contractual. The company is responsible for 
land preparation, providing cane seed, harvesting, 
haulage and extension services .. 
Key Determinants of Successful 
Outgrower Schemes 
--
Five key determinants of successful outgrower 
schemes can be used to measure their performance. 
For both tea and sugarcane cultivation, there are 
agronomic practices and, related services that are 
essential if good results are to be guaranteed. Im-
portant factors that are common to the two crops are 
discussed below. · 
Attractive producer prices 
Subsistence farmers decide to cultivate so-called 
cash crops because of the expected cash income that 
they need in order to blly industrial goods (incentive 
goods) . When there is a poor harvest of subsistence 
crops cash crops enable them io meet their house-
holds' food requirements. Beyond earning a mone-
tary income, peasants are less attracted to cash crop 
cultivation and will either go back to cultivating 
subsistence crops' or other crops that will give 
satisfactory returns to fabour invested. The ques-
tion of real as opposed to nominal producer prices, 
therefore, is extremely importantforany successful -
outgrower scheme. 
Provision of fertilizers and 
extension SeNices 
For both sugarcane and particularly tea cultiva-
regular application of fertilizer is important. 
Any marginal increase of fertilizer use will lead to 
significant productivity increases. It is therefore 
crucial that there is an efficient institutional set up 
that can guarantee the regular supply of fertilizers 
and essential chemical inputs, l,ike weedkillers, and 
at reasonable prices. Agricultural practices which 
can be greatly enhanced by relevant and efficient 
extension serVices are another important factor. 
The rapid institutional changes and near absence of 
extension services from the companies or core 
farms has made extension services amongst out-
growers erratic and largely ineffective. · 
Efficient support seNices 
Since both the cultivatjori of tea and sugarcane 
is labour intensive, outgrowers cannot perform all 
the necessary duties without support from either the 
company (for sugarcane) or the government (for 
tea). Given the perishable nature of the crops, 
prompt and efficient transport becomes one of the 
most important support services. This depends on 
several factors,, such as the ability of the govern-
ment or company to purchase and maintain a suffi-
cient fleet of lorries, construct enough high quality 
feeder roads and establish enough collection points 
to reduce the distance from the farm to the collec-
tion points. 
Credit to outgrowers 
Sugarcane cultivation-whose cycle does not 
exceed five years-<:an only be maintained by a 
constant supply of credit. Both the establishment 
costs and mainbfnance costs (of the ratoon crop) are . -
extremely high and cannot be met by the growers' 
resources alone. This also applies to tea. Although 
the period after the establishment phase is very 
long, the constant application of fertilizers and the 
extremely labour-intensive nature of tea plucking 
all demand cash beyond what most growers can 
retain at any one moment. 
Bnder contract farming systems, credit require-
ments are usually taken care of by the company. In 
Tanzania, this is generally not the case and credit 
provision has to go through a chain of bureaucratic 
channels before it reaches the Even 
then, it is mostly in the form of inputs and services. 
Factory efficiency in processing 
The degree of capacity utilization of factories 
processing green tea leaves and sugarcane has an 
important effect on demand. Where capacity is 
under-utilized due to constant machinery break-
downs due to old age, rigid foreign exchange regu-
-lation preventing the c9mpany from replacing old 
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parts promptly, or management inefficiency, the 
-capacity of the company to purchase the raw mate- · 
rials from the grower will be negatively affected. 
Evaluation of _Performance 
The previous section has identified important 
determinants of a successful outgrower scheme. 
How these determinants operate in the context of 
Tanzania's political economy follows. 
Fulfilling the objectives of the 
government, company 
and grower 
In any outgroweror contract farming system the 
three important actors-government, company and 
outgrowers--enter the outgrower farming stage 
with specific roles and expectations. The success of 
any outgrower scheme will depend on how the 
interests of any one of them are met, which is thus 
. the focus of the following evaluation.· 
Government objectives. The government had 
three basic objectives in encouraging the small-
holder to join outgrower schemes whether through 
settlement schemes (Kilombero and Mtibwa), by 
encouraging subsis_tence peasants to cultivate_ tea 
and sell green leaves to the nearby private core 
Table 5: Sugarcane and Sugar Production, 1974-83 
Season• Sugarcaneh ('000 tonnes) 
State Farms Outgrowers .Total 
-1974{75 986 180 1,666 
1975{76 -1,066 200 1,266 
1976{77 1,180 1,091 1,289 
1977{78 1,003 116 1,124 
1978{79 1,169 197 1,366 
1979/80 1,180 210 1,390 
1980/81 854 193 1,047 
1981/82 1,135 203 1,338 
1982/83 1,090 113 1,203 
1983/84 1,372 160 1,532 
_1984/85 1,148 105 1,253 
1985/86 1,003 104 1,107 
1986/87 991 72 1,065 
farms and factories (Dindira and Ambangulu), or 
by establishing processing·industries and encour-
aging the surrounding peasants to grow tea 
(Rungwe). These objectives were to: 
• enable the government. to increase its foreign 
exchange earning capacity, particular! y from 
black tea export 
• establish import substitution sugar industries 
and thereby save a significant amount of foreign 
exchange by reducing, or finally stopping, sugar 
importation 
• broaden the domestic consumption of sugar and 
black tea thereby increasing the tax base of the 
through sales tax 
Of the three objectives, only the last has been 
fully achieved. Tanzania continues to be a net 
importer of sugar and still, due to inadequate for-
eign exchange, the country cannot import enough 
sugar to satisfy internal demand (Table 5). While 
Tanzania has been able to meet the in tern al demand 
for black tea, its production has been on a down-
ward trend, particularly after the 1982/83 season. 
This has made it difficult to realize the first objec-
tive: increasing the foreign exchange earning ca-































. 109,462 4.84 
a. July to June season 
b .. Sugarcane with 10.5 sucrose content 
c. Including Zanzibar 
d. National sugar consumption estimated at 300,000 to 350,000 tonnes per annum. iffi 
Tanzania has an export quota of 10,000 tonnes per annum to the EEC. · .1] 
e. Tanzania Mainland only · 
• •• 
Sugar Development Corporation (SOC). · ii 
· x · ··. · .. ... ·=· · 
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able to buy 82,240 tonnes of green leaves during the 
1982/83 season, but the amount had declined to 
64,694 tonnes by 1986/87, a 23 per cent decrease.13 
Company Objectives. When a company joins a 
contract farming system or outgrower scheme, its 
main objective is to maximize-profit, in part by 
obtaining high quality inputs from outgrowers at 
reasonable prices. The other objectives derive from 
·this one. That the outgrower may also gain from this 
arrangement (by way of better extension services, 
provision of labour-saving services, inputs, etc.) 
are all linked to this overriding objective of the 
company. 
for the company to realize high profits, how-
ever, many factors have to be taken into account 
both internal and external to the company's estate 
and/or processing factory. This is even more so in 
Tanzania where overall macro-economic policies 
continue to have much influence on sectoral opera-
tions. Such factors include the operational effi-
ciency of the firm itself, ex-factory prices as set by 
the government, the level of world market prices 
and last, but not least, availability of foreign ex-
change needed to buy spare parts and buy new 
machines. 
Among the two crops studied, the performance 
of the sugar industry has been unsatisfactory for 
quite some time. Three estates, including two in the 
study (Kilombero, Mtibwa) and the Tanganyika 
Planting Company have operated at a loss from 
1984/85. The total loss of the three estates was some 
TSh 155 million in 1985/86, and TSh 60 million in 
1986/87. Expressed in shillings per tonne of sugar 
produced, the deficit amounted to TSh 270 in 1984/ 
85, TSh 1,601 in 1985/86 and TSh 1,631in1986/ 
87.14 
Capacity utilization as one measure of the effi-
ciency of the sugar companies has also not been 
satisfactory. For the four state-owned companies, 
from 1984/85 to 1987/88 the following levels of 
capacity utilization have been reached: 68.73 per 
cent, 60.35 per cent, 59.52 per cent and 64.06 per 
cent is The performance of the two companies under 
study (Kilombero and Mtibwa) has also not been 
encouraging. While the two companies tended to 
perform relatively well, particularly between 1980/ 
81 and 1984/85, their performance declined during 
the 1986/87 season and the long-run view (1970n1 . 
to 1987/88) is very bad. 
The average capacity utilization for Mtibwa 
Sugar Estate (MSE) Company for both sugar pro-
duced and cane crushed for the seasons 1980/81 to. 
1984/85 was 100.6 per cent and 100.2 per cent, 
respectively, reflecting both efficiently functioning 
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processing machines and sufficient supply of sug-
arcane from the company's estate.16 For 1986/87, 
however, capacity utilization fell to 49 per cent for 
both sugar produced and cane crushed. The long-
run view of capacity utilization (1970/71to1986/ 
87) is 56 per cent for sugar produced and 66.6 per 
cent for cane crushed.17 
The performance in this area for one factory of 
the Kilombero Sugar Company (KSC), the Msolwa 
factory, is even poorer than the MSE, particularly 
from 1980/81 to 1986/87. The· long-run capacity 
utilization for cane crushed between 1970/71 to 
1986/87 was 69.3.per cent and that for 1980/81 to 
1986/87 was 52.8 per cent. This is comparable to 
the other factory of the KSC, Ruembe factory, 
whose capacity utilization for the years 1977 n8 to 
1986/87 was 66 per cent18 
. The above analysis shows that the objectives of 
the sugar companies-in particular of profit maxi-
mization-have not been fully realized. There are 
several reasons why this has been so, of which two 
are particuiarly relevant. The first, and perhaps the 
most important, reason is the conflicting interests of 
the profit maximizing objective of the companies 
and the objective of the state to provide sugar at 
affordable prices to the largely urban-based 
consumers, while at the same time making the sugar 
industry contribute to the state revenue through 
sales taxes. This has tended to keep the ex-factory 
prices of the company below the cost of production. 
The most recent policy changes might increase the 
profitability of the companies. These include a 
significant increase in the retail price of sugar, the · 
reduction of sales tax from 60 per cent to 33.9 per 
cent and a substantial devaluation of the shilling. 
The second major cause of the companies, poor 
performance has to do with the nature of the rela-
tions between the outgrowers and the companies. 
The absence of a synchronized supply of sugarcane 
from the outgrowers and core farms (of the compa-
nies) has led to either inadequate supply of sugar-
cane (the case of the KSC) or to occasional over-
supply cane (the case of the MSE). 
The tea processing companies have performed 
slightly better in the area of profit maximization 
although this performance is far below world stan-
dards. Available data for profit and loss accounts of 
the IT A-owned companies from the years 1984/85 
to 1986/87 show modest profit margins. The total 
profit/loss account was TSh 1_5.28 million for 1984/ 
85, TSh -49.18 million for 1985/86, and TSh. 54.14 
million for 1986/87 .19 The rather low capacity utili-
zation rates of the privately-owned companies 
suggests that their profit margins are indeed very 
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green leaves to total processed green leaves has 
remained at an average of 24.6 per cent for the 
Dindira Tea Estate Company (1979/80 to 1985/86) 
and for the Ambangulu Factory at 22 per cent (1976 
to 1986),23 it has become increasingly difficult to 
accept most of the green leaves from the outgrow-
ers. 
Indeed, the Dindira Tea Estates Company has 
had to suspend purchases of green leaves from 
outgrowers pending a major rehabilitation of its 
plants. Because ofthis, the outgrowers surrounding 
the company has had either to sell its leaves to the 
already over-burdened Ambangulu processing 
factory, or find an ingenious way to sell their leaves. 
This they may do through third parties at extremely 
low prices (parties that are located between them 
and the nearest TT A-owned processing factory-
the Mponde factory) or leave the bushes unman-
aged to grow into forests, only too visible to any 
passer-by. 
Another reason leading to the uneasy relations 
between the outgrowers and companies in the study 
area is the outgrowers' increasing cost of producing 
green leaves. This is partly due to the recently 
increased producer prices and high labour costs. 
The cost of buying one tonne of green leaves from 
the outgrowers ,is TSh 6,800, whereas the produc-
tion cost per tonne of green leaves of the Amban-
gulu corefarm (estates) isTSh 1,380.Naturally, the 
company would give first priority to its own estate's 
green leaves. 
Outgrower contribution to total processed sug-
arcane has also not been satisfactory. The average 
contribution target of 30 per cent for the KSC' s two 
factories from 1977/78 to 1986/87 was 35 per cent 
for Msolwa factory and 69 per cent for the Ruembe 
factory. Contribution of outgrowers' cane to total 
cane crushed at MSE has been particularly bad. The 
average contribution for the years 1977 n8 to 1986/ 
87 was 14 per cent. Only twice in ten years had the 
company had an excess supply of sugarcane (1980/ 
81 and 1983/84): There are many reasons for this 
poor performance, including poor support services 
(transportation, cutting services, etc.), problems of 
inadequate labour supply, inefficient extension 
services, and inadequate producer prices. 
It can be concluded that the overall outgrowers 
objective-to earn a modest cash income-has not 
been adequately met. Unless viable structiiral rela-
tions are established between outgrowers and the 
companies, the process of withdrawal from the 
ctJltivation of sugarcane and tea into food crops 
which pay more, which is already taking place, will 
certainly increase. 
Assessing the main areas of 
perrormance ,_ 
Food crop production. Under standard out-
grower schemes or contract farming systems, the 
scheme's crop competes with food crops for land 
and other resources. Where growers have little say 
over the land they till and inputs they use this can 
lead to serious food shortages as Williams has ably 
shown regarding to the Mumias Sugar Company.24 
In Tanzania, the absence of legally-binding 
contractual relations, continued existence of tradi-
tional land tenure and the relative abundance of 
land gives outgrowers more flexibility allocating 
cultivated land to different crops. A typical Tanza-
nian household producer of export crops would 
normally also own land for a variety of subsistence 
crops. Because of the general availability of ·land 
the scheme's crop encroaching on the land for 
subsistence crops is almost ruled out. Therefore, 
any food shortage would normally be linked to the 
vagaries of weather. 
Food crops, like paddy rice and maize, compete 
quite well for land with either tea or sugarcane (see 
Table 3 for Rungwe areaand 4 for Kilombero 
and Mtibwa areas). The occurrence of food short-
ages observed in the survey cannot, therefore, di-
rectly be linked to the growers being compelled to 
concentrate on the scheme's crop. When asked 
whether the food harvest was generally enough to 
carry the growers from one harvest to the next , 69 
growers (70.4 per cent) out of a sample of98 grow-
ers for Kilombero and Mtibwa areas said it was, 
while 18 (18.4percent) saiditwasnot,and 11 (11.2 
per cent) did not reply. For the Rungwe area, 14 
growers (30.4 per cent) .said they regularly face 
food shortages while 27 growers (58.7 per cent) 
said they did not. For the Ambangulu and Dindira 
areas of the Usabara Mountains 13 growers out of 
a sample of 53 growers (24 per cent) agreed that 
they face occasional shortages, while 40 growers 
(76 per cent) said they did not. 
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This data from the three research areas shows 
clearly that food shortage is not a widespread prob-
lem among the growers. 
Input supply and extension services. As already 
pointed out, a regular application of fertilizer is key 
to increasing productivity, particularly for tea. In 
spite of the supply bottlenecks, tea growers have 
regularly received adequate fertilizers. Out of 46 
respondents in Rungwe area 42 (91.3 per cent) said \ 
they frequently used fertilizers, 2 ( 4 .3 per cent) did 
not, while 2 (4.3 per cent) did not respond. The 
situation among growers in the Ambangulu and 
Dindira area is similar. In this area, 49 out of the 
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sample of 53 outgrowers (90.6 per cent) said they 
regularly used fertilizers, whereas 2 (3.8 per cent) 
said they did not, and 3 (5.7 per cent) did ilot 
respond. For the cane outgrowers, on the other 
hand, fertilizer use is not prevalent. Out of 98 
respondents 5 (5.1 per cent) said they used fertiliz-
ers while 92 (93.9 per cent) said they did not 
Other types of chemical inputs,however, are not 
in great use although some, if properly used, would 
increase yields and reduce the costs of production. 
Weed killers, important in reducing labour require-
ments, are never used by the growers near the 
privately-owned Ambangulu and Dindira estates, 
although they are extensively applied in the com-
pany's estates. A significant percentage of the sample 
in the Rungwe area used weed killers. Out of 46 re-
spondents 26 (56.5 per cent) said they used weed 
killers while 12 (26.1 per cent) said they did not, and 
8 or 17.4 per cent did not reply. This discrepancy 
among growers of the same crop may be explained 
by the fact that growers in Rungwe, being suppliers 
of green leaves to state-owned processing indus-
tries, might be more favoured in the supply of weed · 
killers. . 
Among the growers of sugarcane around the 
KSC andMSE,only21 respondentsoutof98 (21.4 
per cent) said they used weed killers, whereas 75 or 
(7 6.5 per_ cent) said they did not and 2 per cent of the 
respondents did not reply.Use of chemical inputs is · 
thus very limited with the exception of fertilizers 
used by tea outgrowers. 
Extension services-when efficiently co-ordi-
nated and tailor-made to meet the demands of 
smallholder producers-can be an important factor 
in increasing production and productivity. In the 
study areas, the growers, particularly those growing 
tea, receive regular visits from extension workers. 
In the Ambangulu and Dindira area, 48 of the 53 
respondents (90.6 per cent) agreed that they do 
receive visits from the government extensions 
workers. Only 3 respondents or (5.6 per cent) of the 
sample said they had never received extension 
services since they joined the scheme, and 2 or (3 .8 
per cent) did not respond. 
In contrast, among sugarcane growers, exten-
sion visits are not frequent. Out of a sample of 48 
growers for the Mtibwa scheme, slightly more than 
50 per cent said they received extension services 
and 22 respondents (7 5 .8 per cent) said they did not. 
Almost no growers at the KSC receive government 
extension services. Only 2 respondents out of 50 ( 4 
per cent) said they receive visits from government 
extension officers. 
A better indication of the integration of the 
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"culture" of extension services is the willingness by 
the growers themselves to request these services. 
Out of a sample of 48 growers in the Rungwe study 
area, only 17 (36.2 per cent) said they normally seek 
extensionists' advice. In the Ambangulu and Din-
diraarea,24 growersoutofasampleof53 (47.2 per 
cent) indicated that they request extension services. 
These percentages are not very high but, neverthe-
less, they indicate that when extension services are 
available and efficient, the growers are willing to 
use them. 
Amount and timeliness of payment: Growers 
generally receive extremely low real prices for their 
crops. This problem, particularly for tea growers, is 
made worse by late payments, partly due to frequent 
institutional changes and liquidity problems. The 
recently re-established Regional Co-operative Union 
is currently going through immense liquidity prob-
lems and will probably need mqre time to stabilize. 
Availability of credits and their recovery. Since 
cultivation of both sugarcane and tea is labour 
intensive, without a regular supply of credit-ei-
ther through cash or mputs-it is difficult for the 
growers to maintain even the modest levels of de-
livery of sugarcane and green leaves they have been 
able to get so far. 
For the sugarcane outgrowers, they company 
provides land preparation (fallowing), harvesting 
and haulage services on interest-free credits de-
ducted annually from cane sales. The tea growers, 
on the other hand, receive credits in the form of 
fertilizer inputs and transport services, both de-
ducted annually from sales. These are highly insti-
tutionalized credits tied to specific services and 
they therefore exclude 9ther urgent production 
services that would normally require additional 
credit. · 
Tea plucking is the most labour-intensive activ-
ity and yet tea growers receive no credit to pay for 
the outside labour. A few may obtain commercial 
loans whose lending conditions makes the credit 
out of reach for an ordinary smallholder. A good 
number of tea outgrowers do normally resort to 
employing outside (non-household) labour .. Out of 
53 respondents interviewed in the Ambangulu and 
Dindira areas, 35 (62 per cent) said that they em-
ployed outside labour, while for Rungwe area, 42 
out of 48 (89.4 per cent) said they employ extra 
household labour. 
Opportunity for farmer participation. Some of 
the most successful outgrower schemes, such as 
those under the Kenya Tea Development Authority 
(KIDA), owe their successes partly to the fairly in-
dependent character of the schemes. Under KTDA 
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growers own shares and tend to act as an interface 
between the Government and the KTDA. · 
The institutional set-up in Tanzania is such that, 
even with the re-introduction of Co-operative Un-
ions (effective in 1984), it is almost impossible to 
establish grmyers associations that would· have 
relative autonomy from the state-sanctioned ·co-
operative Unions and the companies. This arrange-
ment would only be possible if a farming system 
approximating contract farming, with checks and 
balances for both the c.;ompanies and the growers, is 
established. As it is, the Tmizania state is not yet 
ready to reduce its hold on the conditions of peasant 
household production and marketing. 
Conclusion: 
Evolving an institutional set-up. 
conducive to outgrower and 
contract farming systems . 
There has been no single outgrower scheme in 
Tanzania that has been successful from the point of 
vie'Y of the growers, the companies or even the 
government. 
Rapid institutional changes and an institutional 
set-up that aims to have a state presence at all levels 
of agricultural production are the main obstacles to 
evolving viable outgrower schemes or contract 
farming systems. Any major breakthroughs in 
improving smallholder production will require far-
reaching changes in marketing, input distribution, 
provision of extension services and producer price 
determination. There have, of course, been major 
attempts to evolve viable institutional structures, 
particularly after 1982. (e.g., the re-introduction of 
co-operatives, local governments and the Economic 
Recovery Programme adopted in 1986). While these 
Changes have, to some extent, freed agricultural 
proouction from excessive state iIJ.tervention, they 
were not related to the objective of evolving viable 
schemes and have hardly_ affected this 
potentially effective farming system .. 
Four major institutional changes could go a long 
way in ·establishing viable outgrower schemes in 
Tanzania: 
restructure outgrower relations away from di- -
rect state control and build more links with the 
companies, be they state-owned or privately-
owned, particularly in providing extension 
services and key chemical inputs 
• encourage and support the privately-owned core 
farms and factories in expanding their installed 
processing capacities in order to capture more 
of the outgrowers' output. Smallholder out-
grower contribution to total production of sug-
arcane and green leaves can be significantly 
increased if the responsibility of expanding · 
smallholder outgrower production is not domi-
nated by the state as it is currently, particularly 
for green leaves. 
transform the loosely-structured outgrower-
company relations into more legally binding 
relations to protect the interests of the growers. 
This would demand fundamental changes in the 
current approach to co-operatives in Tanzania. 
The current dominance of Regional Co-opera-
tive Unions, vis-a-vis Primary Co-operative 
Unions is not conducive tO successful out-
grower-company relations. 
re-evaluate land tenure. The state should con-
tinue to be be the overall owner of land but 
allow for a system of controlled "freehold" land 
tenure in which land could be sub-leased to the 
outgrower through the company, but revoked if -
outgrower-company agreements are not fol. 
filled. The revoked title deed should not be 
subject to sale by the company except through 
the state, and the outgrower who forfeits the 
title deed should be guaranteed another piece of 
land elsewhere. This prop0sal is similar to the 
land tenure changes suggested in the 1983 
Agricultural Policy of Tanzania, with slight 
modifications introduced -to take into account 
the nature of relations between the outgrowers 
and the companies.25 
The above proposed policy changes are not easy 
· to- implement, particularly in view of the many 
years of state-managed agricultural transformation. 
Fundamental- changes in agricultural production 
can only be effected if the interests of the major 
·- actors are protected. A carefully worked out con-
tract farming system could well be one way of 
.realizing this objective. 
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Abstract 
Contract fanning and outgrower schemes in Zambia were studied to understand their contri-
butions and limitations for increasing agricultural growth and rur31 welfare. This case study 
focused on sugarcane and cotton. · 
The relationships between contracting parties,·the nature of $e contracts and the operation 
of the contractual arrangements are discussed, including the implications for replicating such 
arrangements for other crops. Given the incidence of institutional deficiencies in projects under · 
other strategies, the two projects under study have performed well. The field work covered the 
Central, Eastern and Southern provinces of Zambia.· The authors drew freely upon Ellman's 
1986 report on the Kaleya Smallholder Sugarcane Scheme. 
Basic Description. 
Policy context 
The policy context can be discerned from the 
three levels representing state ideals and the policy 
execution environment. The fourth factor is that of 
various instruments used to support the realization 
of set objectives. 
First, at the macro or national level, broad raw 
values of the state are provided. Zambia's agricul-
tural policy objectives areto: 
diversify the economic base by striving to maice 
agriculture a leading sector in generating na-
tional Income · 
promote a self-reliant and progressive rural 
society through farm andagro-industry-related. 
employment, opportunities with the hope of 
reversing or curtailing rural out-migration 
• . achieve self-sufficiency in food crops to sustain 
·consumption of protein-rich protective foods 
for al,l inhabitants as a measure of food security1 · 
Second, at the meso level, these ideals are shared 
out as obligations among the ministries and the 
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holding parastatal congloQlerate. Since private 
capital investment has proved hard to attract .into 
the agricultural sector, the realizatioI). of agricul-
tural policy objectives is the primary work of the 
public sector. The State, through its ministries, 
undertakes programmes and projects to selectively 
promote certain crops, or agro-ecological zones for 
specific crops. · 
Further, the State has set policy guidelines for 
all the parastatal or associate companies that are 
formed or operating under the Zambian Industrial 
and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). These guide-
liries, specific to the agricultural sector, can be 
divided into two sections. The first deals with 
guidelines <;>n joint ventures:. 
Shareholding portfolios are 51and49 per cent 
with ZIMCO having 51 per cent ZlfylCO's 
shares are to be made up of the valued existing 
unexha:ustoo improvements on the farms inclu-
1 sive of machinery, equipment and vehicles. If 
valued assets do not make up the 51 per cent, 
ZIMCO has to subscribe cash to meet the short-
fall. I 
In the event of existing management being 
inadequate, a management contract is to be 
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given to minority·shareholders. · 
Detailed discussions and feasibility studies are 
to be carried out to detennine the extent of 
investment and share capital subscription. 
Feasibility studies on development and trans-
fonnation of the farms are based not only on 
concepts of viability and profitability, but also 
recognize the government's policy of produc-
tion of food and exportable crops. 
The second section of the guidelines refers to 
ZIMCO's role in incoxporating the peasants and 
other petty commodity producers into the national 
economy. ZIMCO has defined this role through the 
concept of "small-scale farmer partnership". The 
approach has involved: 
nuclei estates whose aim is both to bring devel-
opment to rural areas and to act as training 
grounds and demonstration units for peasant 
and smallholder farmers 
smallholder schemes which facilitated transfer 
of technology and production on contract for 
ZIMCO' s processing companies2 
The meso level takes much of the brunt of 
pressure for shifts in policy and policy instruments, 
as well as challenges that are internal and external 
to the institutions concerned in effecting those 
shifts. For example, it is the ministries and the 
ZIMCO group of companies that are at the forefront 
of negotiations for joint ventures with private inves-
tors. 
" Third, at the micro or project level, the raw 
values of the State are further processed and task 
goals are targeted. Policies are adjusted according 
to instruments at hand, resources available and 
strategy appropriate for the expected end-result of 
the project The two case studies under the Lint 
Company and Kaleya Smallholder Scheme are 
examples of the micro-level of policy. 
The Lint Company (Lintco) was fonned by a 
presidential ordinance in 1978 taking over from the 
combined operations ofNAMBOARD and the then 
Ministry of Rural Development which had been 
promoting cotton production since 1975. Lintco, 
although with its own Board of Directors, is subject 
to operating rules of a parastatal company directly 
under the prerogative rules of a government minis-
try. Its objectives are to: 
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satisfy lint requirements for local textiles and a 
surplus for export 
• induce cotton growing as a remunerative pro-
ductive activity for smallholder families3 
The Kaleya Smallholder Scheme (KSC) was 
established in 1980 as a more viable option for 
foreign funding than further expansion of the 
Nakambala Sugar Estate. The KSC is an associate 
company with policy guidelines coming largely 
from the Industrial Development Corporation 
(INDECO) with the latter being answerable to 
ZIMCO. The company's objectives are to: 
supply at least 200,000 tonnes of sugareane to 
the Zambian Sugar Company (ZSC) mill in 
Nakambala Sugar Estate to suppiement estate 
production 
allow and encourage Zambians to participate in 
the sugar industry and to improve their living 
standards 
The two companies differ in their organiza-
tional and management structure, and thus the fac-
tors against which to measure project objectives 
and operations. These differences will be made 
clear in the sections below. 
Finally, the policy context has various combina-
tions of instruments to support the achievement of 
policy objectives. Among these are providing for 
infrastructure, mainly through public investment; a 
pricing policy which the State claims has been 
conducive to balanced production of raw materials 
and food crops; a monitored price structure for 
agricultural products, inputs and consumer items; 
marketing institutions which have been reconsti-
tuted over a number of years to create a composite 
structure of parastatal, co-operatives and private 
units to increase efficiency and effectiveness; and 
and a fixed rate of exchange which has had contro-
versial effects on export promotion. 
Additional elements are the provision for tech-
nical, extension, research and credit facilities mainly 
through public institutions and establishing-or 
encouraging-irrigation; schemes for multiplecrop 
harvests; wooing outside investment through the 
Investment Act; discouraging absentee landlordism 
and land speculation through the Land Acquisition 
Act; a land tenuie base of stateland, reserves, and 
trustland regulated by applied English landlaw and 
local statutes (such as the Natural Resources Con-
servation Act, Lands and Deeds Registry Act, Town 
and Country Planning Act, Land Survey Act and the 
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Land (conversion of titles) Act). Tariffs, import 
control and the allocation of foreign exchange have 
proved important instruments for stimulating im-
port substitution projects. 
The interplay of these policies and policy instru-
ments provide sufficient conditions for the growth 
of smallholder outgrower schemes and contract 
farming based on one or a combination of the 
following forces: · · 
• a competitive situation amongst marketing or 
processing enterprises whose sole purpose is 
either to protect or promote the sources of their 
raw materials 
• a situation in which an enterpri8e is moved by 
profit margin either to curtail production costs 
arising (or likely to arise) from its direct in-
volvement in production or to take advantage of 
low-cost smallholder labour 
• a deliberate programme under which the State 
(alone or in partnership with private investors) 
undertakes to selectively promote certain crops, 
or target certain categories of the rural commu-
nity or agro-ecological areas for specific crops 
to satisfy internal demand or promote a 
fied export base. The two case studies in this 
paper are a result of this condition_. 
Legal framework 
Sugar. The KSC is owned by four investors who 
havejointly suQi;cribed sha!es of25 per cent each: 
. Zambia Sugar Company (ZSC), DevelopmentBank 
of Zambia (DBZ), Barclays Bank of Zambia (BBZ) 
(Lusaka Trustees), and the Commonwealth Devel-
opment Corporation (CDC). The company's opera-
tions are subject to five legal agreements. First is the 
Investor's Agreement between KSC and the Gov-
ernment of Zambia (GRZ), ZSC, DBZ, BBZ and 
the CDC. Second are theLoan Agreenientsamount-
ing to K 40 million4 between KSC and CDC; be-
tWeen GRZ (on behalf of KSC) and Africa Devel-
opment Bank (ADB); between KSC and DBZ; and 
between KSC and BBZ. The Sugarcane Purchase 
Agreement between KSC and ZSC is the third legal 
agreement. This commits ZSC to purchase all stan-
dard cane produced by KSC; establishes the price to 
be paid as 115 per cent of ZSC's average cane 
production cost for that year; and fuys down regu-
lations on cane quality, delivery schedules, pay-
ment for by-prOducts and phytosanitafy controls. 
· The fourth regulation is the CDC Managing 
Agency and Consultancy Agreement. This agree-
ment was mutually terminated by the two parties on 
31 December 1986. There are, however, still some 
expatriate. staff on secondment from CDC funded 
by the Overseas Development Agency (ODA). Fifth 
is the Cane Farmers Agreement, signed between the 
smallholders· and the company. The agreement 
comprises regulations forfarmers, their obligations 
and those of the company. The farmers' regulations 
agreement stipulates standards for cultivation, irri- . 
gation and re-planting of cane, the control of the 
dwelling area and other matters relating to the 
.farmers' settlement. The company holds title to 
both cane and dwelling areas. The smallholders 
have annual leases with automatic renewal as long 
as: 
• the farmerremains solvent 
• KSC remains solvent 
• the farmer proves him or herself to the satisfac- . 
tjon of the company to be a gqod and diligent 
farmer and has not contravened the terms of the 
agreement or regulations · 
If KSC wishes to terminate the tenancy agree-
ment permanently, the company serves a notice of 
intention for one to three months. If the farmer 
wishes to terminate it, the Company is supposed to 
be given a month's notice before the plot is vacated. 
The termination of the agreement is automatic on 
the farmer's death if no successor was nominated 
by the farmer. However, the nominee's admission 
is a prerogative of the selection committee. Com-
pensation-which should be settled within 90 
days-is calculated on the basis of unexhausted 
improvements on cane and dwelling areas under-
taken with prior knowledge of the company, stand-
ing cane, deductions accruing from damages to 
installed property and unpaid charges or loans. · 
· Cotton: Lintco is owned by the government 
. with the Minister of Finance holding the issued 
share capital. While the government has been the 
major source of fimµ1ce, the company enters into 
legal concessions with various financial institu-
tions for long and short-term loans. These sources 
for finance have included the Development Bank of 
Zambia for short-term loans ·and overdrafts for 
seasonal operations guaranteed by the government· 
Lintco was receiving subsidies from the govern-
ment up to 1985. 
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The two categories of cotton growers-com-
mercial cotton and basic seed growers-have dif-
ferent legal status in their relationship with Lintco. 
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The majority (98 per cent) are smallholder farmers 
growing commercial cotton. Farmers may grow 
cotton for this category upon expressing their inten-
tion to the extension agent. The agreement is basi-
cally concerned with the loan package and does not 
have any punitive clause in case of default or 
defraud. With no rigid conditions of eligibility, 
large-scale farmers are also considered under the 
system as smallholders if the are interested in grow-
ing cotton by setting aside a portion of their farm for 
the crop. 
The second category involves individual and 
group contract farmers under Lintco's Seed Divi-
sion. According to the Basic and Certified Cotton 
Seed Contract, the farmer is bound through pay-
ment of the registration fee to: 
buy the basic seed only from Lintco . 
grow and grade the crop in accordance with the 
regulations 
abide by all instructions given by Lintco seed 
officers or government seed inspectors 
adhere to the Seed Act regulations regarding 
seed production 
give the official agents free access to the cotton 
field to take samples for quality 
destroy any area of cotton field in excess of 10 
per cent of the allocated land area 
complete picking by mid-August and deliver 
the whole harvest to Lintco' s ginnery or depot 
For its part, the Company binds itself to: 
supply basic seed 
take care of registration and control according 
to the Seed Act regulations 
buy all seed cotton produced which meets the 
standards in force 
Farmers are obliged to destroy crop residues by 
a certain date, failing which they are struck offas 
seed growers. Disputes that may arise from the 
contract are resolvable by mutual discussion or by 
arbitration under the Arbitration Act 6 
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Crop production and processing 
system . 
Sugar. The KSC is highly mechanized, with 
centrally-controlled irrigation systems and a strict 
management approach, combined with tight con-
trol of smallholder behaviour. 'l;'he management 
maintains that this "high-impact" strategy is the 
best possible option given the need to bring land 
into production as rapidly as possible considering 
the output requirements expected of KSC; that the 
system is well proven on commercial estates and 
applied with success on smallholder cane projects 
in Swaziland and Kenya; and that it is uncertain 
whether an alternative production technology-
possibl y of lower cost and more labour intensive--
would be feasible in KSC's circumstances.7 
The production system involves clearing, level-
ing and ripping, and constructing roads and irriga-
tion works by heavy machinery using local contrac-
tors. Seedbed preparation and collecting, loading 
and transporting cane to the factory are mechanized · 
and carried out by the company. Irrigation, fertiliz-
ing, weeding and control of pests and diseases are 
tasks normally carried out by the farm families. 
Several other demands for family labour input are 
made by the management when need arises. These 
tasks are carried out under close supervision of 
extension officers assigned to supervise smallhold-
ers. The company reserves the right to carry out 
tasks on the cane area during the production cycle 
and charge the costs to the farmer's account 
Each farmer is allocated 4 hectares for growing 
cane and a further 0.5 hectares for dwelling and 
growing rainfed crops in a village cluster. Farmers 
can only grow recommended varieties of cane. No 
other crop is· allowed to be cultivated in the cane 
area 
The Company keeps a labour force of more than 
700 permanent and temporary employees on both 
the nucleus estate and smallholders' plots. The 
management cites technical reasons for not leaving 
tasks of harvesting (burning and handcutting) or 
transportation to smallholders, in order tO uphold 
the required cane quality. 
Cane is milled at the adjacentNakambala Sugar 
Estate which has the capacity to mill 2.5 million 
tonnes of cane--a maximum production of some 
200,000 tonnes of sugar per annum. 
Cotton. Lintco recommends a land-intensive 
approach for optimal resource allocation. To this 
end the company provides a standard cotton pack 
consisting of seed, insecticide and sprayer. The 
packs can be obtained on credit or by purchase, the 
amount required determined by the size of the 
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cotton field. 
Most of the fanners use a combination of draft 
power and hand tools and depend on both family 
and hired labour. The of crops to grow and 
land-use patterns are left entirely to the fanners' 
discretion. Usufructural rights under which cotton 
is grown by the majority of fanners are embodied iii 
the traditional land tenure system. 
Producers of seed cotton are assigned limited 
land area to ensure good husbandry and spread the 
task to encompass many fanners. This limitation, 
however, does not apply to overall land use and 
cropping patterns. Seed production quantities are 
pre-determined by the company to avoid wastage as 
shelf-life for seed is short. Lintco employs seeds 
officers to supervise the whole production cycle. 
The yield per fanner is assessed and estimated as a 
precaution against adulteration and admixtures. The 
price for basic seed is higher than that of the 
commercial cotton Seed. In the 1987 /88 season, for 
example, basic seed fetched K 5.00 per kilogram, 
compared with K 3.00 kilogram for commercial 
cotton seed. 
Seed is only purchased in mid-August to ensure 
that commercial cotton is not added to the seed crop 
and that seed is ginned early enough to allow for de-
linting and testing by the end of September so that 
seed distribution can start in the second week of 
pctober. 
Lintco gins commercial cotton for the local 
mills and markets at its plants in Lusaka and Eastern 
provinces. A plant in Mumbwa, financed by Lonrho, 
has a capacity of 16 million kilograms and gins 
solely for export An additional capacity of 16 
kilograms of seed cotton is being installed at 
Gwembe by a consortium of private investors_ under 
_ the Gwembe Development Company. Lintco is a 
minoritypartnerin both theGwembeandMumbwe-
ginneries. 
Nature of firm, growers and 
contracting relationship 
Lintco's operations are biased toward peasant 
cultivators as fann families or co-operators. The ' 
company has designed and implemented produc-
tion and marketing strategies that have encouraged 
smallholders to enlist as cotton The rela-
tionship between growers of commercial cotton _ 
and the company is made up of a loose sysiem of 
mutual benefit, where the grower has an assilred 
market and access to company services. Fanners 
-are recruited by expressing their interest to exten-
sion officers and can opt out of growing cotton at 
will. Nevertheless, as long as .they grow cotton, 
' fanners have to get their inputs from Lintco, follow 
cultural practices as recommended and sell orily to 
the company. 
In the absence of a'legal contract to cover cases 
of default, the company seeks to recover loans from 
fanners through mutual arrangement with other 
marketing or lending institutions and through ex-
tension agents who trace the defaulting growers. 
Lintco has been encouraging the formation of 
-fanners groups. These groups, so far, are in the 
company's interest as they are within reach and 
participate iri a delivery set-up for services it offers 
to fanners. The company has had plans to organize 
Village Business Communities (VBCs) as an ap-
proach for grouping smallholders through which it 
can: 
• contract cotton growers to Undertake input sales, 
marketing and transportation of produce to 
Lintco depots on agency basis 
• provide extension services together with a pro-
vision to second a Lintco Depot buyer for 24 
months to enable the VBC to gain experience to 
undertake operation on its own. 
• extend loans since the Socio-economic cohe-
siveness of the group would be enough for 
liability, replacing the property-based collater-
als which was found to be inappropriately far-
fetched for peasants 
However, in its administrative structure and 
objectives, this approach has <;onflicted with the 
operations of a more encompassing primary co-
operative society. It is, therefore, unlikely to be 
imple_mented in its entirety. Lintco's relationship 
with seed growers takes on a tighter twist with most 
provisions weighed against fanners, as described 
earlier. The contract is rigid and only punitive to the 
producer in the event of default or misdirection on 
regulations; The company justifies this position by 
claiming that seed production is a highly special-
ized technology upon which a particular future crop 
depends for variety and purity. Thus growers must 
adhere to specific production requirements which 
are imposed by the Act through the Seed Certifica-
tion and Control Institute (SCCI). 
Seedfannersarepaid-upmembersoftheZambia 
Seed Producers Association (ZSPA). The ZSPA -
. represents all its members at meetings to discuss the 
development and future of the cotton industry and 
engages in the negotiations and fixing of producer 
prices. Currently, the Association, the government 
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seed inspectors and Lintco are reviewirig the con-
tract to reduce the bias against producers and to 
allow them more say in the contract. However, 
organizing smallholders to this end has been slow. 
It has been alleged that most of the members are 
illiterate or semi-illiterate.8 
The KSC' s system of recruitment and induction 
ha5 a number of stages. Applications from prospec-
tive farmers are invited through press advertise-
ment and announcements by 10<'.al authorities. The 
company then considers basic qualities required of 
the applicant. The applicant must be Zambian, 
middle-aged in good health and physical strength, 
have a reasonable-sized family for assisting him on 
the farm but with a limited number of dependants. 
The applicant must also have agricultural experi--
ence·and interest, adequate arithmetical ability, be 
used to working in a disciplined environment, have 
drive, determination, initiative and be of good 
character and prepared to settle atKaleya and work 
in a disciplined environment. 
The selection process then proceed into four 
distinct phases, involving: 
• preliminary screening by the management 
first selection interview, conducted by a Selec-
tion Committee consisting of the District Gov-
ernor, four chiefs from within the province, 
District Land Use Officer, District Agricultural 
Officer, Personnel Officer of the ZSC and the 
KSC General Manager 
six months training programme 
second. Selection Committee interview 
A prospective farmer has to go through these 
stages and is considered an applicant until_ he is· 
confirmed. A trainee farmer works in a gang of 
twenty-five as a general worker on induction for at 
least six months on Estate cane. He will work on 
aspects of production such as planting, weeding, 
fertilizing, irrigation and drainage, pest and disease 
control, cane cutting and trash clearing. The trainee 
farmer must report for work daily, perform satisfac-
torily, learn and get used to the demands of sugar-
cane production and the necessary self-discipline 
and imposed discipline. 
In addition, trainees have a iliree-hour class-
room discussion each week on particular topics of 
cane husbandry, farm management and budgeting. 
They are paid as general workers both for field and 
classroom work. A confidential report is prepared 
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for the Selection Committee on each trainee's per-
formance. This report is used as a reference for the 
final selection. 
Once confirmed, the farmer is to abide by the 
regulations: 
• The farmer must cultivate only cane on the cane 
area, according to recommended husbandry, 
and sell all cane to KSC. · 
• · No third party is allowed to cultivate any crop or 
permit any person other than his immediate 
family to live on the scheme. 
• The farmer should not carry out any construc-
tion without prior knowledge of KSC. 
• He must avoid any activity that can be of disas-
trous consequences ornuisance or annoyance to 
KSC or the neighbourhood. 
• He must assist in such undertakings that are for 
the security of the scheme, such as fighting fires. 
• He must allow company employees free access 
to both cane and dwelling areas to carry out 
supervisory, repair, maintenance or production 
tasks. 
• The farmer must pay rental·and other charges 
for inputs and services such as extension, re-
planting, harvesting and transportation. 
• Neither cattle, sheep nor goats may be kept at 
the scheme. 
Smallholders are formally on a one-year lease. 
They are allowed to draw monthly allowances from 
KSC until the first harvest Farmers cari, if they 
wish, sell their labour as casual workers for which 
the company pays them casual wages. The farmer 
builds his dwelling house according to the com-
pany's specifications. 
KSC provides all the infrastructural support for 
irrigation water to the cane area and repair and 
maintenance work to the irrigation system. The 
company supplies seed cane, replants, harvests and 
delivers cane to the mill. Due dates for these tasks 
are given in a notice to farmers to make certain that 
they ·are present when company employees are 
working on their plots. KSC operates a current 
account between the farmer and the company for 
records on charges to the farmer and proceeds from 
the sales of cane. 
There seem to be no penalty clauses with regard 
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· to the company's responsibilities to the smallhold-
ers. The company, for cannot be held 
responsible for any damages resulting from its 
routine maintenance of the irrigation system nor is· 
it held liable for any loss resulting from incomplete 
harvest owing to such reasons as insufficient matur-
ity of carie. Whereas the farmer is expected to pay 
his charges on a timely basis, the company exoner-
ates itself from being obliged to pay the farmer on 
schedule. · · 
The smallholders have an association which 
handles and presents all their problems to the 
company management. They are also represented 
on theBoardofDirectors. The Cane Farmers Agree-
ment stipulates that. KSC is committed to devising 
a system whereby, in due course, the farmer, to-
gether with smallholders, "shall participate in 
the ownership" of the company and "not to remain 
- solely as a licensee of Kaleya" and that it is the. 
"intention of the parties hereto that the farmer shall 
become a member of a co-operative, or an associa- . 
tion, or such other body as Kaleya considers is the 
appropriate means whereby the farmer may so 
participate". These provisions are yet to be imple-
mented. 
Distinctive Features 
Social policy has been instrumental in imple-
menting and promoting cotton and sugarcane pro-
. duction. However, at Kaleya production targets 
have been the main determinant of management 
· structure, the production technology favoured, in-
ve8tment plans m;id support services to farmers. In 
comparison, Lintco, has demonstrated a strong social 
purpose. Both companies are subjected to pressures 
to meet national consumption needs, produce ex-
ports to earn foreign exchange and provide a means 
for other compaQies (private and government) to 
realize their foreign exchange retention quotas. 
Both camps of farmers are subject to monopc)ly 
powers of the two companies on the choice of 
technology, sources of inputs, crop varieties, mar-
keting and returns. This has a substantial influence 
on the farmers' behaviour with or without contrac-
tual arrangements. 
Lintco assumes an open and evolutionary ap-
proach thereby maintaining a socio-economic fab-
ric of primary relationships and obligations en-
shrined in traditional mores and set-up. This ap-
proach provides an indeterminate internalization of 
technological packages, based on a secure tenure 
and a production system dependent on individuals' 
independent decisions. The KSC approach . as'-
. sembles individuals to form a socio-economic.fab-
ric based on Secondary contacts characteristic of 
mddem sector workplaces. This closed system is 
resulting in dependence on a monoculture and farm-
ers' subjugation or organizational manipulation · 
and insecurity. 
The various institutions and agencie& linked to 
the two companies constitute an important inter-
vening variable due to their impact on performance 
criteria which, as far as possible, are reduced to a 
"joint purpose" objective. While the two compa-
are directly responsible for task and relation-
ship behaviour· with farmers,.both the KSC and 
Lintco are linked to other institutions who deter-
mine (or have a major influence on) the output 
quality, prices and allocations by direction (export 
or internal) and volume. isc and the financial 
stitutions have authoritative presenc;e in KSC .op-
erations while Lintco is subject to.demands made 
upon it by MA WD, the four local mills and chenii- . 
,cal suppliers, such as Hoechst.. These linkages as-
sume national or associational interests and thus 
have a questionable effect on returns to_ farmers. 
The proportion of import content in the opera-
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Table 2: Sugarcane Production at Kaleya, 1983-87 
Year Smallholders Production (tonnes) 
(no.) Smallholder Estate Total 
1983 30,028 30,028 
1984 8 4,706 126,368 131,074 x 
1985 8 3,155 219,139 213,294 x 
1986 86 46,199 139,965 186,164 
1987 147 72,219 157,706 229,725 
Source: H.I.M Siridele, Kaleya Smallholders Ccmpany Limited: Its Objectives and Operations. Paper presented to the National 
W mkshop on Contract Faining and Smallholder Outgrowe:r Schemes in Zambia, February 1988. 
lions of the two companies make them vulnerable in 
a country faced with acute shortage of foreign 
exchange. Lintco, for example, has experienced 
late consignments of chemicals and debilitating 
pressure resulting in their changing chemical brands. 
In this situation either the farmer is at a disadvan-
tage or the company bears more management and 
operational costs in extension needed to implement 
the changes. 
Evaluation of Performance 
Crop production 
Lintco has been acclaimed as one of the success 
stories in the promotion of agricultural develop-
ment in Zambia. On this account it was directed to 
promote coffee and soyabeans in addition to its 
cotton operations. The general upward trend in 
terms of number of growers, hectares planted and 
production levels indicates the stride$ made by the 
company in cotton production (fable 1). 
At KSC, by 1987 sugar production had sur-
passed the annual target to supply 200,000 tonnes of 
sugar cane to the ZSC. This goal has been attained 
using only 84 per cent of its irrigable land (fable 2). 
Unfavourable climatic conditions have been 
singled out as the major factor preventing Lintco 
from meeting its targeted production levels. 
For example, in 1981/82 the late arrival ofrains 
led to late planting; the crop was further subject to 
unfavourably heavy rain towards the close of the 
rainy season.9 
Inadequate supply of inputs has also been cited 
as a constraining factor. In the 1983/84 season the 
company was forced to sell sub-standard planting 
seeds on account of high demand. The Lintco an-
nual report for 1985/86 points to the inadequate 
supply of planting seeds. 
In some cases the failure to secure the required 
amounts of bulk chemicals from suppliers has 
compelled the firm to use alternative insecticides. 
Late delivery of inputs has also been cited as a 
stumbling block. 
A number of cons.train ts have been identified in 
the cane production system: delays by contractors 
in completing projects and costs exceeding the 
budget. The production system is highly sensitive 
to foreign exchange shortages which may lower 
yields regardless of smallholder efforts. 
Welfare aspects 
Outgrower schemes and food production. A 
critical concern in the promotion of contract farm-
ing and outgrower schemes is their possible impedi-
ment to food production. Most out-grower schemes · 
have emphasized production of non-traditional cash 
·crops. In the Zambian case of cotton, the "contract" 
does not specify the amount of land that should be 
devoted to cotton or other crops. 
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The tenure system does not pose any problems 
to the majority of growers, whether the issue addi-
tional land needed for expanding plots or the gen-
eral occupation of crop and animal husbandry. The 
family size, types of implements used and access to 
extra-household labour are the three most impor-
tant determinants of land-owning patterns and vol-
ume or diversity of crop output. The majority of 
smallholders consider cotton growing as a neces-
sity in addition to subsistence food crop production. 
The company provides no assistance to the grower 
other than services for cotton production. 
· In terms of land use and crop patterns, maize 
accounts for the larger share of planted area and is 
also a major cash and food crop. this is partly due to 
price variations among crops. For example, the 
price of maize is currently 1,200 per cent higher 
than it"was in 1979, while the corresponding rise in 
the price of cotton is 783 per cent. The wider access 
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to credit' for maize, through the Cooperative Credit 
Scheme begun in 1986/87, also contributes to in-
creased maize production. 
In comparison, the KSC approach impedes food 
production. In the management's view, food crops 
allowed to be cultivated on the dwelling plots are 
not intended to satisfy subsistence food require-
. ments. The company considers smallholders as 
cash crop farmers and thus provides no support 
services to their food crop plots. The farmers are 
expected to gain their livelihood from the cultiva-
tion of cane.10 
Smallholders, however, hold different views. In 
addition to expecting an adequate cash income, the 
farmers attach high priority to producing their own 
food. 11 Furthermore, Ellman points out that mecha-
nization of major parts of the production system and 
mono-cropping of sugarcane on the irrigated land 
leaves the smallholders' family labour under-util-
ized for much of the year.12 This implies that food 
production could be boosted if impediments were 
removed. 
Food production at KSC is further constrained 
by the poor soils on which .the dwelling land is 
situated. It is estimated that, on average, the farmers 
require at least 1.5 hectares of rainfed land or 0.5 
hectares of irrigated land to meet their household 
food requirements. 
From the above we can conclude that contrac-
tual arrangements that do not link land use and crop 
choice are not likely to impede food production. 
Indebtedness. The cotton outgrower scheme 
does not pose any serious problems of indebted-
ness. Unlike the KSC, the cotton scheme does not 
fundamentally alter the position of the farmer. The 
KSC scheme, however, moves farmers to desig-
nated smallholder plots. With a time lag between 
planting and first harvest, the company is therefore 
compelled to provide incomes to assist farmers-
invariably an aspect of indebtedness. 
In the cotton scheme, cotton is simply intro-
duced as an additional crop. Lintco is under no 
obligation to provide for the growers' livelihood in 
the interim period. 
Technological aspects 
Extension. The efforts of Lintco have greatly 
improved the farming skills of cotton growers. The 
major contributing factor being the extension serv-
ices provided by the company. Though the com-
pany does not have a large staff of extension work-
ers, the arrangements whereby the Department of 
Agriculture seconds extension staff to Lintco has 
proved effective. In 1986 there were a total of 277 
extension staff seconded to Lintco. They rank from 
Provincial Cotton Extension Officer · to Cotton 
Demonstrators. To assist the extension officers are 
1,080 contact farmers. Contact farmers are a kind of 
intermediary class with lower status than extension 
officers but conversant with details needed by the 
. small farmers and available for consultation in the 
village where they re8ide. Unlike extension agents, 
contact farmers are not mobile nor are they remu-
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nerated. · 
As an incentive, the extension officers seconded 
to Lintco receive allowances and are provided with 
transport in addition to their departmental salaries. 
The incentive package offered to the Department of 
Agriculture staff seconded to Lintco seems to 
motivate them to work harder. The majority of the 
farmers feel that Lintco extensionists offer better 
services than government agents not seconded to 
Lintco. The mobility ofLintco extension staff augurs 
well for the extension services provided. The Ka-
leya project, on the other hand, relies on its own 
extension staff. 
Inputs development. Lintco produces its o.wn 
seed. Since 1985, th_e company introduced a zonal 
system of seed production. Under this system all 
growers in specific areas are recruited as seed 
growers. This helps to avoid contamination of the 
seed crop and improves the supervision of growers. 
In collaboration with the agriculturalresearch insti-
tutions, the Seed Certification and Control Institute 
and Zambia Seed Company, the Seed Multiplica-
tion Division of Lintco spearheads seed develop-
ment KSC has its own nursery from which two 
different varieties of cane are raised for the nucleus 
estate and smallholder plots. There is need for more 
work on developing cane varieties resistant to smut 
infestations. 
With respect to chemicals, bothLintco and KSC 
depend on imported inputs. This dependence may 
have negative impacts on cotton and cane produc-
tion largely due to the country's lack of foreign 
exchange. Delays in obtaining supplies and impor-
tation of substandard chemicals have been experi-
enced. In 1979/80, for example, Lintco was forced 
to purchase for the first time a different insecticide 
(pyrethroide) due to supplier inability to secure 
enough quantiµes of the regular chemical. 
Implements. Another aspect of technological 
issues relates to the implements used in the farming 
operations-especially the ownership of the imple-
ments and the terms of acquisition. Since the only 
implementLintco provides is a sprayer, acquisition 
of other implements used in the farming operations 
depends on the availability of credit from other 
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sources &nd the fanners' own resources. 
Provision of implements has been a concern 
among the cotton growers. Farmers would like 
Lintco to provide them with farming implements. 
Though not as a direct response to the fanners 
demands, Lintco and Lonrho fonned in 1987 a 
tractor hire company which is currently confined to 
Mumbwa District. This is not surprising consider-
ing that Lintco and Lonrho have stakes in the 
Mumbwa ginnery. It is in. their interest to raise the 
production of cotton inMumbwasoas to service the .. 
16,000,000-kilogram capacity ginnery. 
Effectiveness of the technological package. 
Effectiveness of the extension services and techno-
logical aspects of the Lintco scheme can at best be 
judged on the basis of output per hectare. Taking 
into account weather conditions, one notices a 
general increase in the output per hectare (Table 3). 
However, the effectiveness of the KSC techno-
logical package seems spurious for two reasons. 
First, the KSC supervisory function is suspect: If it 
is true that the fanners are under strict supervision, 
how then does one explain the different output per 
hectare, and the decline on the estate and small-
holder plots? Output per hectare is higher on the 
estate (Table 4). The management attributes the fall 
in production per hectare experienced after 1984 to 
failure to fertilize and weed. Indeed, the smallhold-






unsupervised to work their cane fields. 
. The second reason is that the highly mechanized 
production system may increase fanners' costs due 
to machinery breakdown as wear and tear start 
taking effect 13 
Marketing aspects 
The Lint Company of Zambia is the sole mar-
keting agency for seed cotton. To facilitate its input 
supply and marketing functions, Lintco has set up 
depots in all cotton-producing areas. The depots are 
set up along the lines of Provincial Cooperative 
Unions which, with Namboard, are responsible for 
the bulk of agricultural marketing. Although the 
depots are widespread, fanners face problems in 
transporting their produce from the farming areas to 
the depots. Providing transport to the depots would 
therefore enhance cotton production. 
With regard to cane marketing, the farmer is 
required to sell all cane to Kaleya. The company for 
its part agrees to endeavour to arrange the cane 
harvesting and delivery to the mill but accepts no 
liability if, for reasons beyond its control, it is 
unable to. Clearly this clause creates insecurity on 
the part of the fanner. · 
KSC markets cane produced a.t Kaleya . An 
agreement between KSC and ZSC commits ZSC to 
purchasing all standard cane produced by Kaleya. 
The agreement also establishes the price to be 
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paid-115 per cent of ZSC's average cost of cane 
production for the year in question-and lays down 
regulations on cane quality, delivery schedule, 
payment for by-products and phytosanitary con-
trols. Ellman observes that the absence of any 
formal institutional procedure for negotiating on 
price payments and controls and for arbitration is an 
unsatisfactorily aspect of the agreement. 
Another aspect of marketing relates to the pay-
ment mechanism. Prompt payment augurs well for 
any marketing arrangement. Farmers are generally 
pleased with the payment procedures. However, 
delays by the company may have an impact on the 
growers. The delays, which the company attributed 
to administrative errors, ranged from four to eight 
weeks. Due to these delays farmers obtained inputs 
for their other agricultural activities late, as well as 
having had problems supporting their families. 
Smallholders at Kaleya are paid for their cane 
less the cost of inputs and services provided by 
KSC. The farmer is paid for the cane in two stages: 
first, a month after delivery of the cane to the 
factory, and again in July following the year of 
harvest. Adherence to this schedule depends on 
timely payments by ZSC. The costs incurred up to 
the time of harvest are deducted from the payments 
and cover: credit (cash) and inputs (fertilizer, 
tractors.water, etc.); rent; administration charges; 
extension charges; replant charges; and interest. 
The payment clause under the cane farmers' 
agreement is highly weighed in favour of the com-
pany. For instance, a farmer is obliged to meet any 
payment due within thirty days with a 10 per cent 
interest imposed on overdue debts. When the pay-
ment is due from Kaleya to a farmer, Kaleya en-
deavours to ma:ke prompt payment with no mention 
of interest on delayed payments. Although there has 
been no incident of Kaleya failing to fulfil its obli-
gation, the imbalance between regulations govern-
ing the farmers' and company's behaviour is strik-
ing. It is, therefore, not surprising that the farmers 
have reservations regarding the imbalance inherent 
in this clause. 
Credit aspects 
Access to credit gives the farmers the opportu-
nity to increase their production levels. The provi-
sion of inputs on credit by both Lintco and KSC has 
gone a long way towards increasing cotton and cane 
production. However, Lintco credit is limited to 
chemicals and insecticides, sprayers, seeds and 
packing materials. Farmers are therefore compelled 
to look elsewhere for credit, particularly loans for 
obtaining farm implements. 
The performance of agriculture credit institu-
tions in the country has not been satisfactory due to 
the limited supply of loanable funds and the ten-
dency among these institutions to demand collat-
eral. In these circumstances farmers have no option 
but to continue using a low level of technology. 
Clearly,Lintco'sadjustmentof its credit package to 
include providing implements will benefit both the 
company and the farmers. On the other hand, the 
highly mechanized production system at Kaleya 
compels the KSC to provide services pertaining to 
implements. 
.Currently, Lintco faces problems in loan recov-
ery owing to its scanty contract and its dependency 
· on mutual arrangements with other marketing and 
lending institutions. 
Benefits and risks 
Lintco buys seeds from the farmers and the· 
farmers receive inputs on credit from Lintco. The 
seed is processed into lint and fuzzy cotton seed 
which is sold to the textiles and oil processing 
companies, respectively. Surplus lint and fuzzy 
seed is exported. The producer price for cotton is 
fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Development as provided for under the National 
Agricultural Marketing Act.14 The prices for lint 
and fuzzy seed are fixed by Lintco upon negotiation 
with the iiser industries. Input prices are determined 
by the company. The Lintco Inputs Division adds a 
mark-up which they contend covers the costs of 
handling the inputs. Since Lintco does not charge 
interest on credit, a proportion of this mark-up may 
as well be some form of hidden interest. 
To determine the apportionment of benefits 
. accruing from the cotton development programme, 
one must consider the input, producer and sales 
price variations. This reveals that the price structure 
is highly biased against the farmer. While producer 
prices rose by 46 per cent between 1978 and 1986, 
prices for inputs, lint and fuzzy seed rose by be-
tween 67 and 335 pet cent. 
93 
The erosion of grower benefits is further dem-
onstrated by examining the incomes and expendi-
ture in their cotton operations. In 1985 the average 
income of the growers was K 1,373 against an 
average expenditure on inputs ofK 125. In contrast, 
the corresponding average income and expenditure 
in 1986 were K 1,418 and K 228 respectively, 
representing a decline in net income from K 1,248 
in 1985 to K 1,190 in 1986. 
The nature of the contract, however, requires 
the company to absorb a greater part of the risk 
involved. Farmers are not compelled to grow the 
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crop. Hence, situations arise where some farmers 
had not grown every season since they registered as 
cotton growers. This has a bearing on loan default. 
In the absence of any legal contract, Lintco can only 
persuade the farmers to grow cotton with a view to 
recovering outstanding loans. The company ex-
tends additional credit facilities hoping that the 
farmer would eventually meet his loan obligations. 
The leniency with which defaulters are treated may 
partially explain why the loan recovery rates have 
dropped from 86 percent during the 1982/83 season 
to 73 per cent in 1985. 
Selling through third parties is the most com-
mon fonn of loan defaulting. One reason is that the 
company deducts 100 per cent of the loan at the time 
of buying the crop regardless of the possible nega-
tive effects of such a measure. Compounding the 
matter further is the fact that loans for soyabeans 
and cotton are treated as one loan where farmers 
grow both crops with Lintco assistance. Thus, a 
loan due for one crop which perfonns poorly is 
deductible from the proceeds of the other crop. It is 
probably due to the high risk involved that Lintco 
has occasionally threatened to take defaulting farm-
ers to court. 
The cane growers incomes on average have 
steadily risen over time. However, closer examina-
tion of income distribution reveals that the average 
picture portrayed is not representative (Table 5). 
The lower income category has undergone both 
downward and upward surges in income. One plau-
sible reason for the huge disparity between the high 
and low income groups is that new entrants to the 
scheme may tend to be less efficient than those that 
have been in'the scheme longer. 
In the absence of the cost structure, a letter 
written by eight "worried farmers" provides some 
insight on the farmers' views towards the income 
accruing from the scheme. In the letter to the Settle-
ment Manager, the farmers protested against what 
they considered very high rental, administrative 
and replant charges and questioned whether the 
project profited the farmers or not. The farmers' 
concern is captured by Ellman' s observation that 
for the project to achieve long tenn viability in its 
present form, overhead and annual production costs 
should be reduced.15 
Organeationalaspecm 
The existence or lack of a growers organization 
is a tricky issue. Effectiveness of such a body, 
where it exists, depends on factors other than the 
management merely offering the opportunity for 
farmer participation. Like most small-scale farm-
ers, the cotton grower· has no forum. Although the 
farmers genuinely believe that Lintco is interested 
in dealing with small-scale farmers, the majority 
feel that establishing a grower's organization would 
be in their interest. The farmers' judgement is cor-
rect, especially regarding representation of their· 
interests. For example, Lintco pays a bonus to its 
employees whenever it makes a profit. This benefit 
should be questioned since it is not extended to the 
farmer. The growers would want an association to 
provide a forum for sharing ideas, organizing credit 
unions and providing implements. 
Some of the farmers perceived the "contact 
farmer extension approach as a type of growers' 
association-insofar as the farmer shares his cotton 
growing skills with others. 
Unlike the cotton growers, cane farmers have an 
organization which handles and represents their 
problems to the company management. In addition, 
the smallholders cane producers are represented on 
the Board of Directors. The existence of a represen-
tative system alone does not indicate much about 
how beneficial it is to the smallholder. This is 
especially so if the management continues to stick 
to "Dos" and "Don'ts" of the contract without 
shifting position on those points of social and eco-
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nomic disadvantage to farmers. In this case farmers 
under KSC are not better off. 
Although the terms of the KSC Contractual 
. Agreement are weighted against the farmers, it is 
important to note that the company has not yet felt 
the social pressures that would arise with a larger 
number of smallholders. The number of smallhold-
ers stood at 8 in 1984 and 1985, increased to 86 in 
1986 and 146 in 1987. For its full development 
phase, KSC is expected to have 291 farmers taking 
up two-thirds of the schemes' area. 
Replicability 
The replicability of contract farming and small-
holder outgrower schemes can be considered in two 
stages with each one offering a substantively differ-
ent environment. There is the phase of monopoly 
operations, and that of competitive operations. A 
set of similar determinants for replication would 
yield different results under the two phases. 
Monopoly operations 
This phase is characterized by firms or compa-
nies involved in contractual arrangement being free 
from competition, either due to a low level of 
commercialization of the agricultural sector or 
because companies are protected through state 
policies. Under this phase-such as with the Lintco 
Scheme-"scanty contracts" and a traditional land 
tenure base do not necessarily pose any hinderance 
to the parties involved achieving their basic objec-
tives. Lintco owes its degree of success largely to 
this portfolio. The monopoly position enjoyed by 
the company assures sustained links with small-
holders and cushions Lintco whenever actions are 
arbitrarily taken against the interest of farmers. 
The welfare interests or just returns for their , 
produce are not and cannot be guaranteed with this 
phase for two main reasons. First, the firms assume 
much of the risk involved in promoting crop spe-
cialization and countering imperfections in factor 
and product markets. Contractual arrangements are 
therefore merely compensating for insurance against 
poor products. The second reason is price structure, 
combined with direct or indirect taxes on agricul-
ture which the state often uses to provide for redis-
tribution policies. 
Replication is possible as long as several condi-
tions are met 
• The monopoly position in marketing and proc-
essirig of the promoting agency must be guaran-
teed 
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• Inputs and extension services must be. provided 
· and timely payments made. 
• Farmers' returns must be sufficient to deter 
them from switching to other crops 
• Land-useandcroppatternsforothercropsshould 
be left to the smallholder to determine. 
• Research on seed, chemicals, pests and disease 
control should be developed and localized. 
Competitive operations 
As the sector gets more commercialized or the 
agro-industrial base expands (with well-formed 
forward and backward linkages and liberalized 
marketing and processing structures), an environ-
ment exists for competitive operations. Tight con-
tracts are normally resorted to for guaranteeing the 
market share of suppliers. The potential for im-
proved farmer welfare may be greater under com-
petitive operations in that competing firms are 
compelled to offer better incentives to attract and 
retain farmers. 
Apart from the package of inputs, extension 
services, research and development and sufficient 
returns to farmers, replication is best assured through 
the following additional factors: · 
• Contracts should be tight enough to control 
farmers' behaviour, uphold crop management 
standards and undercut opportunistic behaviour 
against quantity cheating, quality manipulation 
and sales through alternative channels. 
• The firm should have land tenure rights to attain 
the required scale of production, control 
holding and enforce cropping and land use pat-
terns. 
• Credit 'should be provided to sustain farmers 
during the period between first planting and 
harvest and hardship days. 
The Kaleya Scheme is designed on a model of 
competitive operations which compels the com-
pany to commit itself and the farmers to unneces-
sarily high costs of investment and overheads. The 
current environment would adequately supportKSC 
shifting away from such severe and restrictive set-
tler conditions and tight management regulation. 
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Conclusion 
Contract farming and smallholder outgrower 
schemes are a relatively new phenomenon in 
Zambia. Nevertheless, they have been adopted as 
part of the strategy to attain given policy proclama-
tions. The single factor that atiracts smallholders to 
these farming arrangements are the services pro-
vided. The monopoly position enjoyed by promot-
ing agencies vis-a-vis marketing and processing 
compels these agencies to extend services which 
include credit, implements and extension. 
Overall success of these schemes can be meas-
ured against a number of intervening factors. These 
may include the impact of these arrangements on 
food production, the apportionment of benefits or 
risk sharing and production levels. The case studies 
presented here reveal that contractual arrangements 
that limit land use and crop choice may have nega-
tive repercussions on food production. The lack of 
growers' association, characteristic of small-scale 
farmers, subjects them to unilateral management 
decisions of the promoting agencies which may not 
be in the farmers' interest. Notwithstanding these 
. issues, the potential of contract farming and small-
holder outgrower schemes is tremendous. 
The two case studies have demonstrated in 
many ways a higher level of achievement and 
effectiveness in dealing with smallholder farmers, 
technological diffusion and crop output compared 
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This paper discusses contract farming in Zim-
babwe, presenting case studies of sugar, tea and 
cotton production. The term "contract farming" is 
used according to the following definition: 
i) a future or forward market in which a 
buyer or proeessor commits in advance 
to purchase a crop acreage or volume; 
ii) the linkage of product and factor mar-
kets insofar as purchase rests on spe-
cific grower practices or production 
routines arid input and/or service provi- . 
sion by buyer-processors; and · 
iii) the differential allocation of production 
and marketing risk embodied in the 
contract itself.1 
As elsewhere in Africa, the precise terms, con-
ditions, and organization of contract farming in 
Zimbabwe vary considerably. Within Zimbabwe; 
where coritract farming dates back to the mid-
1950s, the institutional nexus of pricing and mar-
keting, as well as the terms of contract marketing, 
also varies among crops. 
The Zimbabwean state controls-at least in 
theory-fifteen different agricultural commodities 
through six separate marketing boards (the Grain, 
Cotton, Dairy, Tobacco, and Coffee Marketing 
Boards, and the Cold Storage Commission). For 
each of these commodities (except tobacco, whiCh 
is auctioned) prices are negotiated between the 
· Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettle-
ment (to which these parastatals report) and pro-
ducer organizations. In contrast, the pricing and 
marketing of all other agricultural products within 
the private seetor is much more varied. 
This paper examines three examples of contract 
farming: cotton and tea produced by outgrowers 
linked to nucleus estates owned and managed by the 
state, and sugarcane ·grown -by large and small 
planters oontracted to deliver their total output to 
the country's two privately-owned mills. These 
studies represent state and private contracting, irri-
gated and dryland production and marketing chan-
nels stretching from state marketing boards to pri-
vate companies. These are only a few of the many 
examples of contract farming in Zimbabwe, which 
include: Burley.tobacco growers in the north-east 
prOducing for a local affiliate of an international 
corporation; horticulturalists in the eastern high-
lands growing vegetables for a local subsidiary of a 
.. different multinational; small commercial farmers 
growing sugar-beans for a large Zimbabwean food 
processor; peasants and a few large commercial · · 
farmers cultivating dryland castor beans for the 
Zimbabwean licensee of another transnational; and 
the future ()utgrowers of a palm-oll project planned 
in the south-eastern lowveld. 
Doubtless there are other, more "private" forms 
of contracting, such as those linking horticultural-
ists and rice growers to supermarket chains, about 
which even less is known. · 
The institutiqDal diversity under which contract 
' farming occurs in Zimbabwe is, in large part, a 
colonial heritage. There are notable gaps in_ produc-
tion and income levels between peasants, small 
commereial farmers, and the really large producers, 
both corporate and individual. Since independence, 
the Zimbabwean government has tried to reduce 
this dualism between peasant and commercial agri-
culture. In s<>me cases, however, such as for sugar-
cane, milk, coffee and tea, the policy of resettlement 
and contracted peasant production has reproduced 
de novo the very dualism which was to be elimi-
nated in other crops, by creating a category of 
smallholders that did not exist in these commodities 
before independence. Political pressures to redis-
tribute the means of agricultural production have 
led to some contradiction between different poli-
cies. Differences in scale of J>roduction are also 
related to different marketing and contracting op-
tions. A contracting- package for small peasant 
farmers may have to include input credits (for 
fertilizer and transport) as well as seed from the 
contracting company. For a commercial producer, 
however, a marketing contract at an agreed pre-
. planting price may suffice to produce the output 
required. 
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In the colonial era, pricing policy for state-
controlled crops was based on capitalist relations 
and costs oflarge-scale production. It is thus impor-
tant to question the assumed viability of small-
holder production which is encouraged primarily 
for political -reasons. Where peasants cost neither 
their own nor their families' labour, such prices 
may initially look very attractive. However, when 
the small producers of cash crops under contract are 
required to use "high-tech" production procedures 
(e.g., aerial spraying of cotton, haulage of tea or 
sugarcane) which are controlled and costed by 
nucleus estates (whether state or privately-owned), 
their very scale of operation may be structurally 
unviable. In Zimbabwe, the question of structural 
viability needs to be examined separately for each 
contracted crop, with its own specific nexus of 
production scale, pricing and marketing procedures. 
Structural viability affects contractors' strate-
gies of participation in the contracting system con-
cerned. Smallholders under contract who are, by 
definition, unviable, adopt survival strategies that 
straddle and manipulate different options (legal and· 
illegal) within the contract framework. These "strad-
dling strategies" inevitably conflict with the rules of 
contracting which are understood-though not 
always explicitly spelt out-by planners, devel-
opers and contract managers. There is a gap be-
tween plans and rules, on the one hand, and con-
tracting practices on the other. Careful investiga-
tion reveals that in practice, planner-managers have 
to adopt a more realistic, laissez faire-type of prag-
matism in applying the rules if these are to fulfil 
their original intent at all. Such pragmatism, how-
ever, also has its own tensions, as the following 
three case studies reveal. 
The Case of Sugar 
Structure of the sugar industry in 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is among the top twelve sugar ex-
porters in the world. Sugarcane is today produced 
under a modem plantation system, although in the 
past it has been both privatized and nationalized 
before passing into foreign control. The plantation 
system includes both large and small planters. 
Slightly less than half a million tonnes of raw and 
refined sugar, over half of which is exported, is 
produced from a little under 35,000 hectares ofland 
owned and/or controlled by three estates. Triangle 
and Hippo Valley estates, both ultimately foreign-
owned but locally-controlled, grow 70 per cent of 
the total hectarage and process all of the cane in 
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their two mills. Their mills have a combined crush-
ing capacity of 20,000 tonnes per day, a "white-
end" capacity of 60,000 tonnes per year, and an 
investment value of over Z$60 million.2 They also 
own the third estate, Mkwasine, and the non-profit-
making, monopsonist Zimbabwe Sugar Sales, re-· 
sponsible for both domestic and international mar-
keting. 
Although planters within the estates benefit 
from the estates' monopoly in many ways, they are 
also organized into the Zimbabwe Cane Producers' 
Association (ZCPA), which defends their interests 
as independent growers against those of the mills as 
processors. Like the estates, millers and refiners, 
the ZCPA has representation on the Zimbabwe 
Sugar Association, formed in 1963 when Zim-
babwe became self-sufficient in sugar production. 
This private association liaises with government on 
all matters concerning the sugar industry, and funds 
its own experimental research station at Chiredzi. 
The government's role in sugar production is 
limited to licensing growers, millers and refiners; 
fixing domestic prices for refined and unrefined 
sugar; and regulating conditions of land and water 
use and employment. The Sugar Production Con-
trol Act (No. 23of1964) makes it illegal to cultivate 
hybridized sugarcane varieties for milling without 
a grower's licence, issued by government after 
consultation with the Zimbabwe Sugar Associa-
tion. 
Production constraints 
Irrigated cane production is highly capital-in-
tensive in Zimbabwe's dry south-eastern lowveld. 
As costs have escalated, indefinite ratooning, at 12-
month intervals, has replaced the six-ratoon-regi-
men of the past. The harvesting season is also 
extended to its maximum, up to the record of 287 
days, between April and November. However, cane 
yields fall off in the second half of the cutting 
season. In addition,the sucrose content (estimated 
recoverable crystal percent or ERC) is so low in 
cane harvested at the beginning and the end of the 
cutting seaion that this cane is not economically 
viable to produce unless it can be offset against 
much higher, mid-harvest ERC values. 
Some 9 5 per cent of the total hectarage is planted 
to a relatively low-sucrose and smut-susceptible 
variety (NCo376) which, however, has the best 
commercial performance under Zimbabwean con-
ditions. Current breeding research may yield a 
better variety in the future. Meanwhile, the disad-
vantages ofNCo376 are partially offset by average 
annual yields ranging from 90-180 tonnes per 
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hectare and an annual sucrose recovery of some 13-
14 tonnes per hectare, in part due to extremely 
efficient milling. Production and marketing effi-
ciencies alone permit Zimbabwe's high-cost sugar 
to compete internationally with the low-cost, rain-
fed producers. The international market is highly 
volatile, with high-fructose com syrups replacing 
sucrose,5 and absorbs over half of Zimbabwe's total 
sugar production. 
Organization of cane production 
On ·the three estates, irrigation, planning (of 
both cropping and cutting), providing power and 
water, monitoring the use of these resources, and 
transporting the cane, are the responsibility of the 
central agricultural administrations. 
Each of the three estates is sub-divided into. 
sections of 300 to 800 hectares. Each section (with 
an average of35-40 "fields") is a semi-autonomous 
production and accounting unit, with its own work-
ers' village. However, the sections do not fund the 
costs of their own capital (or welfare) development. 
The housing, irrigation infrastructure and ha.ulage 
are paid for as well as planned by the central estate. 
In contrast, planters fund their own welfare and all 
overhead costs incurred on their behalf by the 
estates (including, for small planters, extension 
advice). 
The smallest production unit is a "field", deline-
ated by the central estate. Estate fields range in size 
from 3 to 30 hectares and average 13 hectares. 
Fields are smaller on the 50 to 150 hectare farms of 
large planters, averaging 4 hectares. Yields from 
different fields in the same section vary enormously. 
The differences in sugar content at different 
stages of the harvesting cycle are averaged out by 
cutting fields from each section and each large 
planter each week. Production is oriented com-
pletely to economies of scale and the meticulous 
scheduling of all production sequences. The precise 
dates for cutting each field are planned in advance 
each year, and are varied only by central estate 
decisions in conjunction with the milL Estate sec-
tion managers organize, but do not decide, irriga-
tion, cutting and transportation schedules. Large 
planters accept weekly quotas issued to them by.the 
mill and organize their own cutting accordingly. 
The plantation system uses labour sparingly, 
even though cutting is a manual operation. Cutting 
bonuses vary, starting at a daily summer quota level 
of four tonnes of cane, but in winter (June-August) 
cutters regularly cut up to 9 tonnes daily. Some of 
the permanently-employed cutters sub-contract 
"helpers", who may be kin or foreign refugees. As 
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minimum wages have been raised since independ-
ence, the estates have improved agricultural labour 
efficiencies and 3,000 permanent jobs have been 
lost from the estate system. · 
Planters within the estate system 
A little under 20 per cent of the total cane land 
within the estates' boundaries is owned by planters, 
whose title deeds contract the owner of the land to 
produce cane. However, many planters also operate. 
poultry, aquaculture, and vegetable enterprises from 
their homes, especially the small ones whose 0.5 
hectare residential plots are spatially separated from 
their caneholdings. The three estates in 1987 incor-
porated 55 large planters (growing 50 to 150 hec-
tares of cane each) and 141 much smaller planters, 
whose holdings average 10 hectares (from 8.8 to 
11.3 ha.).4 By the end of 1988, another 50 small 
planters will have been settled, totalling 191 plant-
ers working approximately 5 per cent of the cane-
land. These 10-hectare units are actually sub-divi-
sions oflarger, 30-hectare fields in the estate irriga-
tion network.5 They are being purchased freehold, 
over twenty years, at a cost of Z$2,000 per hectare 
plus interest. This figure does not quite cover the 
estate's costs of bringing the land into cane produc-
tion. 
All planters are contracted to deliver their total· 
output to their "parent" mill, the large planters 
having annual quotas divided into weekly units. 
One mill relies much more heavily than the other on 
planter cane and.is consequently stricter about the 
precise scheduling of planter deliveries. A mill-
gate price is applied only to the large planters. The 
transportation of estate sections' cane is a central 
charge, and the two mills share the costs equally of 
tailing in all the cane (from sections, large and small 
planters alike) from the third estate, which goes 
equally to the two mills. This mill-gate price means 
that only the large plaqters must bear the costs of 
transporting their own (cane to the mill. The system 
scheduling the very accurately forecasted yields at 
the mill means that only a miniscule fraction of the 
cane is ever rolled over to the start of a new crushing 
season. 
crushing fee for planters is 35 per. cent of 
sucrose value, based on the average sugar price 
realized during the season. Payment is made in part 
on delivery, with the remainder spread out over 
roughly 18 months, or as long as it takes to sell the 
sugar. All cane from each planter, large or small, 
must-like the sections' cane--be ERC-tested as 
well as weighed on delivery to establish the precise 
quantity of sucrose. There is some dissatisfaction-
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· especially among the large planters-with the crush-
ing fee, although all planters also receive their 
proportionate share of the crushing by-products 
(especially filter mud used to build up poor soils and 
stillage waste from the distilleries, used as fertil-
izer) and the monetary value of "their" molasses 
and 
The small planters face particular structural 
difficulties, both specific and general. Essentially, 
the cane smallholders' structural problems arise 
from the fact that they are expected to approach 
yields which depend on economies of scale which 
are, by definition, not available to planters of their 
size. They were settled in fulfilment of the colonial 
government's stipulation that 40 per cent of their 
estate area must be privately settled. Mkwasine is 
50 and 75 kilometres from the two mills which split 
the cost of transporting its cane. However, this 
estate's producers still face higher transport costs 
for inputs. The new Zimbabwean Government in-
sisted on settling African smallholders, to spread 
· the perceived financial benefits of cane production 
more widely, instead of the 80-hectare holdings 
originally envisaged. Many of these settlers, se-
lected by government, had no previous experience 
of cane production. The cane smallholdings, as sub-
divisions of the field units with which the estate 
sections normally work, very soon ran into specific 
problems. · 
Each individual, IO-hectare, sub-field holding 
is cut (as part of the field itself) all at once. Half of 
them are, therefore, by definition structurally unvi-
able, because they are cut during months when the 
sucrose content is below break-even level unless 
averaged out peak-season levels. This prob-
lem was not foreseen in the planning of the small-
holder scheme. A formula has now been accepted, 
with. some reluctance, by the small planters to 
equalize the different ERC yields and remove the 
specific. structural unviability of those sub-fields 
cut early or late in the season. This formula actually. 
allows for exceptional performances (above or below 
the long-term stable average for a particular month) 
to be reflected in the sucroSe "earnings". It is 
complicated to administer and is resented, particu-
larly by those who give, rather than receive, the 
benefit. , 
From its 1980 peak, the international sugar price 
fell far below that on which the smallholders' 
general viability had been predicated. Simultane-
ously they failed to reach the average yield of 120 
tonnes per hectare required to break even, thus lead-
ing to poor relations between the estate and its 
settlers, in whom ithadinvestedconsiderable money. 
During this period, the small planters depended on 
their sideline activities to guarantee their household 
subsistence and repayinent of their settlement al-
lowances. In 1985, these settlers formed them-
selves into an input cooperative (not a producer co-
operative) to obtain access to marginally cheaper-
by 0.5 per cent per finance from the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation. As they over-
came their financial difficulties, the relationship 
between planters and estate management improved. 
The entire system of growing and milling cane 
is based on large scale-efficiencies crucial to Zim-
babwe's high-cost system of production. This sys-
tem depends not only on irrigation but also on 
extending the crushing season to its maximum 
limits, despite unviable sucrose levels for half of 
this total period. Even the largest and the best 
individual planters find it difficult to achieve a IO 
per cent net profit (on direct costs of Z$400, 000 to 
grow 150 hectares of cane) especially if they work 
marginal soils. Many large planters own other agri-
cultural enterprises in addition to their cane farms, 
having diversified to spread the financial risks of 
producing for an international market The small 
planters, whose cane holdings and residential side-
lines are their only farming investments, are there-
fore more vulnerable than either the estates or the 
large planters. In 1987 small plantersneededZ$800 
per month to cover their direct input costs alone. 
Should a fourth, state-owned, sugarcane estate and 
mill be established as planned, even smaller-scale 
contracted peasants on such an agro-industrial es-
tate would compare themselves unfavourably with 
estateemployees,andrightlyso. Today's minimum 
agro-industrial wage of overZ$165 per month, plus 
the benefits of estate employment (free housing, 
domestic power or fuel, water, transport, health 
care and primary schooling) mean that unskilled 
workers on the two processing estates· may be 
slightly better off than the small, IO-hectare, sub-
field planters on the third estate. The position of 
even smaller cane growers would be substantially 
worse than that of estate workers. 
The Case of Tea 
Tea production in Zimbabwe is dominated by 
large-scale private and state-run plantations. A 
number of both planned and spontaneous small 
outgrowers are associated with these estates. Estab-
lishing tea is an expensive and labour-intensive de-
velopment and the returns only begin to mature 
after several years. A plan for narrow tea-based 
rural incomes will in the initial years create unbear-
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able costs in terms of lack of cash and related 
insecurity. Tea development for smallholders has 
to be seen within the context of a wider and neces-
sarily diversified household income strategy. This 
is especially so in the context of the tea develop-
ment that is taking place withm the Communal 
Lands. As regards the future structure of the tea 
industry, there is considerable interest in further 
promoting smallholders. 
As an agricultural commodity, tea is completely 
dependent upon its immediate post-harvest proc-
essing in specialized. factories. In contrast to inte- · 
grated estates with plantations and factorie8, out-
growers are completely dependent upon the de 
facto monopoly of their local tea-processing facto-
ries. There are no alternative green leaf markets nor 
small-scale rural processing systems for tea. Es-
tates which control the upstream agro-processing 
become the sole buyers of an often directly-pro-
moted outgrower component of green leaf produc-
tion. As such, they represent a clear example of the 
core-satellite situation in which, in Zimbabwe, the 
outgrowers have neither a co-operative nor share-
holding interest in the factory. 
Current structure of the tea industry 
Zimbabwe's share of the world tea trade is 
microscopic. The gross national production of 
manufactured teas would only satisfy two to three 
days' consumption on the world market. Within 
Zimbabwe, the production share controlled by the 
outgrowers is small and likely to remain so in the 
near future. 
Our case study is drawn from the Pungwe Val-
ley (or Katiyo) Estates, a state farm run by the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority 
(ARDA). The factory, which processes the state 
plantation's and the outgrowers' green leaf, annu-
ally produces 800 to 1,000 tonnes of processed tea. 
This represents 6 per cent of the national estimated 
production of 14,000 tonnes. The outgrowers' share 
of this output in the Pungwe Valley region is ap-
proximately lOto 14percent(l00to 140tonnes}-
a small proportion of the national production. While 
there are outgrowers associated with the other locus 
of the tea industry in Chipinge, it is safe to say that 
outgrowers are an insignificant part of Zimbabwe's 
tea industry as it is currently structured. In terms of 
numbers of producers, the Katiyo outgrowers are 
equivalent to 0.1 per cent of the Kenya Tea Devel-
opment Authority (KIDA) scheme. 
Evolution of outgrowers at Katiyo 
Pungwe Valley Estates emerged from one of the 
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activities of the Tribal Trust Land Development 
Corporation (TILCOR) which was established in 
the mid-1960s. (TILCOR operations came under 
ARDA' s control afterindependence ). These estates 
are made up of both the plantation and the factory at 
Kati yo and the plantation at Rumbizi. The latter is 
a separate section currently producing about one-
third of the green leaf. 
Failure to establish 
a smallholder tenantry 
TILCOR's attempt to establish a tea outgrow-
ing tenantry failed, and the established tea has 
subsequently reverted to the status of plantation tea 
under estate management. The reasons for this 
failure are not clear but were likely a combination 
of a highly-restrictive tenancy contract, probably 
modelled on other TILCOR contracts; the collapse 
of security in the early 1970s as that part of the 
country moved into full-scale war;6 and long delays 
involved in recouping the costs of establishing the 
tea and viable full-time tea-growing tenants as 
planned. A failure to appreciate the short- to me-
dium-term costs (labour, foregone incomes, and 
negative cash flows) that the tea enterprise imposed 
on the tenants, may have generated short-run struc-
tural unviability. 
The war in the 1970s had a profound impact on 
the local economy. Only 9 of the 85 outgrowers 
interviewed had entered tea production in the 1970s. 
Half of the currently-registered producers deliver-
ing tea to the factory have entered tea production 
since 1980. All this post-war and post-independ-
ence development has taken.place on the Commu-
nal Lands adjacent to Pungwe Valley estates. 
Tea outgrowing 
on CommunarLands 
. AtKatiyo, lOto 14percentofthefactory's1987 
output was based on the proouction of 144 regis-
tered producers who were cultivating about 140 
hectares of rainfed.tea of mixed age.7 In addition to 
the 144 registered producers (those currently deliv-
ering green leaf to the factory), the outgrowers 
section of ARDA had registered the development of 
137 new tea nurseries by 1985/86. These were 
administered by ARDA and financed by the Agri-
cultural Finance Corporation (AFC). Credit for 
another 200 nurseries (capable of establishing 
another 200 hectares of tea) had been issued in 
1986/87. There has thus been a significant sponta-
neous development of smallholder tea plantings on 
the Communal Lands adjacent to Katiyo Estates. 
Given the failure to re-establish the tenantry, this 
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pattern of development suggests that it may have 
been the tenancy contract, rather than the pro-
duction of tea as a commodity that was unaccept-
able. There is now considerable interest in tea 
production on land more securely under the grow-
ers' control, and within the strategy for wider rural 
incomes. 
Tea contracts 
The "contract" for these more autonomous 
outgrowers of the 1980s, while not written and 
signed, is nonetheless cemented in the conditions of 
sale of green leaf to the Katiyo factory. I tis based on 
what is called the "Chipinge formula" which ap-
pears broadly to replicate the KTDA system. The 
growers are given a fixed first payment based on the 
weight of green leaf collected and a second variable 
payment based on the sale price of the manufac-
tured tea as it is auctioned on the world markets. A 
transport charge and an administrative and exten-
sion services levy is charged, estimated to be as high 
as 30 per cent of the value of green leaf delivered. 
Transporting green leaf is a costly activity for 
scattered outgrowers, particularly given the sea-
sonal pattern of leaf deliveries. Small amounts of 
the crop (7 per cent of total harvest) are delivered 
initially in August-September; between December 
and March monthly deliveries amount to 14 to 16 
per cent of the harvest. The deliveries then tail off 
over the period of May to July. For five months of 
the year the transport system is required to deliver 
a meagre 14 to 20 per cent of the annual crop, 
compared to 80 to 86percentofthecropin the five 
months from December to April. This pattern of 
crop distribution is also demanding on the factory 
and labour requirements. 
From the point of view of the growers, estab-
lished tea is still attractive as compared with many 
other annual crops because farmers receive a vari-
able but monthly income for eight to ten months of 
the year. · 
The recent dynamic and rapidly-developing tea 
outgrower component of the Pungwe Valley Es-
tates has emerged out of the rejection of the initial 
attempts to establish an outgrowing tenantry under 
very close and paternalistic control. This has subse-
quently evolved into a relationship whereby the 
peasantry is freely electing to put some of its land 
under tea in the context of the communal tenure 
system adjacent to ·the estates. This development 
represents an important diversification of the eco-
nomic activities of these participants rather than a 
narrow mono-cropping as under the tenantry model. 
Moreover, outgrowers are combining this ex-
pansion of tea with a wide range of agricultural 
production (including maize, yams, rice, ground-
nuts, beans, millet, sugarcane, cassava, bananas, 
guavas, pineapples, coffee, green leafy vegetables, 
tomatoes and onions) as well as other non-farm 
sources of income. For example, a quarter of the 
currently-registered outgrowers claimed that their 
first primary source of income came "off the farm 
holding" (as labourers, employees, and self-em-
ployed persons in the local rural economy). Half of 
the households claimed that their second main 
source of income was "off the farm holding". The 
85 outgrowing households that were interviewed 
claimed to have in aggregate 40 non-resident 
members employed elsewhere who regularly con-
tributed economieally to the rural household. Off-
farm opportunities in formal wage employment are 
structurally restricted, and only a·small proportion 
of rural households are economically diversified 
off-farm.8 However, where household members 
with off-farm employment are present, they have a 
profound impact on per capita incomes and under-
pin the economic security of rural households. 
The "rules" of participation on outgrower 
schemes tend to impinge on the peasant strategy of 
diversifying incomes, as in the case of the tea 
outgrowers described above. In extreme situations 
the development plans will fail. From the peasants' 
point of view, the TILCOR development was a 
model of land expropriation (in what was a frontier 
zone within the Tribal Trust Land, and we surmise 
here that the tenancy agreement was totally in-
secure and had far too narrow an economic base. 
The Case of Cotton 
The Zimbabwean cotton industry represents 
one of the most remarkable recent developments in 
Africa. In 20 years the value of cotton earnings has 
grown from less than Z$1 million9 to Z$160 mil-
lion. The number of registered cotton growers had 
risen to over 150,000 by 1986-120,000 more 
growers than in 1980, a five-fold increase. The vast 
majority of this growth has come from Zimbabwe's 
Communal Lands where the aggregate impact of 
research, development, extension, and training 
doubled the national average yield from the peasant 
sub-seetor within a 4-year period (now at 
mately 920 kgs. per ha. under rainfed conditions). 
This development in production has been accompa-
nied by the development of a marketing network of 
depots and transit depots to serve the rapidly ex-
panding, but more remote, peasant sector. 
While cotton has a long history in Africa, the 
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development of the Zimbabwean cotton industry 
since the mid-1960s carries its own historic and 
institutionally-specific features. All cotton produc-
ers in the country fall under a nationally co-ordi-
nated system of cotton marketing, controlled by the 
parastatal Cotton Marketing Board (CMB). The 
CMB regulates the sale of all seed to all registered 
growers; the intake of all seed-cotton from farmers 
at state-set prices; processing through ginning the 
seed-cotton into lint and cottonseed; and marketing 
of these products locally and on export markets. 
Only one of the nine gins in the country is operated 
by a private company as an agent of the CMB. 
Irrigated cotton outgrowers 
and the cotton industry 
In the 1985/86 season the CMB took in 250,000 
tonnes of seed-cotton: 110,000 tonnes came from 
the Communal Lands, 105,000 tonnes from the 
commercial farming sector, 22,000 tonnes from the 
ARDA estates (i.e., estates and outgrowers) and 
12,000 tonnes from the small commercial growers. 
The 230 outgrowers associated with the two 
state-run irrigation schemes that were studied 
(Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi) are a tiny fraction 
of all cotton producers. They'are, however, unique 
in their position as tenants on state land and in terms 
of their scale of operations ---6 to IO-hectare irri-
gated holdings. The modal land holding underrain-
fed conditions in the Communal Lands is around 
1.69 hectares.10 The cotton outgrowers studied repre-
sent an even smaller fraction of Zimbabwe's cotton 
industry than the tea outgrowers, partly because the 
Zimbabwean cotton industry has developed so 
rapidly, but also because the proportion of the 
national crop produced under irrigation is relatively 
small. Moreover, the agro-ecological potential for 
rainfed cotton is vast compared to tea. 
Cotton outgrower schemes 
Access to means of production (a package of 
irrigated land, credit and other services)-rather 
than access to a critical post-harvest processing 
facility or an assured market through the CMB-is 
crucial to the contract between cotton outgrowers 
and the ARDA estates. Until 1985, outgrower cot-
ton was marketed through ARDA. In the absence of 
local AFC offices, ARDA also administered credit 
on behalf of the AFC. The core estates recouped 
credit, interest charges, and other costs of produc-
tion incurred on behalf of the growers. However, 
with the post-independence administrative expan-
sion of CMB activities, outgrowers now deal di-
rectly with the CMB when marketing their crop. 
The cotton producers studied paraJlel the diver-
sified incomes strategy observed among the tea 
outgrowers. However, within the context of the 
tenancy agreements there is much more subterfuge 
involved. The strategic behaviour of the cotton 
tenants, in most cases, provides legal grounds for 
their eviction. Half of the fifty tenants were evicted 
from the Middle Sabi scheme in 1985. 
Participation in these two schemes involves a 
formally-signed contract The agreement broadly 
covers the tenancy on state land and adherence to 
the rotation (winier wheatartd summer cotton, both 
irrigated), rights to and obligations to pay for hous-
ing, water, electrical pumping and extension and 
administrative services. Tenancy status can be 
withdrawn for practices which diverge from the 
formal rules. It also includes an explicit restriction 
on non-farm activities and a full-time farming pres-
ence on the scheme. This last point is where many 
farmers' practices diverge from the formal rules of 
participation. From the point of view of the out-
growers, this seems to be necessary, rational, and 
indeed essential. · · 
At Chisumbanje most of the outgrowers are 
local. After fifteen years, a large majority of the 
tenants continue to have land and homesteads in the 
immediately adjacent Communal Land (the major-
ity within 50 kilometres). This very marginal land, 
well outside the limits of "safe" dry land cropping, 
nonetheless supports a high-risk arable agriculture 
(including cotton) and livestock. Thus, subject to 
the rains, the tenant outgrowers also undertake both 
dryland farming and livestoc,k husbandry. 
A striking feature of these schemes is the com-
paratively high degree of polygamous households 
with wives and homesteads on and off the schemes. 
Polygamy explains why the yields of one of the 
long-standing growers had suddenly fallen from 
being one of the best on the scheme. The grower's 
second wife (trained at the Kadoma cotton training 
centre, a hardworking and experienced irrigated 
cotton farmer) had been "evicted" from the scheme 
by a third new wife. While financed from the profits 
of cotton, the new wife unfortunately knew nothing 
about irrigated cotton and was not hardworking. 
The second wife moved off the scheme to set up a 
third hearth-hold on the husband's adjacent dry land 
operation. Tenancy is clearly only a part of a wider 
income strategy which includes both dryland and 
non-farm activities. 
Households permanently resident in semi-arid 
to near-desert climates are likely to have a much 
higher dependence on non-farm and off-farm sources 
of income, other things being equal. If irrigation de-
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velopment schemes aim to recruit local people 
(such that they can benefit from a more secure 
irrigated agriculture), it is quite logical that many 
prospective tenants are likely to be in business, 
trade or otherwise self-employed, rather than being 
"farmers". Thus beneath the smoke-screen of"full-
time farmer", the diversification strategy persists. 
Tenants continue, in the social context of polyga-
mous marriages (which serve to straddle the 
schemes), to operate businesses, be involved in 
local employment, have household members in-
volved in a wider regional labour migrancy, and 
practice dryland crop and livestock farming. 
By 1983-84 large debts began to accrue for 
some Middle Sabi growers. It was not possible to 
ascertain the reasons from ARDA records. ARDA 
reassessed the viability of both schemes and re-
viewed the current charges. ARDA was concerned 
with whether it was subsidizing the outgrowers in 
any way. Provided all real costs of ARDA are 
recouped and that the tenants achieve an income 
margin at least equivalent to an agricultural mini-
mum wage, the schemes have been deemed vi-
able.11 Disaggregated, the ARDA figures reveal 
that many outgrowers, despite large turnovers, are 
failing or just breaking even after delivering tonnes 
of cotton and wheat to the marketing boards. 
One explanation for this behaviour is that since 
1985 the repayment of seasonal loans through the 
stop-order system has involved linking the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB), the CMB, and the AFC 
computers. This had resulted in enormous delays in 
payments to the farmers-a problem felt through-
out agriculture. These delays consolidated the ra-
tionale of a "parallel" marketing strategy. The ten-
ants who receive large amounts of credit (linked to 
their CMB numbers) for their 10-hectare irrigated 
cotton farms, shorten these delays by selling a 
proportion of their cotton through CMB grower 
numbers other than their own. A fair proportion of 
their irrigated cotton crop is sold through a close 
relative.' s CMB grower number which is free of any 
AFC credits. 
This is possible because (a) there are many more 
dryland than irrigated cotton enterprises, and (b) 
many of these enterprises are financed without 
formal credit The net effect is that growers get 
some of their cash back within three months of 
harvesting (as opposed to nine months). Their offi-
cial yields, productivity and financial situation, as 
recorded by the CMB through their "personal" stop 
order number, presents an incorrect record of their 
crop performance. 
Some farmers who are more directly dependent 
upon their tenancy for their income, have done this 
simply to improve appalling cash flows. They need 
cash to live, pay school fees and meet other recur-
rent expenses. Strategically they aim through their 
parallel marketing to ease their cash flow problems 
and at the same time maintain their credibility with 
ARDA and the AFC from y_ear to year despite their 
apparently "poor" farming performance. Others 
have naively· gone too far (such as bartering exces-
sively large proportions of their cotton crop to a 
middleman for a new car) and have subsequently 
been evicted. The eviction of half of the tenants at 
Middle Sabi has left large sums of money yet be 
accounted for by the administration. For those ten-
ants who remained, the prospects of punitive de-
ductions for all accumulated debts in a single sea-
son or year further fuelled the parallel marketing 
strategy. 
· ARDA head office, probably under pressure 
from the AFC, has subsequently told the estate 
management that these outgrower losses will sim-
ply have to be deducted from estate incomes. This 
has given rise to a new situation in which indebted 
tenants may get locked into the schemes. The estate 
management ensures that they will not be evicted 
until they have farmed their way out of their debts 
(under close supervision). This involves some crea-
tive accounting as ARDA is letting settler debts 
accrue to the ARDA estate while maintaining the 
growers' credit-worthiness with the AFC. Detailed 
crop forecasting of the outgrowers' cotto,n harvest 
has been carried out to prove the existence of, but 
ineffectively police, the parallel marketing. 
· The breakdown of communications between 
the tenants and the management appears to have 
had a domino effect in which causes and effects 
have become progressively ·more confused over 
time. This has been compounded by a degree of 
administrative discontinuity, especially a high turn-
over of settlement officers and, to a lesser extent, 
other ARDA staff. While we were unable to locate 
any of the evicted tenants, we understand that the 
original tenancy agreement included an option to 
buy the land after a two- to three-year probationary 
period. This option was resurrected for all growers 
when new agreements were signed by incoming 
tenants in 1985. Subject to a satisfactory probation, 
a large proportion of the growers should be able to 
begin to purchase their lands sometime in 1988. 
The first round of major arrears on the scheme 
in 1982-84 resulted from tenants withholding rent 
in anticipation of approval of their right to purchase. 
This situation became ossified, ending in what was 
deemed a necessary and substantial change of ex-
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ecutive and administrative staff on the Middle Sabi 
scheme. Two years of rent arrears rapidly turned 
into three years of rent arrears as new staff grappled 
with the current year's crops. Poor and non-existent 
records hampered their understanding of the situ-
ation in the preceding years. The discovery of the 
rent arrears and other misconduct led to the eviction 
of twenty-five growers in 1985. 
Conclusion 
The definition of contract farming given by 
Watts and Little at the beginning of this paper can 
be scrutinized in the light of the study's data pre-
sented here. · 
Isaforwardmarket necessary to contract farm-
ing? For Zimbabwean sugarcane, it is. Although 
milling is based on extremely accurate crop projec-
tions, the system is quite flexible for planters be-
cause they comprise so small a fraction of total 
production. However, despite the seasonal j:>eak of 
the aggregate harvest for tea, for the outgrowers at 
Katiyo the answer is no. Current factory capacity 
exceeds total deliveries of green leaf. The ARDA 
plantations are being expanded to close this gap 
between deliveries and processing capacity. How-
ever, as is the case with the sugarcane planters, the 
system is likely to remain quite flexible for tea 
outgrowers, given their small share of total produc-
tion. 1f high quality is to be sustained, and until 
processing capacity is stretched, the harvest-
ing of the green leaf will continue to take prece-
dence over any forward contracts. 
For cotton, where the prediction of yields is less 
accurate, a forward market is not necessary. ·Al-
though the monopsonist parastatal Cotton Market-
ing Board has a weekly quota delivery system, 
everything is ultimately accepted. Seed cotton is far 
less dependant on immediate post-harvest process-
ing than either tea or sugarcane. 
Are factor and product markets for contracted 
crops linked by specific grower routines/practices 
and the provision of inputs and services? For the 
· small planters of sugarcane, the answer is yes on all 
counts. The large planters are more autonomous in 
respect of their production, but still depend upon 
estate Services, especially in emergencies. For tea, 
the outgrowers musf satisfy much higher quality 
than the ARDA estate. The outgrowers 
rus0 finance ARDA's outgrower extension advi-
sory, marketing, credit and input services. Linkages 
are thus apparent in' the provision of iriputs and 
credit and in the strict quality control. Among those 
who produce cotton, the answer is no on all counts, 
except for those on ARDA estates, to whom inputs 
and services are supplied. Here the linkage is not 
inherent in the inputs, the crop itself, or its market-
ing, but in the institutional structuie of ARDA 
estates and AFC financing, which apply equally to 
all crops and are specific to the relationships with _ 
organizations. _ 
Is a differential allocation of production and/or 
marketing risk embodied in the contract itself! 
Clearly not for sugarcane, where the contract is a 
conditional clause in the land title, and the monopo-· 
list estate system protects the minority planters. Tea 
production for the outgrowers is based on rainfaII 
(as opposed to the irrigated estate system) and they 
therefore carry a higher degree of production risk. 
In a majority of cases; they are·also dependent upon 
ARDA transport for collection and delivery of their 
green leaf to the factory. The experience at Katiyo 
illustrates, however, how buyer-processors, who 
promote outgrowers as a component of their overall 
operations, also face marketing risks. 
ARDA has provided services and .support to 
establish outgrowers who have subsequently shifted 
their green leaf deliveries to an adjacent private 
sector tea-processing. factory (Eastern Highlands 
Tea Estates). While this shift has only involved a 
few growers (12 to 18) they control approximately 
50 per cent of the outgrdwer production. The main 
reason for this practice appears to be a reduction in 
the marketing cost to the growers. A systematic 
difference in the long-run prices achieved on the 
world markets between ihe two factories could also 
be a motivating factor. (Tiiis was not assessed; 
neither was it put forward as a reason by the out- · 
growers). 
Nor is it true that cotton 'producers, whether 
ARDA tenants or independent growers, are ex-
posed to differential risks. They are all exposed to 
the same ·marketing risk through a monopsonist 
parastatal organization, and roughly similar pro-
duction risks. Irrigated cotton is at less production 
risk than where it is grown on dryland. Yet.there is 
an additional (financial) risk in using AFC credit to 
produce any crop anywhere, posed by delayed 
payout and problematic cash flows, which applies 
to all AFC credit packages and is not specific to 
cotton or outgrowers. · · 
Clearly, the Watts and Little criteria have vary-
ing applicability to contract farming in Zimbabwe. 
At least for the three crops examined, there is no 
overall pattern. The Zimbabwean case studies sug-
gest that a narrow emphasis on the nature of the 
conl!act itself is likely to overlook highly signifi-
cant factors. These factors arise out of the institu-
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tional nexus governing both the production and 
marketing' of specific crops, which would still af-
fect different crops differently even if (for argu-
ment's sake) contractual conditions were identical. 
Of particular importance in the Zimbabwean con-
text are: firstly, the question of the structural viabil-
. ity of different arrangements for financing produc-
tion, and the scales, rather than contracts, of pro-
duction within these institutional nexuses. Sec-
ondly, the strategies that producers devise, in the 
face of such structural unviability, to guarantee 
their households' consumption requirements by 
manipulating their contractual agreements (by 
concentrating on sidelines, diverting outputs to 
other processors, or illegal parallel marketing under 
another name), are important. As yet, contract . 
managers seem not to have formulated their own· 
controls over such contractual breaches, but instead 
have settled into a "blind-eye" approach when the 
controls built into the institutional nexuses do not 
· work as intended. 
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Conclusions 
David J. Glover 
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As the case studies have shown, there is a 
diversity of experience in the region with respect to 
the organization and performance of contract fann-
ing (CF) and outgrower schemes (OGS). This sum-
mary article attempts to highlight some of these 
variations, while at the same time drawing some 
conclusions and policy recommendations that may 
be applicable in a variety of contexts. It identifies 
some of the key determinants of success or failure, 
evaluates performance in several areas and exam-
ines some of the constraints to replicability. It 
concludes with some recommendations for public 
and private sector policy makers regarding the 
design and management of CF and OGS. An agenda 
for future research will be suggested. 
Determinants 
One of the purposes of this comparative study 
was to identify the key factors which determine the 
outcome of a contract fanning situation, particu-
larly the viability of the scheme and the distribution 
of benefits between the firms and its growers. One 
of its main hypotheses was that the nature of the 
crop and the technology used for its production and 
processing were the most crucial determinants. 
As so frequently occurs, the research provided 
only partial support for the original hypothesis. The . 
case studies have identified a great many determi-
nants, so many that it is difficult to identify one or 
two as critical. The studies also demonstrated a 
wide range of experience: crops or land tenure 
systems that appeared to be conducive or detrimen-
tal in one country were neutral in another. In par-
ticular, the "technological determinism" hypothe-
sis was not strongly supported. One complicating 
factor was that the principal contract crop, while 
showing certain common characteristics across 
countries, is often grown in conjunction with non-
contract crops or off-farm income sources that vary 
from case to case. This complicates the analysis 
considerably. 
With these caveats in mind, it is nevertheless 
possible to identify some of the factors which, in 
combination, have an important influence. 
Nature of the crop. Though not of over-riding 
importance, the technology used in crop production 
and processing is clearly significant. Some crops 
are easier to incorporate into smallholder OGS than 
others, while some present particular management 
problems. 
It is clear, for example, that contract production 
of asparagus in Lesotho was aresponse to the labour 
requirements of the crop. Asparagus required fre-
quent and careful attention, particularly at harvest 
time when picking must be carried out very early 
and very late in the day. It is impractical to provide 
this with hired labour or to ensure quality control 
and co-ordinated deliveries with open market sales. 
Smallholder production linked to the factory through 
contracts was the obvious answer. 
Sugar, on the other hand, presents obvious 
management problems resulting from the scale on 
which processing must be provided. In many of the 
cases studied, this problem and others related to 
providing irrigation, co-ordinating harvest and de-
livery and assessing sucrose content were dealt with 
through siµiply assigning most production and 
harvest tasks to the company. In such cases, the 
outgrowers resemble hired workers. In some other 
cases, however, scheme authorities have made ef-
forts to preserve some managerial role for produc-
ers; this usually required fairly elaborate quality 
assessment, control and payment procedures. The 
cases described in this volume provide some inter-
esting examples. Cases outside the scope of this 
study (e.g.; Ellis, 1988, on Fiji) also point to viable 
smallholder sugar systems. 
Another situation in which the cropping system 
constrains the contracting scheme occurs with crops 
that have long gestation periods before the first 
IJarvest In such cases, loans to growers from the 
project authority or the· government are generally 
needed, creating the possibility of serious debt 
problems and barriers to exit. The problem is mini-
mized where farmers have other sources of income, 
as the tea growers of Kenya did. 
In general, the crops most easily incorporated 
into CF or OGS are likely to be those which require 
much highly-skilled labour and provide high reve-
nues per hectare. Crops enjoying significant econo-
mies of scale in pro4uction are less suitable, though 
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imaginative management techniques can sometimes 
compensate. 
Prices and pricing policy. A large and lucrative 
market will obviously increase the viability of any 
scheme. Lesotho's exports of asparagus to high-
income consumers in the European Economic Com-. 
munity (EEC) is perhaps the clearest example. 
Zimbabwe's success in exporting c·onon is another, 
in which the country identified a particular market 
niche and designed a production and marketing 
strategy to fit it. The gains may or may not be passed 
on to b.ut even the potential for benefit 
does not exist without adequate markets. . · 
Where markets are depressed, as in the case of 
sugar, profits for processors or growers are difficult 
to achieve. Government pricing policy cannot alter 
this without a cost. In countries where the sugar 
industry is highly protected (e.g., Kenya), the pros-
perity of the grower or processor is achieved at the 
expense of the consumer. In cases where the retail 
sugar prices is controlled (e.g., Tanzania), low 
consumer prices exert downward pressure on the 
prices processors can offer farmers. The Kenya Tea 
Development Authority (KTDA) exemplifies the 
stimulus that buoyant world prices, free from ex-
port taxes, can provide for an industry. · 
Pricing policy is of such importance in deter-
mining the success or failure of a scheme that it 
often overshadows the.organizational factors more 
easily controlled by scheme managers. More finely-
tuned analysis of schemes, over periods of cyclic 
price fluctuations, might allow us to better separate 
price from non-price factors. 
Land tenure. In a number of Southern· African 
countries, individual ownership of land is not per-
mitted under traditional tenure rules. It had been 
thought that this might impede access to credit, 
since land titles could not be used as collateral for 
loans. Theexperienceis thatcontractfarmingmakes 
land titles unnecessary for this purpose; the crop in 
itself is collateral and the firm or agricultural devel-
opment bank generally deducts a sum for loan 
repayment before issuing crop payments to growers 
(the "stop payment" system). · 
A more frequent problem was the incentive and 
uncertainty problems created by land-use rights of 
insufficient duration or security. Resettlement 
schemes' management may want to facilitate the 
expulsion ofnon-performing farmers by providing 
short leases. As a result; farmers do not feel com-
mitted to the scheme and performance suffers. Lack 
of secure tenure also discourages growers from 
investing in their land. Finally, the buyer faces 
problems of insecure. supply when tenure is inse-
cure because long-term supply is not assured. In 
Tanzania, for example, villages can reallocate land 
among their members and buyers have been unable 
to ensure that any given farmer will be able to 
continue producing the crop in question. 
Access to land has a more general importance as 
well. It affects the barriers to entry and exit for the 
scheme, and access to food crops and off-farm 
income. Many OGS were established as resettle-
ment schemes and outgrowers sometimes find it 
gifficult to leave because land is unavailable else-
where. They continue to participate in the scheme, 
not because the contract is attractive per se but 
because it provides access to land. 
Microeconomic and "macro-institutional" poli-
cies. The Tanzania study brought out most clearly 
the importance of such factors as macroeconomic 
management and institutional stability. Since the 
raison d'etre of CF and OGS is to co-ordinate 
commodity production and processing (frequently 
of perishable commodities), timely distribution of 
inputs and reliable transportation of harvested crops 
is critical. When foreign exchange shortages cause 
shortages of inputs or spare parts, there is little 
scheme managers can do to compensate. Manage-
ment is also difficult when multiple institutions are 
involved, as occurred to some extent in the Zim-
babwe cotton project. In that case, ARDA, the 
Cotton Marketing Board, the Grain Marketing Board 
and the Agricultural Finance Corporation all played 
a role in providing services, credit or payments. 
This situation was so complicated that, until the 
system was simplified, farmers evaded it through a 
parallel marketing system of their own. Further-
more, when responsibilities shift frequently from 
one institution to another, payments and records 
can be misplaced and communication with growers 
is undermined. 
Payment systems. The form in which growers 
are paid can affect their performance. A variety of 
payment systems were revealed in the case studies. 
A common one, which can provide both stable 
income and incentives for timely delivery of high 
quality produce, provides an initial "base" payment 
on delivery, and a later payment based on the price 
in the final market, reflecting quality, seasonal 
premia and the like. This amounts, formally or 
informally, to profit sharing. 
Payments are frequently made net of deductions 
for inputs, loans and services. These deductions can 
often constitute a large percentage of the gross 
price, particularly if they include fees related to 
project activities but unrelated to the contract crop, 
as in Swazi sugar. These deductions were a source 
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of much conflict, some of which could have been 
avoided if their method of calculation and expected 
magnitude had been clearly communicated ini-
tially. 
Finally, who receives the payment is a key 
factor in providing incentives and in influencing 
expenditure patterns. Frequently these are distorted 
when contracts and payments go to "heads of 
household", whilefarm management is carried out 
by women. · 
M oMpoly!monopsony. The degree to which the 
firm is the only buyer of raw materials or seller of 
the final produc;t can have an important effect on the 
scheme's viability and the distribution of its bene-
fits. Normally, monopsony is viewed as detrimental 
to the seller's bargaining power and clearly the 
wide availability of alternative income sources is to 
the growers' benefit. Monopsony is often required, 
however, if the firm is to avoid free rider problems 
such as those which occurred in Kenya where the 
firm's expensive technical assistance to growers 
benefited other buyers. Diversion of production-to 
other buyers when spot market prices exceed the 
contract price is also a significant problem, as in 
Lesotho, when it prevented the factory from draw-
ing on supplies of other fruits and vegetables to 
operate at full capacity. Furthermore, monopoly 
can benefit growers if enables the firm to obtain a 
higher price in the final market and pass a share of 
it on to the growers. 
More generally, any analysis of the effects of 
monopoly or monopsony must be carried out rela-
tive to some standard or alternative, e.g., the struc-
ture of the market before the firm entered. Contracts 
are responses to market imperfections-in a per-
fectly competitive market, with full information, no 
uncertainty, and so on, there would be no need for 
them. This sort of "monopoly" is a reflection of 
underlying market conditions; it is rarely created by 
a contract. 
Barriers to entry/exit. Barriers to entry restrict 
participation in a scheme's benefits while barriers 
to exit can reduce a grower's bargaining power and 
welfare. The availability of alternatives and a cred-
ible threat to withdraw from the scheme provide 
important bargaining power and allow the grower 
to pursue more attractive options if the contract 
conditions decline over time. Barriers to entry and 
exit were found in a number of cases. · 
The most common barrier to entry was the 
limited capacity of the scheme: many had long 
queues of applicants for whom land or production 
quotas were not available. Scarcity of land outside 
the scheme was also a barrier to exit in countries 
such as Zambia and Malawi. This was most often 
the case where OGS had been set up for resettle-
ment puri)oses in land-scarce regions. . 
In Tanzania, legal prohibitions on the uprooting 
of tea were a barrier to exit. The perverse conse-
quences of such restrictions are witnessed by the 
growers' response: neglecting the bushes, but not 
using the land for more productive purposes. In 
Swaziland, lack of tools to carry out farming pre-
vented many growers from leaving the sugar scheme. 
These people had come to the scheme without tools 
through a resettlement programme, and the scheme 
. provided the specialized equipment used for sugar. 
Finally, the Swazi pineapple scheme requiied 
highly specialized cultivation skills which took 
time to acquire. The co-operative preferred to see as 
little entry or exit as possible because of the time 
and cost of training new members. 
The existence of such barriers can make inter-
pretation of data about scheme performance diffi-
cult. For example, a low turnover rate among grow-
ers might indicate satisfaction or it might result 
from high barriers to exit. Conversely, a high turn-
over rate, made possible by low barriers, might 
show a lot of short-term profit-taking by farmers. 
Farmers participation in management. Schemes 
in whic.h farmers played a role in managing the 
scheme, or at least in disseminating information, 
seem to have performed well. In the Swazi cases, 
farmers' organizations allowed good communica-
tiOn of the firm's requirements to growers. For 
·pineapple, a growers' co-operative has actively 
taken over the scheme and runs it well. A similar 
role, with similar positive effects, has been estab-
lished for the growers' co-operative in Lesotho. 
The effective absence of such a mechanism has 
contributed to poor communication about pricing 
policies in Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
Diversification. The ability of farmers to earn 
income from other crops and/or non-farm employ-
ment influences their bargaining power with scheme 
management, their overall income level and their 
exposure to risk. Each of the schemes studied in 
Zimbabwehasatsomepointattempted to restrict its 
growers' activities outside. the contract crop, for 
example allowing them to grow only the contract 
crop on their plot or admitting only full-time farm-
ers. In each case, whether farmers evaded these 
(sugar and cotton) or the scheme be-
came unviable (early attempts at smallholder tea 
projects). There are SOple indications that nutrition 
may also be better in households with diverse 
income sources, though more research would be 




There are two obvious problems in summariz-
ing the performance of OGS in East and Southern 
Africa. Variations in performance from case to case 
make generalizations difficult. It is also difficult to 
define performance standards: comparing these 
schemes to a Fortune 500 agribusiness firm in 
California, to a local parastatal, or to the hypotheti-
cal situation that would exist in the absence of an 
organized scheme, would all give very different 
scores. 
With respect to generalizations across cases, the 
reader is advised to take these assessments with a 
grain of salt, referring to the country studies for 
finer distinctions. The assessments that follow refer 
to the majority of cases and provide, where feasible, 
an indication of variance across cases. 
With respect to the second problem, the implicit ' 
standards employed are, first, a comparison with. 
existing alternatives in the region, most commonly 
government or parastatal extension and marketing 
programs; and second; a judgement about whether 
these schemes could be achieving superior results 
by making better use of existing resources. In most 
of the areas examined below, the assessment is that 
performance is generally good relative to existing 
alternatives, but could be improved. In some cases, 
improvement could be achieved by scheme man-
agers; in others, it would required changes in the 
national macro-policy environment or improve-
ments in the economy. · 
Profitability for farmers. Data on this are not as 
extensive as one might wish, in part because farm: 
ers themselves have poor data. In many schemes, 
numerous deductions from crop payments make it 
difficult for farmers to assess their profit position. 
In most cases, however, farmers express satisfac-
tion with their returns and many schemes have long 
queues for entry, both very clear indicators of the 
net benefits available. 
In Lesotho, returns from asparagus were found 
to be much higher than those from the common · 
altemati ve, maize. Swazi pineapple producers were 
conspicuously prosperous; many even owned cars. 
Malawi had long queues for the tea schemes, and 
Tanzanian-tea also seemed to be profitable, provid-
ing better returns per hectare than coffee. In Kenya, 
tea, tobacco and French beans provided good·re-
turns; sweet com was not as lucrative but had 
compensating advantages in theassuted marketand 
short growing season. , 
The most conspicuous exception to this pattern 
was sugar. In those cases where producer prices 
reflected world prices, growers had initially done 
well with this crop, but are now experiencing seri- . 
ous price declines. Cotton in Zimbabwe was an-
other problem case, where rainfed· farmers of the 
scheme were faring much better than the outgrowers 
who had to pay charges for irrigation and the very 
heavy management structure. 
Payments. Again, the variety of payment sys-
tems is notable and the case studies provide mate-
rial for a more thorough analysis than space permits 
here. It would be interesting, for example, to look 
carefully at the different payment systems used in 
sugar in the region. Sugar schemes in Malawi use an 
equalization formula that takes into account the 
production levels of the farmer, the district and the 
scheme to compensate for variations in local grow-
ing conditions. In Tanzania, growers are paid by the 
average sucrose content of all cane received at the 
factory. Zimbabwe has an equalization formula that 
compensates for seasonal variations in sucrose and 
the different harvest dates affecting farmers. Other 
schemes pay simply by weight, with no allowance 
for sucrose. 
A careful analysis of the costs, administrative 
complexity and incentive effects of each system 
would be worthwhile. An initial analysis yields two 
conclusions. First, schemes with complex equaliza-
tion formulae have generally done a poor job of 
· communicating their rationale to growers; they 
have produced misunderstanding and dissatisfac-
tion more often then good performance or percep-
tions of equity. Second, there is little point in 
providing price incentives to growers for factors 
beyond their control. When the operations that 
affect sucrose content (cutting and transport) are 
carried out by the company, sucrose payments have 
no effect on growers' performance and are a need-
less and· expensive complication. 
Three aspects of payments are of interest to 
growers: the level (producer prices), the basis on 
which prices/payments are calculated, and prompt-
ness with which payments are made. Price levels 
are sometimes under the scheme managers' control 
and sometimes set or influenced by government 
policy. Price formulae are usually set by the scheme. 
As mentioned previously, there is some evidence 
that a system combining a base price with premia 
for quality or timely delivery provides a good 
combination of security and incentives. Prompt-
ness of payments varied considerably in our sample. · 
In most cases, it was quite good; in others serious 
delays occurred. The cases where delays were seri-
ous usually occurred in schemes with complicated . 
relationships among multiple institutions (Zim-
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babwe) or countries undergoing major economic 
stress (Tanzania); the latter probably reflected 
endemic problems more than management defi-
ciencies in the schemes. 
Input supply. Many of the comments made with 
respect to payments apply to input supply. Timely 
supply of fertilizers and agro-chemicals is impor-
tant to growers and is a notorious weakness of 
public distribution systems. The performance of 
OGS systems appears to be somewhat better, but 
cannot overcome serious economy-wide shortages. 
Credit. As in other areas, credit delivery sys-
tems varied, often involving some division of labour 
with public agencies. When schemes provided credit 
themselves it was usually in kind, in the form of 
inputs, payment for which was deducted from crop 
Performance was generally very good, 
with Kenya and Swaziland reporting favourable 
rates and infrequent defaults. For many growers, 
availability of credit was one of the major ad-
vantages or membership in a scheme. Given the 
poor performance of many public and even NGO 
credit delivery schemes, and the on-going search 
for alternatives, the relatively good performance of 
CF and OGS in this area is quite noteworthy. 
Security. One of the principal purposes of con-
tract farming is to reduce risks for buyers and 
growers. Generally the buyers reduce the risk that 
the flow of raw material supplies will not match 
plant capacity. The growers bear the same produc-
tion risks that they would when producing for the 
market (i.e., tho!ie resulting from climatic condi-
tions) while reducing or eliminating their market-
ing risk. A fixed price contract for a specified 
·volume reduces the latter type of risk; a fixed price 
contract for the production from a given hectareage 
virtually eliminates it 
In some of the cases examined, farmers contin-
ued to bear heavy market risks. This was most 
notable in Tanzania, where growers had no written 
contracts and tea processing plants had several 
capacity problems that frequently caused them to 
turn away outgrowers' deliveries. This situation 
was likely to be more serious in cases where out-
growers were marginal, providing only a small 
percentage of raw materials to a plant which relied 
prindpally on output from ' 
In a few. cases, however, security was sufficient 
to compensate for relatively low prices. Green bean 
production in Kenya was an example, where the 
guaranteed market a stable element in 
farmers' income. Depending on local circumstances, 
the contract crop may provide a small but secure 
'income element in .a farm enterprise with variable 
cash flow; in other cases, it may provide a seasonal 
injection of cash into a farm enterprise based largely 
on subsistence. 
Food supply. Generally speaking, when land 
was fairly abundant and farmers had the freedom to 
diversity their crops and income sources, food supply 
was adequate and no special measures were needed 
from the scheme authorities. In Swaziland, for 
example, households produced much of their food 
on family plots outside the scheme, allowing them 
to use their scheme plots for sugar. In Tanzania, tea 
displaced some food crops, but the tea scheme 
stimulated and diversified the local economy through 
road building, expansion of trade and so on, so that 
tea income easily covered food purchases. Reduc.: 
· tion of food supply was most likely to be a problem 
in areas where availability of land was a constraint. 
Research. Generally, OGS are less likely to 
carry out research than to provide extension for 
techniques developed elsewhere. Some technologi-
cal research is done on the Tanzanian sugar schemes 
and elsewhere. Basic technological research on 
sugar in Zimbabwe has produced some important 
breakthroughs. Given the high costs of basic re-
search, it is probably not sensible for schemes to 
elaborate technological research program-
mes. However, the case of cotton in Zimbabwe 
seems to indicate that the payoffs to market re-
search can be very high with relatively mociest 
costs. The outstanding performance of the Zim-
babwe cotton scheme in this respect merits emula-
tion. 
Extension. Virtually all schemes had active 
extension programmes wiqi results equal to and 
usually better than those of national programmes. 
Performance was particularly good in Swaziland. 
However, there are indications that .performance 
could be better. There are signs, for example, that 
KTDA in Kenya is "resting on its laurels" to some 
extent; having achieved quite high quality, the 
Authority is not as aggressive as it could be in seek-
ing out opportunities to raise quality still higher or 
to improve yields. The Zimbabwean cotton service 
had not changed its programme in years or tailored 
. it to different types of farmers; the service was 
useful to new farmers, but did little to help experi-
enced farmers to continue to improve. This scheme 
was also weak in providing intelligence to scheme 
managers; although growers with identical condi-
tions often had very different yields, extensionists 
were unable to explain this or to learn from the 
experience of the more successful growers. 
A variety of extension systems were found in 
the studies. In many cases, some sort of relationship 
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with a government programme is involved. In the 
Malawi tea schemes, for example, the scheme pro-
vides tea specialists while government extension 
agents advise farmers on other crops. In Zambia, 
extensionists were provided by the government 
until recently, but the scheme topped up their sala-
ries and provided transport for them, apparently 
with good results. 
- These examples raise a couple of potential 
problems or questions about the organization which 
are not easily answered. One is the diversion of 
resources from national programmes into the OGS, 
where salaries and facilities tend to be better. If this 
occurs, then good results on the schemes will be 
achieved at the expense of the country's overall 
agricultural performance. Another is ihe long-stand-
ing conflict between crop-specialized extension 
systems and those which service all of the grower's 
crops. Crop-specialized systems have the advan-
tage of permitting specialization and more detailed 
knowledge by the extension agent. The drawbacks, 
of course, are lack of attention to relationships 
among other crops in the farming system and some 
inefficiencies in service delivery as more than one 
agent must travel to service each farm. 
It is unlikely that the debate over single crop 
versus multicrop extension systems will ever be 
completely resolved. However, the case studies 
tend to give more support for multicrop systems. 
Farmers seemed to prefer the farm management 
approach provided by muiticropextensionists (BAT 
in Kenya, for example) and it could be argued that 
specialized extension services are something of a 
luxury in poor countries. 
Finally, a careful assessment of extension pro-
grammes should include a look at their cost. Unfor-
tunately, the data in most cases do not permit this. 
There are grounds for concern about the high ratio 
of extensionists to farmers in some schemes and the 
difficulty of sustaining this or replicating it on other 
schemes.' In Swaziland for example, the pineapple 
and sugar schemes had ratios of 1:65 and 1: 19 
respectively, compared to a national average of 
1:400. 
Management efficiency and cost. The case stud-
ies tended to emphasize farm-level data; access to 
data on management costs was less accessible. It is 
difficult, therefore, to assess performance except to 
note the generally wide range of services provided, 
the extent of the scheme's intervention in farm 
management (in many of the sugar cases, for ex-
ample) and the high ratio of staff to farmers (e.g., 
extensionists in Swaziland). Intuitively, one would 
expect these to be costly and to limit the applicabil-
ity of such systems to lower value crops. This 
subject receives more extensive treatment under 
. "Constraints to Replicability". 
Opportunities for farmer participation. Across 
the board, performance was weakest in the area of 
farmer participation. Only in Lesotho did a strong 
growers' co-operative play an active and expanding 
role in the scheme. Elsewhere, few co-operatives or · 
farmers' organizations were operative. Aside from 
an incipient case in Lesotho, there were no cases 
where the KTDA model of "corporate participa-
tion" had been picked up (i.e., farmers holding 
shares in the venture and seats on its Board of 
Directors). Even in KTDA, there are doubts about 
how much clout the growers' representatives really 
exert on the Board. Much of the poor communica-
tion, and apparently high management costs, that 
surfaced in the case studies can be directly attrib-
uted to lack of farmer participation in management. 
·Constraints to Replicability 
Few of the cases examined were unqualified 
successes; each had some weaknesses and a few 
performed so poorly that no one would want to 
replicate their experience. However, the study did 
reveal many positive elements in most of the cases. 
How can these positive experiences be more widely 
diffused? What eonstrains their wider adoption? 
Management cost and complexity. As men-
tioned earlier, OGS demand skilled managers and 
technicians, who are often in short supply. Main-
taining high ratios of extension agents to farmers, 
co-ordinating harvest and delivery, signing con-
tracts and communicating requirements to large 
number of farmers are all costly. Crops which fetch 
. high prices (e.g., in export markets or protected 
domestic markets) provided margins wide enough 
to cover these costs, but low value basic food crops 
. generally do not. However, basic grains that are not 
perishableanddonotrequirestrictqualityorprompt 
harvesting or processing generally do not require 
contract arrangements. It is therefore unlikely that 
- replication of cash crop OGS to other crops is 
necessary or feasible; the schemes will probably 
continue to fill a relatively restricted niche. 
Market factors and infrastructure. Potential 
profits are greatestin high-value export markets. As 
yet, African participation in such markets is rela-
tively limited, compared with Central American 
producers, for example. Whether new entrants can 
repeat the success of vegetable exporters in Kenya 
· ·and Lesotho will depend on a number of factors, 
including market-related factors arid infrastructure. 
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Market-related factors include awareness of the 
characteristics of consumer and retail demand 
(quality, packaging, seasonality), information on 
technical and marketing innovations of competi-
tors, awareness of tariff and non-tariff barriers and 
preferences, and access to wholesale and retail 
marketing channels· via brokers or multinational 
corporations. 
Infrastrµcture provides another set of constraints. 
Delicate and perishable goods require good roads, 
refrigerated. trucks and storage, and frequent and 
reliable air transport. Distance to the final market is 
an important factor, which can be partly compen-
sated for by better infrastructure in distant coun-
tries, 'but does impose a significant constraint. A 
North African country may be able to ship by sea 
what a Southern African country must send by air. 
Unless the more distant country has offsetting 
advantages or specializes in products with very 
high value-to-weight ratios, distance will limit the. 
range of countries in which export-oriented OGS 
can succeed. 
Land tenure. Land tenure systems which do not 
provide leases of sufficient duratio[\ or security to 
safeguard tenants' investments are not conducive to 
OGS. Nor are systems which provide no means by 
which management can ·sanction or expel non-
performing growers, as in VIF id Swaziland. , 
Pricing policy. One of the reasons for KTDA's 
success in Kenya appears to be the high world 
prices for tel!- and a 1960 agreement that govern-
ment would not impose an export tax on it. Such 
agreements would have been difficult to achieve in 
the 1960s and 1970s, though in today's climate of 
conditionality and enforced liberalization they may 
reappear. Replicating KTDA's success by copying 
its internal organization would not succeed without 
similar pricing policies. · 
Farmers' management skills. Outgrower 
schemes make heavy demands, not only on project 
managers, but on farmers themselves. Illiteracy, 
lack of basic accounting skills, and lack of experi-
. ence in handling large sums of money have led to 
deception or misperceptions of contracting prac-
tices, poor communication o( the scheme's re-
quirements, poor use of cash income generated by 
the project, and other problems. In such circum-
stances, it is tempting for project authorities to 
adopt a top-down centralized management style, 
rather than attempting the more difficult process of 
educating and communicating with growers. 
Policy Recommendations 
Many recommendations as to how to improve 
the design and implementation of OGS are implicit 
in previous sections. Others can be found in Glover, 
1987. This section will make some of these explicit 
and highlight others not alluded to previously. These 
recommendations fall into seven categories. 
Negotiation. In negotiating projects with multi-
national corporations or lending agencies, develop-
ing country policy-makers are often unaware of the 
kinds of bargains that have been struck in other 
countries, or lack experience or information that 
would enable them to participate in negotiations on 
an equal footing. It would be very useful if agencies 
such as the UN Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions or the Commonwealth Secretariat were to 
keep a registry of existing agreements and provide 
advisory services to countries entering negotia-
tions. It has also been suggested that host countries 
develop a code of conduct or Contract Farming Act, 
which would specify certain minimum conditio[\s 
for contracts and provide incentives for investors. 
Monitoring and evaluation. Following negotia-
tions of an initial agreement, government agendes 
frequently tum their attention to other pressing 
matters and do not follow up the agreement's im-
plementation. More careful monitoring of schemes, 
and periodic evaluation, would be beneficial. 
It would also be useful to put into place arbitra-
tion mechanisms that would come into play in the 
event of disputes between growers and processors 
over quality standards, delays in delivery or pay-
ments, defaults on loans, and the like. 
Training. Many of the communication prob-· 
lems that occur between growers and project man-
agers could be reduced by providing s_hort training 
courses to farmers in basic literacy, accounting and 
cash;management. Quasi-training activities, such 
as group meetings to explain contract terms, inter-
estrates, calculation of deductions, anq so on would 
improve efficiency and reduce the likelihood of 
conflict. For local firms wishing to enter export 
markets, training courses in export marketing would 
beuseful.AContractFarmingHandbookforentre-
preneurs and investment bankers would also be 
useful; the handbook might include a checklist of 
key features· (similar to the determinants descnbed 
above) and sample contracts. 
Legal aspects. Land tenure arrangements often 
require modification to make them compatible with 
contract farming, particularly in- perennial crops. 
Land leases, where used, should be of sufficient 
duration and security to provide some incentive for 
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investment by tenants. · 
Contracts should be signed with those . who 
actually manage farm operations. Although im-
plementation and enforcement of contracts is much 
more important that what appears on paper, the 
language and conditions of contracts should not be 
one sided (such as those that impose strict obliga- · 
tions on growers while requiring the firm to "make 
every effort''). Better phrasing of contracts would at 
least improve the scheme's image and avoid dis-
couraging new outgrowers. 
Relationships with national agencies. '.fhe rela-
tionship between the project authority and national 
government agencies for extension; credit and in-
put distribution is often problematic. One of the 
principal advantages of OGS is their frequently 
superior performance in these areas, resulting from 
sniailer scale, specialization, autonomy and other 
factors. It would be wasteful not to take advantage 
of these strengths. Yet duplicating, ignoring or, 
worse still, running down the resources of national 
programmes by drawing away their best people is 
not in the country's best interest. Working relation-
ships should be established which provide for a 
deliberately considered division of labour. What 
this might consist of is difficult to say. One example 
of this type ofrelationship, suggested by Ayako, is 
to rotate extensionists between OGS and govern-
mentagencies. These secondments could be used as 
rewards for good performance in the national serv-
ice and upgrade and refresh staff, who would then 
bring new skills back to their home institutions. 
Pricing policy. It is tempting to regulate pro-
ducer prices in order to provide . growers with a 
"fair" return to their labour. This is rarely effective, 
for several reasons. Setting a fair price is difficult, 
requiring knowledge of costs of productioq and 
demand, and changes in these over time. Even if an 
appropriate price could be set, it is almost impos-
sible to enforce it, since contracting relationship 
involves so many important non-price variables. 
The firm can easily manipulate quality standards, . 
raise the prices it charges for inputs or delay pay-
ments and collect the interest in the meantime. It is 
usually futile to try to police the niany elements that 
determine the effective producer price. 
Although price regulation is generally not fea-
sible, it is possible to make more imaginative use of 
price formulate often the case. Many of the 
behaviours that scheme managers try to 
through directives or contract provisions (e.g. early 
planting, quality control) can more easily be af-
fected by pricing. The country studies provided 
many examples and a good short listing is provided 
by Kirsch: 
... prices calculated according to the state of 
the market (in between the market price and 
a basic price, average prices over a period of 
time, pooling prices), prices taken from 
current market prices (fixed difference to 
market prices, market prices limited to a 
fixed latitude between maximum and mini-
mum fixed prices, average prices taken from 
several quotations) ... 1 
In general, such formulae should be sufficiently 
sensitive to provide clear signals and incentives to 
producers, without being so complicated ·that they 
lead to excessive administrative costs and delays in 
payments. 
The principle of pricing formulae that take into 
account world prices can also be applied to other 
variables. For example, interest rates on outstand-
ing debts can be inversely linked to world or local 
interest rates, so that growers get some relief when · 
rates are extremely high, and pay back more rapidly 
when they are low. Such formulae have been used 
with some success in Indonesia. 
Management. The studies show that at-
tempts to provide very tight centralized manage-
ment are likely to be very costly and forego the 
advantages of farmer's initiative and farm-specific 
knowledge. The more successful schemes have 
been those which use a looser management style, 
which emphasizes: 
farmer participation in project management and 
iiicome, usually through some form of profit 
sharing · 
economic incentives, particularly reliance on 
finely tuned pricing formulate to elicit produc-
tion of desired timing and quality 
This approach involves less reliance on central 
legal and contractual management and legal sanc-
tions and·more on farmers' self interest and eco-
nomic incentives. In principle, this approach should 
reduce the number of staff needed to prepare, monitor 
and enforce contractual obligations; and the adver-
sarial quality of the firm/grower relationship and 
the corresponding potential for conflict. 
Future Research Issues 
There are by now enough case studies of con-
tract farming-in this volume and elsewhere-that 
the marginal return to additional studies using ·the 
same research questions is probably not high. 
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However, more intensive comparative analyses of 
some aspects of the studies, or empirical research 
on different kinds of schemes might well be produc-
tive. Some suggested topics are: 
procedures and criteria used to recruit, select 
and train outgrowers in new schemes, particu-
larly resettlement schemes. Which procedures 
work best? What are the relative benefits of 
drawing on local farmers, immigrants to the 
region or squatters? 
alternative credit delivery systems including 
variations in the roles and relationships of proc-
essors, local agricultural development banks, 
growers and growers' organizations. Have group 
credit programmes, analogous to those used by 
the Grameen Bank, been used successfully in 
contract farming schemes? 
comparative analysis of incentive effects and 
administrative costs of alternative pricing for-
mulae/payment systems 
comparative study of sugar, including costs of 
production, payment systems, national pricing 
and import substitution strategies 
case studies of projects that have failed and 
disappeared or been converted to estates 
case studies of contract farming in poultry and 
livestock. 
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